Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

881.00/12–947

The Consul at Rabat (Pasquet) to the Secretary of State

top secret
No. 192

Rabat, December 9, 1947.

Sir: I have the honor to refer to my Secret despatches No. 176 of September 16, 1947, entitled “Test of Power between Resident General and the Sultan”, and No. 185 of November 14, 1947, entitled “Continued Tension between Sultan and French”,¹ and to report to the Department that Mr. Abdelatif Sbihi came to me on behalf of His Majesty the Sultan. He started as an introduction to repeat more or less in the same words the reasons previously reported for the indefinite postponement of the cornerstone laying for a school at Marrakech and inauguration of a school in Rabat by the Sultan. The Resident General requested particularly from His Majesty that the name of the Istiqlal party be banned from all ceremonies, including those mentioned above. The Sultan replied that he could not guarantee such a thing and that he would make an appeal to his people; whereupon the Resident allegedly replied that he could not count on the support of more than one-fifth of his people, but that in any case he himself had the support of the Army. The Sultan regretted having said that he would appeal to his people, because he soon realized that such an act would forcibly result in disturbances which might very well result in an uprising of no mean proportions.

A few days after this interview took place, the Sultan drafted a memorandum, which he had already planned to send some time ago but deferred at the Resident’s request, and sent it to the Resident, both in the Arabic and French languages, by the person of his Grand Vizir. The main points made in the memorandum, a copy of which was sent to the Sherifien Councilor for transmission to the Quai d’Orsay at Paris for information, were the following, as reported to me by Sbihi:

1. Recapitulation of the shortcomings of France in respecting and applying the terms of the Protectorate Treaty.

2. Intrusion of French political activity into Morocco and complaint against protection which communism enjoys in this country.

3. Detailed mention of instances of direct administration by French authorities in Morocco.

a. Suspension or direct appointment of Pashas, Caids, and Khalifats by French authorities without approval or against wishes of Sultan.

4. Sovereign has called the attention of the Resident to the elections of French citizens to the Council of Government and left full responsibility to him. This mention was probably meant only as a reminder and having reference to the Sultan’s opposition to French elections being held in Morocco should the Council of Government become deliberative instead of consultative as at present. There is a pending proposal of reform making the Council deliberative, but the Sultan is objecting on the grounds that Frenchmen are foreigners and cannot vote in the proposed capacity in Morocco.

5. Being the Sovereign of Morocco and not having the benefit of a deliberative assembly (as opposed to the present Council of Government which is consultative only), which would reflect the will of the people and while waiting for this reform which the people demand, I am obliged to defend and to safeguard the rights of the Moroccan people. This is the wording as reported to me which was used by the Sultan in his memorandum under discussion.

6. The Sultan reminds the Resident General that the presence of France in Morocco is by virtue of international accords (Treaty of Fez), and that he would be unworthy of his country if he accepted that the spirit of the accords be violated.

7. The Sultan insists on the loyal application of the provisions of the Protectorate Treaty, pointing out that of the eight Residents General who were assigned to Morocco, it is only General Juin who has received the mission of making Morocco into a colony.

8. His Majesty then points out that France has made the solemn promise to respect the religious sphere but is at present attempting to interfere in religious matters.

There were three or four more points taken up in the memorandum, but my informant only recalled them as of minor importance.

Upon receipt of this memorandum, the Resident General allegedly asked the Grand Vizir if His Majesty was disposed to receive him, whereupon the Grand Vizir replied that tradition required that his visit should be arranged through the Director of Protocol. The interview was arranged and took place on December 2, 1947, according to my informant who described it as follows:

Resident General: “I shall transmit your memorandum, but I can assure your Majesty here and now that I have blanket authority from my Government, and that your memo will change nothing in the policies which I am following.”

Sultan: “I am awaiting nothing from Paris, but I desire that the French Government be informed that its mission in this country is beyond its scope.” (Protectorate mission being rapidly replaced by direct administration methods).

Resident General: “I desire to warn your Majesty that the United States are behind us.”

Sultan: “I do not doubt it for a moment, but not for what you think but only so that communism does not become a cause of trouble in this country. I find that there are two trouble factors in Morocco: 1. Communism, which you protect; and 2. The new spirit of your policies which is contrary to the Atlantic Charter and to the spirit of San Francisco.”

Resident General: “I am only a soldier; I have orders, and I apply them.”

The interview reportedly ended as above described, and His Majesty reflected for a few days as to what action he should take next. His decision was twofold:

1. Either apply to the United States Government to ask it to act as mediator, or

2. Present his case to the Security Council.

To explore the first of these alternatives, the Sultan asked my informant to ascertain if the United States Government would authorize me to receive from his hand copies of all the documents which had already been given to the Provisional Government of General de Gaulle and to the Government of the Fourth Republic. I replied that I would, of course, have to refer this problem to my Government, but that if informal copies reached me, I would examine them. This latter informal method was apparently not desired, because my informant replied that if my Government’s reply was negative, that the Sultan would approach the Security Council, and that in this way the American Government would have to make a decision at that time.

I am not in a position to ascertain what the Department’s decision will be in this matter, but if a favorable reply were made, there is no doubt that we would be placed in an extremely embarrassing position vis-à-vis France. It is not impossible that these documents could be obtained on an informal basis, which might give us the benefit of the definite complaints which the Sultan formulates against France, and possibly then discuss them on the Paris or Washington level with the French, if we found it so desirable. In accepting the documents from the intermediary, it could be made known to the Sultan that we would give them the most careful consideration, inasmuch as we should like to see the difficulties which have arisen between him and the French satisfactorily resolved. If our reply is completely negative, then there is no doubt that the Sultan would see to it that his complaints will be presented to the Security Council, where we would be called upon to make a public decision.

It would be appreciated if the Department would instruct me in the action to be taken with the least possible delay.

Respectfully yours,

Maurice Pasquet

1. Neither printed.