891.6363 AIOC/7–947
The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Inverchapel)
Aide-Mémoire
The Secretary of State refers to the British Embassy’s Aide-Mémoire of July 9, 1947, entitled “Proposal by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, in partnership with the Standard Oil Company, to construct an oil pipeline from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean.” The Embassy requested that there be an urgent exchange of views with a view to ascertaining whether the strategic advantages of the southern route are so great as to outweigh the commercial advantages of the northern route, and justify our two Governments in requiring the oil companies concerned to undertake the added cost and difficulties of [Page 664] construction, bearing in mind the essential need, in the event of war, of safeguarding oil supplies.
The question has received the most careful attention of this Government. It is desired to inform the British Embassy that the study of the matter, both economic and strategic, has resulted in the conclusion that the arguments advanced for the southern route are not sufficient to justify this Government in changing its established policy that the selection of a pipeline route is properly a commercial decision to be determined by the company concerned.1
- The Department’s draft reply to the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire was submitted to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee and was made part of SWNCC 372/2, dated July 25, 1947. The SWNCC paper, which supported the Department’s position, was sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment. The Joint Chiefs, in noting their agreement with the proposed reply, stated: “It is desirable from the military point of view that pipe lines through the Middle East area be located as far to the southward as is compatible with the other considerations involved. However, regardless of the route selected for these lines, the locations of the oil fields, refineries, pipe line terminals and port facilities are not subject to major change. Taking into account the strategic factors involved and particularly the relatively short distance between the proposed southern and northern routes, the Joint Chiefs of Staff perceive no overriding military consideration justifying exception to established State Department policy in this instance.” The State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 372/2 by informal action on August 6. (890F.6363/8–647)↩