NEA Files: Lot 55–D36

Statement by the United States and the United Kingdom Groups

top secret

The Problem

Subversive Activities in the Middle East.

discussions

1.
The British group outlined a number of factors favoring the development of subversive activities in the Middle East. These were: the general social and economic conditions in the area which had been aggravated by the war; reactionary regimes in the Arab countries; disillusionment and impatience among the younger men; tension over Palestine; Arab respect for Soviet power; the existence of a Moslem minority in the Soviet Union; and the existence of large minorities in many Middle Eastern countries. On the other hand, Communism was not widespread in the Middle East and the Moslem religion was not favorable to it. Soviet propaganda, though not working at full pressure, was attempting to exploit the miserable social and economic [Page 611] conditions of the peoples of the Middle East and was in particular representing shortages as due to British domination, and was also attacking American “dollar diplomacy” through various channels. Communism was most active in the Lebanon, with its relatively high degree of industrialisation and its mixed population. In Egypt the government’s policy had recently been more lenient towards Communism, perhaps with an eye to Soviet support in the Security Council, and the Communists had profited by this to consolidate small cells in the police, and perhaps in the army. In Iran there had been a considerable degree of Communist penetration through the Armenians and the Tudeh Party. The American group observed that in French North Africa Arab nationalists had tended to join Communist organizations since these were permitted to exist, while Arab nationalist organizations were banned. The British group went on to say that there was practically no Communist activity in Transjordan, Saudi Arabia or the Yemen. Among the best means of combatting such activities in the British view were measures to improve social and economic conditions in the Middle East, and it was desirable that assistance of this kind should be increased.
2.
The American group shared these views and added that they were also concerned by the fact that the Soviet Government was using the World Federation of Trades Unions for subversive purposes. A further cause for concern was the penetration of certain American and British governmental and semi-official organizations by Communists and fellow travellers. For example, in certain British Army journals and through other channels this had manifested itself in a tendency to criticize the United States and praise the Soviet Union. Similar instances could doubtless be cited with respect to American agencies. It should be the policy of newspapers and other media of publicity, run by governmental agencies of each country in the Middle East, to curtail criticism and rather to call attention on all appropriate occasions to the good work being done by the other in order not to provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity of driving a wedge between the United States and the United Kingdom.
3.
Neither government had issued directives to its Information Services in the Middle East to attack Communism as such. The British Information Services had as their objectives only to correct misapprehensions and to give the Middle Eastern peoples a true picture of the British way of life. The question was being raised whether the offensive should not be taken by the American Government in its information work in an attempt to break down the myth of Soviet perfection. Good use could, for instance, be made of material on the treatment of their Moslem minorities by the Soviet Union.
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conclusions

1.
All possible efforts should be made to combat Communism in the Middle East by measures directed towards the improvement of the social and economic conditions of the peoples of the area.
2.
It might be suggested to the Information Services of the United States and United Kingdom that they should respectively give more favorable publicity on suitable occasions to the achievements of the other country. The suggestion was also made that each government should bring to the attention of the other any deviations from this policy.
3.
Consideration might be given by both governments to the question whether Communism as such should not now be attacked by their respective publicity agencies in their work in the Middle East.
4.
Full information should be exchanged on subversive activities in the Middle East in general.