711.68/12–3147
The Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Chargé in Greece (Rankin)
official—informal
Dear Karl: We were very pleased to get the Embassy’s despatch No. 5735 of December 8 enclosing the memorandum of “Suggestions for United States Policy in Greece”. I know you will agree that Mr. Keeley and the other officers of the Embassy demonstrated initiative and interest in preparing this document. I find it most helpful to have this sort of comprehensive analysis from the point of view of the officers working on the spot. I believe you will Boon receive a formal expression of the Department’s appreciation.1
In most instances we in NEA find ourselves in agreement with the line taken by the memorandum. There are, however, a few points with regard to which it might be well for me to explain our thinking and the general situation within which we have to operate here.
- 1.
- In the memorandum, as in a number of telegrams, the need for quick decisions on important questions is emphasized. I want to assure [Page 481] you that we fully realize the importance of this and do our level best to get action quickly. Unfortunately, as the memorandum itself recognizes, the problems presented are frequently extremely complex, both, in regard to their technical aspects (as in the case of gold sales), and in their possible political repercussions. Because of their importance and complexity, it is almost invariably necessary for us to consult not only other offices in the Department, notably the Coordinator of Aid to Greece and Turkey (George McGhee), and get the approval of the Under Secretary or Secretary, but also the Department of National Defense. In some instances, the approval of the White House is also required. All of this takes time, even when there are no substantial differences of opinion between the various individuals and agencies concerned. When you are dealing with matters of such extreme gravity, affecting our whole foreign policy and usually involving present or future relations with Congress, it is simply impossible to avoid this.
- 2.
- The Embassy has suggested that Governor Griswold should have greater authority to make decisions on the spot in order to reduce delays and reassure the Greek Government. We think that he does have in fact extremely wide authority, just about as sweeping as could possibly be given to any representative of this Government abroad. In a number of cases he himself has referred matters to the Department which he could have decided in Athens if he had wished. In other instances, delays which the Embassy feels were unfortunate have occurred through failure of AMAG itself to act. For example, it has been AMAG which has consistently objected to any substantial increase in the size of the Greek armed forces and which has withheld any recommendation on the supply of a special type of mountain artillery to the Greek Army. In every case in which Governor Griswold has recommended additions to the strength of the Greek forces, the Department has promptly concurred. The only big decision over which there has been serious dispute, so far as I can recall, has been the question of providing gold sovereigns to continue sale of gold to the public in Greece. On this point, all of the Department’s and the Treasury’s financial experts seem to have been unanimous in opposition, and even Eugene Clay, while he was here, expressed his agreement with their view.
- 3.
- I notice in the memorandum a statement that “We must cease unrealistically asking Greece to make unilateral sacrifices, for example, in regard to reparations and territorial claims, which embarrass and weaken the Greek Government and undermine the confidence of the Greeks in our support of them …”.2 In the light of this statement, I should explain the reasoning back of our suggestions that Greece [Page 482] attempt to reestablish relations with Bulgaria, terminate the state of war with Albania and resume relations with that government, refrain from pressing at this time her claim to Northern Epirus, and attempt to satisfy her reparations claims against Italy without insisting upon the delivery of the Saturnia and Vulcania. With respect to Bulgaria, we anticipated the now more immediate danger that the Bulgarians might recognize the guerrilla government in Greece and endeavor to pay their reparations bill to that government rather than to the Athens Government. We also had prominently in mind the resolution of the General Assembly calling upon Greece as well as her northern neighbors to reestablish normal friendly relations with each other. Inasmuch as the Greek representative in New York has unqualifiedly stated that Greece was prepared to abide by any recommendations of the Assembly, we felt it would be a good move from the point of view of world public opinion and possible future UN action for Greece to take the initiative in demonstrating its willingness to comply with this particular recommendation of the Assembly. Leaving aside the point about reparations, which does not arise with Albania, we thought the same reasoning would apply to action by Greece with respect to the latter country. In this instance, it seemed