868.00/2–2747

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman 1

top secret

Subject: Immediate Aid to Greece and Turkey

Two notes from the British Government were received by me on February 24. These notes inform us that, in view of the British economic and financial situation, they can no longer continue to carry the full burden of the economic and military support of the Greek and Turkish Governments. Their estimate is that the foreign currency needs of Greece for the remainder of 1947 will be in the neighborhood of $250,000,000 and that more will be needed for next year. Smaller but equally necessary sums will be needed for Turkey.

I have discussed these notes with Secretary Patterson and Secretary Forrestal. On the basis of information available to us we are convinced that the British Government is sincere when it tells us that its financial position prevents it from extending further aid to Greece beyond March 31, 1947; that the situation, particularly in Greece, is desperate; that the collapse of Greece would create a situation threatening to the security of the United States; and that we should take immediate steps to extend all possible aid to Greece and, on a lesser scale, to Turkey.

We recognize that similar situations requiring substantial aid from this Government may develop in other areas and such possibilities are now being studied by the three Departments. The time factor for Greece, however, requires immediate action, and we recommend the measures set forth in the attached paper.2

G. C. Marshall
[Page 59]
[Annex]

Memorandum by the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy

Measures To Meet the British Request for Immediate Aid to Greece and Turkey

It is recommended that:

1.
The British Government be informed of the decision of the Executive Branch to do all that is possible to meet the needs outlined in their notes, indicating however, that the Executive Branch cannot commit the Congress but will do its best to enlist Congressional support; and that this Government at once propose top secret conversations with the British at a high level in regard to the whole international situation with a view to ascertaining British capabilities and intentions.
2.
This Government should ascertain that the British on their part will continue, within the limits of their means, to assist in the solution of the problem presented by Greece and Turkey.
3.
The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and various other members of the Cabinet be informed of this decision and the Secretary of the Treasury be invited to arrange for Treasury participation in any future discussions bearing on financial assistance. Steps be taken by the Administration to obtain the wholehearted support of all other interested executive agencies of this Government in executing the program outlined.
4.
Every effort be made at the highest governmental level to find means, without waiting for legislation, to alleviate the present Greek financial situation.
5.
That steps be taken to see that the Greek Government requests at once in a formal manner the assistance of this Government in the rehabilitation of its economic life.
6.
The problem be discussed privately and frankly by the leaders of the administration with appropriate members of the Congress.
7.
Legislation be drafted, in the light of these discussions with members of Congress and of the findings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and this legislation be submitted to Congress. Such legislation might well include authorization for the President under certain conditions within prescribed limits to extend loans, credits, or grants to Greece and/or Turkey; also for the transfer to Greece or Turkey or both of military supplies not transferable under existing law; and any necessary authorization for the supply of personnel.
8.
In the meantime measures be taken immediately to transfer to Greece such available military equipment and other supplies as the three Departments find are urgently needed by Greece and are transferable under existing legislation.
9.
Measures be adopted to acquaint the American public with the situation and with the need for action along the proposed lines.3

  1. Marginal notation in the handwriting of Mr. Jernegan: “Taken to the White House by the Secretary on Feb. 26, 1947.”
  2. President Truman’s Memoirs state that at 3 p.m., February 26, Secretary Marshall and Under Secretary Acheson brought him the studies of “our experts” and that the Under Secretary made the presentation (Memoirs by Harry S Truman, vol. ii, p. 100). The studies presumably were the analysis of the British position and the position and recommendations of the Department of State, pp. 48, 52.

    It was after Mr. Acheson’s presentation, presumably, that President Truman approved in principle the measures for immediate aid to Greece and Turkey called for in the latter paper; see Mr. Acheson’s letter of March 5 to the Secretary of War, p. 94.

  3. Marginal notation: “Signed by G. Marshall.”