Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

891.6363/4–1047

Memorandum by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin)¹

top secret

[Moscow, undated.]

On the 18th March, Mr. Bevin mentioned to Mr. Marshall the question of the projected Standard Oil–Anglo-Iranian Pipeline eastwards [westward] from Basra, and undertook to supply him with further details of the various projects which have been under consideration. The present position is understood to be as follows:

It is the intention of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that pipelines from the Koweit and Persian oilfields should be linked to a main pipeline having its terminal near Basra.

There are three main routes from Basra at present under consideration. These are:—

(a) A northern route through Syria coming out on the Syrian-Lebanese coast, shown on the attached map as route 1. A possible alternative is shown on the map as route 2.²

(b) A southern route through Saudi Arabia, Trans-Jordan and Palestine coming out at Gaza, shown on the map as route 3.

(c) A southern route coming out in Egypt. It would follow route 3 as far as Aqaba. The line of its extension to Egypt has not been considered, and is not shown on the map.

His Majesty’s Government have carefully considered these three routes and have come to the conclusion that route (b) is the most desirable, despite the fact that it has certain disadvantages. These are:

(i) that its terminus would be in Palestine, the future of which is undecided, and where it may be impossible to maintain British troops to guard the refinery and pipeline, and

(ii) that it would be much more costly than route (a) passing as it does through waste and waterless country and having its terminus at Gaza, where port development would be expensive.

His Majesty’s Government consider, however, these disadvantages are out-weighed by the following considerations, which have influenced them in reaching their decision:—

(1) From the military point of view, the defensibility and security of the pipeline, refinery and pumping stations are increased the further south the pipeline is routed and the terminus situated. This applies whether British forces can be maintained in Palestine or not.

(2) In case of need, Aqaba on the Bed Sea could be developed as an alternative outlet.

(3) It would contribute to the economic development of a part of Palestine which is very little developed.

His Majesty’s Government consider that the main disadvantages of route (a) consist in the fact that it is less defensible in time of war, and that there is no alternative outlet to the Red Sea.

In the case of route (c), the attitude of the Egyptian Government is most uncertain and it is possible that the Egyptian Government would levy heavy charges because they would feel that the pipeline was a competitor to the Suez Canal.³

His Majesty’s Government have informed the Chairman of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Sir William Fraser, who is believed at present to be in New York for talks with the Standard Oil Company, of their preference for route (b) and have instructed him to press for it despite the added costs. It is understood, however, that the Standard Oil Company are likely to be very much in favour of adopting route (a).

1. Sent on April 8 by Mr. Bevin to Secretary of State Marshall at Moscow where they were participating in the Fourth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The letter of transmittal stated in part: “I left with you on the 5th April a map on the projected Standard Oil-Anglo-Iranian Pipeline. I now enclose a memorandum which will help you to understand the map and which explains His Majesty’s Government’s attitude toward the various projects.”

   At the request of Secretary Marshall, his special assistant, Brig. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, sent the memorandum and the transmitting letter for information to Acting Secretary of State Acheson on April 10. The map in question was transmitted by Benjamin V. Cohen, the Counselor of the Department, to Mr. Henderson in a memorandum of May 8 (890.6363/5–847).

2. The map indicates that route 1 would traverse Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, with termini at Tripoli and/or Latakia, Syria, and that route 2 would traverse Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine, with a terminus at Haifa, Palestine.

   For Secretary Marshall’s memorandum of his conversation with Mr. Bevin on April 5, dealing in part with the question of the location of the pipe line, see vol. ii, p. 309.

3. Mr. Cohen’s memorandum of May 8 set forth Mr. Bevin’s views that route 1 was unsafe and that the route terminating at Haifa was unwise as one pipe line already terminated there. Mr. Bevin explained that the British were inclined to the route terminating at Gaza for security reasons although this route would cost $6,000,000 or 20% more than the line to Haifa.