that Greece was weakening her case before the world and giving an opening to hostile propaganda by unilaterally insisting on a state of war with a neighboring country which did not consider itself at war with Greece and which was not regarded as an enemy by any other member of the UN. It further seemed possible that Albania could claim a right to recognize a rebel Greek government because of the fact that the Government at Athens refused to have relations with Albania and, even more serious, insisted upon the existence of a state of war. On the other hand, we did realize that it would be very difficult for Greece to give up her claim to Northern Epirus, and that it might be impracticable to establish relations with Albania without to some extent weakening the strength of that claim. Consequently, our suggestions in this regard were deliberately made very tentative. In talking with Tsaldaris here, I was careful merely to suggest that he consider the possibility of reopening relations with Albania and indicated that we appreciate the difficulties this might present to the Greek Government. There is, however, one point on which we do not wish to leave any misunderstanding in the minds of the Greek authorities: despite our sympathy for Greece’s troubles and our very positive and costly support for Greek independence, we do not feel that we can support Greek claims in Northern Epirus. According to the best of our information, the claims are not justified on ethnic grounds, and under present circumstances there is clearly absolutely no possibility of realizing the claim, with or without American [Page 483] support. It seems to us that it is highly unrealistic for a country which is fighting for its very existence and cannot be sure when some piece of its present territory may be forcibly detached, to create confusion and arouse animosities by pursuing unrealizable ambitions for the territory of a neighbor.
With respect to the Italian reparation and the case of the Saturnia and Vulcania we have, of course, a somewhat different situation. This is a case of two nations which, despite their quarrels of the past, are now in the same leaky boat. Both are our friends, and we are supporting both in their common struggle against grave external and internal pressures. It is illogical for one to seek to benefit itself at the expense of the other, and this is especially true in the case of Greece since a collapse in Italy would be an overwhelming blow to Greece. In the judgment of our shipping experts, a judgment which I believe is concurred in by Governor Griswold, the acquisition of the Saturnia and Vulcania would be of little or no benefit to Greece from an economic point of view, and any psychological or prestige benefits would necessarily be fleeting. On the other hand, the loss of the ships would be a severe blow to the Italian economy, and an even more severe blow to Italian pride, possibly eliminating all opportunity for a real Greek-Italian understanding. The slight benefit which might accrue to Greece from ownership of these two ships would not compensate for the ill effects their loss would have on Italy. I realize how difficult it is to convince Greek politicians of the soundness of this reasoning, but we have felt that the attempt must be made, and repeated if necessary. It is possible, of course, that the recent Yugoslav claim for the vessels will make a difference in our approach, and that transfer of them to Greece may prove to be the lesser of two evils, I have not had an opportunity as yet to go into this aspect and determine what the alternatives are. What I have written in this paragraph is primarily intended to explain the reasons for our past actions and not to forecast our future attitude.
I should like to close by expressing my emphatic agreement with the recommendation that our economic policy in Greece should be long-range, and that we should not limit our thinking to the scope of the present Greek-Turkish Aid Bill. Both NEA and George McGhee’s office have definitely discarded that limitation. We are working hard to get general acceptance within the Government of the principle that the United States must carry through in Greece no matter how long it takes nor how much money it costs. I need hardly tell you that this is no easy task and is complicated enormously by the conflicting and unpredictable attitudes of the Congress. We hope to have at least some news in this regard fairly soon. I want also to endorse particularly the [Page 484] recommendation for a concerted propaganda campaign to arouse the Greek people, break guerrilla morale, and counteract Soviet propaganda. I have just sent a memorandum3 to Mr. Lovett in which that is included as one of the major steps to be taken to carry our Greek policy to a successful conclusion. We must have more funds from Congress for that purpose, and I am moderately optimistic in the light of the views expressed by members of the Mundt Committee following their visit to Europe last Fall.
Please let us hear from you frequently, both formally and informally, about your problems and your ideas as to what should be done to work things out in Greece.
Sincerely,