Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

868.00/11–1847

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) and the Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey (McGhee) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

top secret

[Washington,] November 18, 1947.

Comments made by Governor Griswold in Amag No. 471, dated November 14, 1947, with respect to instructions by the Department set forth in Gama No. 430, dated November 7, 1947, indicate the necessity for reappraisal of the relationship between Griswold and the Ambassador. In seeking a solution to the immediate issue, i.e., relationship between Griswold and the Ambassador in the light of the assignment of military personnel for the purpose of giving planning and operational advice to the Greek National Army, an attempt must also be made to solve the basic problem of the relationship between the Embassy and AMAG personnel.

Solution of this issue can be found among three alternatives:

1. Inform Governor Griswold that the amplified instructions contained in Gama No. 430 must be adhered to with the exception that the Greek Government and the British Ambassador need not be advised; and that the supplementary instructions were drafted only after careful consideration of the Department and the National Security Council, and are based not on consideration of personalities, but upon established principles of international relations, including the function of an Embassy, what it may properly do and may not do and the responsibility for which it may or may not divest itself. Governor Griswold should be advised that the Department feels that with good will and the spirit of sincere cooperation he and the Ambassador can work satisfactorily together under these instructions. It would be stated that the Department and the President have complete confidence in Griswold and hope he will stay under these conditions. He would be advised at the same time that the Ambassador would be under instructions to lend full cooperation and support to Governor Griswold.

2. Make an attempt to work out an arrangement which would result in a spirit of real cooperation between Governor Griswold and the Ambassador on a basis which would assure the Governor that his prestige will not be weakened or the effectiveness of his work diminished. An appeal would be made to both in the interests of the United States and of world peace to work together with the single purpose of achieving success in our Greek program. A telegram should be sent to the Governor stating the circumstances which led to issuance of supplementary instructions; making certain suggestions for amendment of these instructions in light of his comments and inviting him to make other comments; expressing our readiness to recommend suitable amendments to the National Security Council; informing him that the telegram had been shown Mr. MacVeagh who is still ill and who also takes position that resignation of Governor Griswold would be unfortunate and that he wishes assurances be sent that Governor Griswold could rely on his full cooperation and desire to help. This telegram would of course be approved by Mr. MacVeagh before despatch and with our understanding with Mr. MacVeagh that he is prepared to work out procedures which would be satisfactory to Governor Griswold. This solution would:

a. Make it possible for the Ambassador to continue the traditional role of Ambassador without intervening in internal Greek affairs to the extent which it must be recognized that Governor Griswold and AMAG should engage.

b. Provide an independent representative of the Department who is experienced in political relations with other governments, who can provide counsel for Governor Griswold in overall and political matters and who can report to the Department independently on conditions in Greece.

3. Naming of Governor Griswold as Ambassador to Greece, in addition to his present duties, and the integration of Embassy and Mission activities. Certain functions of AMAG, particularly in the military, economic, labor and information fields, impinge so directly on the activities of the Embassy that the expanded concept of the AMAG function results in overlap and in some cases almost complete duplication of effort between the Embassy and AMAG. The naming of Governor Griswold as Ambassador would:¹

a. Concentrate in one person the responsibility for all relations between the United States and Greek Governments, giving added prestige and power to the one representative and preventing any dispute as to primacy of one over the other and the possibility of Greeks playing one against the other. Although it is clear that under these circumstances Governor Griswold would perform functions not traditionally performed by an Ambassador, it can nevertheless be argued that the important thing is whether or not a representative of the United States Government performs these functions, not whether he is the Ambassador or the Chief of the Aid Mission.

b. Make possible the integration of the activities of the Mission and the Embassy. Where it is conceded that the Mission has primacy, such as in the fields of finance and economics, Embassy personnel in these fields could be subordinated to the responsible AMAG official. Duplication of functions and the possibility of any difference in policy would be eliminated, relationships with the Greek Government would be simplified and possibility for the Greeks playing Embassy personnel against Mission personnel would be eliminated.

In case Governor Griswold is made Ambassador, he should understand that among his functions would be that of promoting friendly relations with Greece and of meeting socially leaders in various phases of Greek life. The representation work which an Ambassador cannot avoid, particularly in a country the morale of which we are trying to bolster, would consume a considerable portion of Governor Griswold’s time. He should, therefore, have a deputy to carry much of the burden of AMAG work just as the Minister Counselor would carry the major portion of routine Embassy work.

Recommendation:

(1) It is recommended that this problem be discussed as a whole with the President prior to the Department’s taking a firm position with respect to any of the three alternate solutions proposed. Discussion with the President should, however, be along the lines of these three alternatives. When this is presented to the President the Department should, if requested or if advisable in the opinion of the Secretary, offer one of the following positions as decided by the Secretary:

(a) Mr. Armour and Mr. Henderson recommend: “2”.

(b) Mr. Peurifoy and Mr. McGhee recommend: Governor Griswold should be advised that No. 1 represents in the view of the Department the maximum possible delegation of authority in matters of “high policy” by the Ambassador to the Chief of AMAG. If in Governor Griswold’s opinion the Chief of AMAG cannot fulfill his responsibilities thereunder which he must assume to assure success of his Mission, then the Department wishes to recommend, subject to his consent, his nomination as Ambassador to Greece as outlined in solution 3.

1. Marginal notation by Mr. Peurifoy: “I agree with this alternative as the only practical solution.”