868.00/2–2447

Minutes of the First Meeting of the Special Committee To Study Assistance to Greece and Turkey, February 24, 1947, 3:00 p.m.1

top secret
Present: Mr. Henderson (NEA) Chairman
Mr. Baxter (NE)
Mr. Bohlen (S)
General Crain (A–H)
Mr. Eddy (SA/E)
Mr. Gauge (S/S)
Mr. Gullion (U)
Mr. Havlik (ED)
Mr. Hickerson (EUR)
Mr. Jernegan (NE)
Mr. Kennan2
Mr. Merriam (NE)
Mr. Ness (OFD)
Mr. Spiegel (FN)
Mr. Thompson (EE)
Mr. Villard (NEA)

Mr. Henderson opened the meeting by summarizing the two notes on Greece and Turkey delivered by the British Ambassador to the Secretary on the morning of February 24.3 He went on to say that these notes appeared to be in line with recent British moves in getting out of Burma, India and Palestine, remarking that the British Government seemed to feel itself unable to maintain its imperial structure on the same scale as in the past.

As background, Mr. Henderson caused to be read a top secret telegram of August 154 sent by the Department to Secretary Byrnes, who was then in Paris. The telegram contained the text of a statement of [Page 46] policy calling for full support of Turkey and made it clear that this policy had received the approval of the War and Navy Departments and of the President. It was explained that this policy had also been enthusiastically approved by Mr. Byrnes.5 Mr. Henderson went on to point out that Greece was considered to be in virtually the same position as Turkey so far as our policies are concerned and that the telegram therefore applied in general to Greece as well.

With reference to the notes presented by the British Ambassador, Mr. Henderson explained that NEA had drafted a memorandum which Mr. Acheson had seen and approved in principle as a basis for discussion. The memorandum was then read aloud.

Mr. Henderson and Mr. Hickerson expressed the conviction that this Government must accept the responsibility which the British Government was proposing to turn over to us with regard to the two countries in question, if we did not Greece and probably Turkey would be lost.

After a lengthy discussion it appeared to be the view of most of those present that this Government should decide in principle to assume the responsibility involved, leaving for later determination the question of whether it was financially possible to do so and how it should be done. General Crain6 disagreed with this view, holding that the British Government had arrived at its present precarious financial state as a result of trying to do just what it was now proposing that the U.S. should attempt. He felt that it would be better policy for the U.S. to conserve its resources for the final trial of strength; that we should attempt to achieve our ends in defending Greece and Turkey by advising the Soviet Government that we would use force if necessary to keep it from seizing control of those countries.

It was brought out that a very important element of the question was the future policy which might be followed by the British Government in Greece and Turkey and elsewhere if we consented to take up the burden Great Britain wished to transfer to us. The Committee agreed that this must be clarified at an early stage and that appropriate assurances of continued cooperation should be sought.

As a further consideration it was mentioned that American action in Greece and Turkey on this line might be only one of many instances of the same kind and that this must be frankly admitted when it came to discussing the question with members of Congress.

Mr. Havlik suggested that the financial part of the problem be approached on a global basis, urging that it must be presented to [Page 47] Congress as part of a worldwide program. Mr. Hickerson concurred, and said lie felt a program of the kind could be presented to Congress in such a fashion as to electrify the American people. However, the Committee was not in complete agreement and no attempt to arrive at a decision was made.

It was decided that a telegram should be sent to London at once summarizing the British notes for the information and comments of Mr. Gallman and Mr. Matthews7 (who was expected to arrive there the following day).

A drafting committee, composed of Messrs. Kennan, Thompson8 and Jernegan was appointed to prepare a memorandum for the Secretary setting forth the views and recommendations of the Committee.

It was agreed that the Committee should meet again at ten o’clock next morning.

Mr. Henderson pointed out that Mr. Acheson had directed the members of the Committee to give its work first priority and postpone other work whenever necessary.

  1. Drafted by Mr. Jernegan.
  2. George F. Kennan, detailed to the National War College as Deputy for Foreign Affairs.
  3. See footnote 1, p. 32.
  4. No. 4122, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, p. 840.
  5. See memorandum by Acting Secretary Acheson to President Truman, August 16, 1946, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, p. 843.
  6. James K. Crain, Deputy Chairman of the Policy Committee on Arms and Armaments.
  7. H. Freeman Matthews, Director of the Office of European Affairs, at this; time en route to the Embassy in the United Kingdom on a visit of inspection. In telegram 891, February 24, to London, the Department summarized the British Embassy notes and requested the urgent comments of Messrs. Gallman and Matthews on the sincerity and accuracy of the British statements (868.00/2—2447).
  8. Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs.