Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

NEA Files: Lot 55–D36

Memorandum on Policy in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean by the British Group

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

1. The Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean is an area in which a threat to peace may easily arise. Since the policy of H.M.G. is the maintenance of world peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, it is essential that H.M.G. should formulate definite views on the most effective means of safeguarding peace in that area.

2. H.M.G. have already decided that the preservation of the security of the Middle East is vital to the security of the United Kingdom (the word vital is used in the sense that failure of such preservation involves mortal danger). The same considerations apply to the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, which, with the Middle East, form a strategic whole.

3. At the same time it is clear that H.M.G. can only implement this policy if the United States Government is adopting a parallel policy. Hitherto we have been unaware of the views of the U.S. Government, and this has prevented us from clarifying our own views.

4. We now understand that the political and strategic authorities of the U.S. Government are thinking on lines similar and parallel to our own. They are advising the U.S. Government that the preservation of the security of the Middle East and of the Eastern Mediterranean is vital to the security of the United States; that the U.S. Government can only implement this policy if H.M.G. adopt a parallel policy; and that it is therefore in the interests of each Government to cooperate with and support the other in the area.

5. In the light of the above, it is recommended that our policy in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean should be based upon the following principles:—

(a) The preservation of the security of the Middle East is vital to the security of the United Kingdom (the word vital is used in the sense that failure of such preservation involves mortal danger). The same considerations apply to the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, which, with the Middle East, form a strategic whole.

(b) The whole of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean would be in mortal danger if any hostile power should succeed in obtaining control of any one of the following countries:—Turkey, Greece, Persia (or indeed Italy).

(c) In view of the foregoing, it should be the policy of H.M.G. to support the security of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, and in particular to assist in maintaining the territorial integrity and the political independence of Turkey, Greece, Persia (and indeed Italy).

(d) The implementation of this policy by H.M.G. depends upon the adoption by the United States Government of a parallel policy.

(e) If any external threat develops to the security of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, the United Kingdom must be prepared, in cooperation with other like-minded members of the United Nations, to resist this threat in accordance with, and in the spirit of, the Charter of the United Nations. The first steps would be to exhaust all political and economic means of resisting any such threat in violation of the Charter. But the United Kingdom must be prepared, in cooperation with other like-minded members of the United Nations, to make use of its full political, economic and if necessary military strength in such manner as may be found most effective in accordance with, and in the spirit of, the Charter of the United Nations.

(f) One of the greatest dangers to world peace may be the failure of any other country to understand the extent to which the United Kingdom is prepared to go to assist in resisting any violation of the Charter in the Middle East and in the Eastern Mediterranean. Means should therefore be found of making known in any appropriate quarter in a firm but non-provocative manner the extent of the determination of the United Kingdom to assist in preserving in the interest of world peace the security of the area.

6. There is no greater danger to peace than hesitant and confused policy. In issues of such importance, there can be no halfway house. In the interest of their own security H.M.G. must be prepared, with other like-minded members of the United Nations, and in accordance with the principles of the Charter, to assist in maintaining the security of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.