868.00/12–2647
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs (Jernegan)
| Participants: | Mr. Lovett, Mr. Armour, General Livesay, General |
| Arnold, Mr. Kennan (S/P), Mr. Henderson (NEA), | |
| Mr. McGhee (U/GT), Colonel R. S. Seedlock, Colonel | |
| T. W. Parker, Mr. Jernegan (GTI). |
The meeting was called to afford an opportunity for consultation between Department officers and General Livesay, who is temporarily in Washington. General Livesay reviewed some of the difficulties confronting the Greek Army. He stressed especially that while the morale of the soldiers was good, the morale of the senior officers was poor at the present time, largely because the intense political activity directed at the Army made them feel insecure in their positions. He said the political parties were anxious to gain control of the Army to strengthen their position. The Prime Minister had not supported the former Chief of Staff and present Army Commander, General Ventiris, despite a public promise to stand behind him. As an example of the political pressures at work, General Livesay said that the Minister of War, Mr. Stratos, was secretly maneuvering to have six officers hitherto classified as unemployable because of their inefficiency and political attitudes, reinstated on the active list with the grade of Lieutenant General. This move would, if it succeeded, make them senior to all the presently active officers in the Army.
General Livesay also spoke of certain attitudes prevalent in the Army which operated against effective conduct of the war against the guerrillas. He said there is much inertia and a habit of fighting at long range instead of coming to grips with the guerrillas. This might be due in part to doubts held by some of the soldiers as to whether they were fighting on the right side. If the neighboring countries should recognize the “Government of Free Greece” and foreign troops were sent to join the rebels, this might have a good effect in resolving the doubts of the Greek troops and intensify their determination to resist. General Livesay further remarked that the Greeks are very insistent on getting exactly what they think they need, regardless of whether it is really the most useful item for the purpose. In this connection, he spoke of their desire to obtain a certain type of mountain [Page 467] artillery. Although he had never received an official written request for such artillery, practically every Greek officer and civilian official that he knew had at one time or other urged upon him the absolute necessity for it. As a matter of fact, General Livesay considered that the present type of mountain artillery in use in the Greek Army was quite satisfactory. Nevertheless, he thought it might ultimately be necessary to provide the other type in order to satisfy the Greeks that they were properly equipped for the kind of campaign in which they were involved.
Reference was made to AMAG Telegram No. 722 of December 24,1 regarding the request of the Greek Minister of War for approval of the formation of 12 new battalions of the National Defense Corps. It was noted that Governor Griswold had indicated his willingness to approve an increase but said he planned to await General Livesay’s return before making a formal decision. General Livesay said he believed the decision should be made promptly and that in his opinion it would be better to authorize not merely 12 but 58 additional battalions to bring the National Defense Corps to a total strength of 100 battalions. He believed we should stop doing things on a piecemeal basis in matters of this kind and that with this NDC force, plus an increase of 10 or 12 thousand men in the regular Army, the Greek Government would be able to clean up the guerrillas provided there were no great increase in the assistance being furnished them by the northern countries. He estimated the additional cost of these increases for the period ending June 30, 1948 at from 8 to 10 million dollars. Mr. McGhee observed that this cost could be covered out of existing Greek Aid Funds by making corresponding reduction in some phase of the Reconstruction program.
Mr. Lovett said that the American Government would have to make an extremely important decision during the next week with respect to the situation arising out of the announced formation of a “Government of Free Greece” under General Markos. Before making such a decision we would want to determine for ourselves whether the Greeks were a people on whom we could rely. Specifically, we could not take action which might result in the loss of American lives if the Greeks were not also ready and willing to sacrifice Greek lives. General Livesay said that in his opinion the Greeks would fight well enough and that with the addition of American observers they would conduct a more active campaign against the guerrillas. In this connection [Page 468] he mentioned that for some reason Greek troops always seem to fight with more determination when foreign officers are present.
During the course of the conversation, General Arnold2 stressed his belief that we must take a definite, long-range decision now and establish a firm policy for future action in Greece. Even though our immediate decision might be merely to furnish more supplies to Greece in the hope that the Greek Army would be able by itself to clear up the guerrilla situation, we should also decide now to send American troops to Greece if such a move proved necessary. Mr. Henderson agreed with this position, and Mr. Lovett also agreed that a decision must be taken. He said, however, that as yet we do not have authority to dispatch American troops to Greece. General Arnold remarked that we should attempt now some decisive action on substantial scale to prevent continuation of the present piecemeal deterioration of conditions in Greece; as fast as we made some small move, the northern neighbors of Greece would counter that by increasing activity on behalf of the guerrillas. Mr. Lovett concurred, saying that the next move is up to us. He saw little point in continuing our operations in Greece unless we were prepared to match anything that the opposition forces might bring up.
Mr. Kennan asked General Livesay whether the introduction of a United Nations force to occupy strategic points in Greece would be effective in enabling the Greek forces to clean up the guerrillas. General Livesay said that a foreign force would have a good morale effect under present conditions but might be ineffective if the pressure on Greece were increased. Mr. Kennan asked if it would not be feasible to throw a cordon of foreign troops right across Northern Greece. General Livesay said that this would be feasible and effective provided the troops were allowed to fight, to protect the areas assigned to them. He and General Arnold both said that they thought it would be unwise for American troops to go into Greece with the instructions in force for the British troops now there, that is, that they were to fight only in case they themselves should be directly attacked. Mr. Lovett indicated his agreement with this view.
General Arnold suggested that an American Corps of two Divisions in Greek Thrace would have an excellent effect on the general situation. He and Mr. Lovett agreed that Thrace would be the best location because of its strategic importance in relation to Bulgaria, the difficulty which the Greek Army is having in defending it, and the fact that a force there could easily be supplied and supported from the sea. Mr. Kennan suggested that we should give very careful consideration to the idea of sending American combat troops to Greece, especially if they were to go as part of a mixed United Nations force; we might [Page 469] find ourselves in a difficult position from which it would be hard to withdraw and equally hard to keep other nations from withdrawing the contingents they contributed. He also thought an area in southern Greece, such as the Peloponnesus, might be easier to defend and therefore a better place for our troops from a strategic point of view.
At one stage in the discussion Mr. McGhee suggested that we should prepare promptly to present to Congress a new request for funds for Greece, including in it not only supplementary funds for the current fiscal year, but also money needed for military purposes in the 1949 fiscal year. General Arnold concurred emphatically in this and added that he thought we should tell Congress frankly the full seriousness of the present picture and the dangers we have to meet.
The meeting broke up without attempting to reach final decisions on any of the points covered.
- Not printed; Governor Griswold stated that “Although I have reached conclusion that there should be an increase in number of NDC battalions, I believe that it would be a serious psychological error to authorize piecemeal aid. I propose to await Livesay’s return and completion of study by planning staff before formally requesting further increases military aid.” (868.20/12–2447)↩
- Maj. Gen. A. V. Arnold, Assistant Chief of Staff (Plans).↩