Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

868.00/12–2947

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret
urgent

[Washington,] December 29, 1947.

There is attached a memorandum listing the steps NEA believes should be taken promptly to cope with the difficult situation we are facing in Greece, particularly in the light of the recent announcement of a guerrilla government under General Markos. Mr. McGhee has seen the memorandum and concurs in the proposed steps.

If you approve, this office and U/GT will proceed with implementation of the various measures, in conjunction with SPA and other interested offices.

L[oy] W. H[enderson]

[Annex]

Steps To Be Taken by United States Government To Meet Situation

1. Instructions should be sent Governor Griswold to authorize the immediate formation of a total of one hundred battalions of the National Defense Corps and a permanent increase of at least twelve thousand men in the Greek Army.

a. This question was discussed at length with General Livesay at a meeting on December 29, and a telegram to Governor Griswold has been drafted by U/GT. General Livesay will send a separate telegram setting forth in detail such conditions and restrictions as he feels should accompany the authorization of the increase.

b. Issue public statement here as to action taken, explaining it was requested by Greek Government.

2. Furnish to the Greek Army whatever additional arms and equipment, especially machine guns, General Livesay may determine to be necessary for a fully successful campaign against the guerrillas.

a. This question was also discussed with General Livesay on December 29. He expressed the opinion that the Greek Army needs more machine guns and may need a different type of mountain artillery. However, he has a special group of his staff at work on a survey on the organization and equipment of the Greek Army and has expressed a desire to await a report of this group (due around January 1 or 15) before making definite recommendations.

3. Expedite decision of National Security Council on paper proposing steps to be taken in case “Free Greek Government” is recognized by Soviet satellites, these steps to include eventual despatch of United States troops to Greece, under UN General Assembly recommendation or under Article 51.

a. The full National Security Council should meet just as soon as its working staff has completed its urgent studies on this paper. A definite decision must be made without delay. No instructions can be sent Ambassador Kirk¹ at Salonika and no replies can be made to urgent requests and inquiries of the Greek, British and Turkish Governments until this decision is made.

4. At earliest possible moment issue public statement condemning formation of Markos Cabinet as neither spontaneous nor representative of wishes of Greek people and warning of United States attitude toward its recognition by any nation.

5. Begin immediately preparation of new request to Congress for additional aid to Greece, to include all supplementary funds needed during current fiscal year, plus funds for all anticipated expenditures in 1949 which will not be covered by ERP.

a. Inform Congressional leaders immediately of our plans in this respect and of the seriousness of the Greek situation. We should be completely frank in this preliminary presentation.

b. Ask Griswold and Livesay for their fullest estimates as to what is needed in this respect, keeping in mind very much more dangerous situation created by formation of Markos Cabinet and probability that Soviet assault on Greece will be stepped up. In making estimates Griswold and Livesay should not concentrate upon keeping figures small but rather upon providing for all foreseeable contingencies and laying basis for an all-out, definitive blow at the guerrillas.

c. In consultation with Congressional leaders, the Department should make an early official announcement of its intention to seek more funds for Greece as soon as decision called for in paragraph 3 is taken.

6. Prepare and despatch to Ambassador Kirk full instructions as to course of action he should urge on UNSCOB in event of recognition of the Markos Cabinet by any foreign government or major increase in foreign-supported attacks on Greece.

7. Work out provisionally all details of United States action to be taken in UN if Markos Cabinet is recognized or UNSCOB recommends new action by UN because of stepped-up armed intervention in Greece.

8. Draw up comprehensive, positive outline of information work to be carried on in Greece by AMAG and USIS and outside of Greece by USIS and make immediate arrangements to secure whatever funds and facilities are necessary to make this effective.

a. Consult with OIE to determine whether gravity of Greek situation does not warrant diversion of funds from other programs.

b. Include special funds for information work on Greece in any request made to Congress for supplementary OIE appropriation.

c. Expedite arrangements for establishment of broadcasting station in Salonika or Athens.

d. Explore possibility of appointing top-notch man as head of USIS in Greece and supplying him with expanded staff and physical facilities.

9. With respect to appropriate phases of this program, especially those suggested in paragraphs 3, 4, 6, and 7 above, maintain close contact with the British Government and ensure coordinated action.

a. Consult Ambassador Douglas, who is reported to have discussed Greek situation with Minister of Defense before leaving London.

b. Reply to British note of December 26.

1. Adm. Alan G. Kirk, United States Representative on the Special Balkan Committee established by the General Assembly.