Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

868.00/8–2647

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William O. Baxter of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

confidential

[Washington,] August 26, 1947.

Participants:	Mr. Dendramis, Greek Ambassador
	U—Mr. Lovett
	NE—Mr. Baxter

The Greek Ambassador called today at his request. He said that the situation in Greece is very grave indeed and, referring both to the recent Soviet vetoes and the increasingly aggressive attitude of the Soviet “satellites”, expressed the opinion that all indications point toward imminent moves to deprive Greece of her independence.

At this critical time, there must be no misunderstanding between the Greek Government and the United States. If Mr. Lovett was in possession of any reports indicating a lack of cooperation on the part of the Greek Government, or if he had any criticisms of the Greek Government’s behavior, the Ambassador earnestly hoped that he would discuss them frankly. The Ambassador indicated that, us a person who had no political connections, he might be able to influence Greek leaders or to present any United States views directly to the King. If it should be considered advisable, he is prepared to fly immediately to Greece.

Mr. Lovett assured the Ambassador that he had no official “criticisms” and that, to his knowledge, there were no reports from our representatives in Greece indicating a non-cooperative attitude on the part of the Greek Government. Speaking personally, he said that he and others in the Department were disappointed that conditions in Greece were not showing improvement. He fully appreciated, of course, the many difficulties facing the Greek Government and emphasized once more that his remarks were not to be interpreted as “criticisms”. It is not encouraging, however, to find Greek political leaders at this juncture unable to reach some agreement and put aside narrow partisanship when the threat to their country is so serious. We are in the awkward position at the moment of really having no Greek Government to deal with. It is also hard for the average American to understand why a Greek Army of more than 100,000 cannot deal effectively with guerrilla warfare when most reports refer to rebel attacks involving only a few score or a few hundred guerrillas. Our military experts in Greece are still of the opinion that the present Greek armed forces could be utilized more effectively than is the case at present, and have therefore not been able to approve the requests for increasing the size of the Army.

In connection with the Greek case before the Security Council the Ambassador stated that his Government is seriously considering invoking Article 51 of the Charter at this time without waiting for possible action in the General Assembly, and he wished Mr. Lovett’s opinion on the advisability of such a step. Mr. Lovett explained that the thinking in the Department remained unchanged from our position as expressed in the Security Council—in other words, that all possibilities of United Nations action should be exhausted before considering unilateral or collective action under Article 51. As the Ambassador knew, the Department has already placed the threat to Greek independence on the General Assembly agenda and intends to pursue the matter vigorously. It is doubtful at this time if the American people would be prepared to support action under Article 51, and Greece might find other countries equally unwilling. In such circumstances a move to invoke Article 51 at this time might be of more harm than help to the Greek case.