868.00/8–2547: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State
1455. Apparently convinced that he must acquire broadest basis for government he now trying to form, both because of my insistence and that of Griswold and because Populist Party unlikely be able carry on without effective help, Tsaldaris went yesterday to see Sophoulis practically hat in hand. According his personal verbal statement to me last evening he proposed to Liberal leader that Populists and Liberals unite on equal basis to form new government, with Sophoulis presiding over Council and Tsaldaris functioning as “active” Prime Minister owing Sophoulis age which permits him only few hours work each day. In addition proposed distribution of portfolios be divided 50–50 and that Sophoulis have veto power over any Cabinet appointment unacceptable to him and vice versa. Also conceded to Mr. Sophoulis “preponderance” in social program, on which Liberal leader professed set great store.
In reply Sophoulis said would consult advisers and at Tsaldaris urgent request promised answer by last night. However, when communicated about 7:30, reply (which in writing and shown me by Tsaldaris) stated simply that (1) as Government had failed it should be duty of opposition (Liberal Party) to form new one and (2) that [Page 312] if collaboration undertaken with Populists, policy must be wholly that of Liberal Party.
Since this reply obviously anything but cooperative, all concessions being made by Tsaldaris and none by Sophoulis, and door appeared closing if not closed to further attempts obtain participation Liberals, I last night requested interview with Sophoulis. However, he stated this morning he “indisposed” and suggested I call him again tomorrow.
In this apparent impasse, and in view urgency quick action, I saw Rendis and Venizelos together this morning and former undertook see Sophoulis himself and take him my views. These I stated to be that without presuming to interfere in details of internal affairs, I felt I could and should speak for overall interest of United States in Greek political unity at this time of international as well as internal crisis. I hope Mr. Sophoulis would not close door entirely to Tsaldaris approach but would, if latter’s proposals unacceptable, indicate in what way they might be improved, and thus facilitate possible conclusion of accord. I emphasized that government any less wide than recent one could not fail to be viewed in United States as retrograde, and that whether dominated by Populists or Liberals such a government could not attract same support abroad as one presenting wide united front. I suggested that if Tsaldaris proposals appeared to Sophoulis to give Populist leader too much importance in proposed joint Cabinet, alternatives like selection of neutral Prime Minister, such as Maximos, or the heightening of role to be given to Sophoulis personally, might be put forward. Pointed out Tsaldaris now clearly in mood make every possible concession, and eager continue discussions earliest possible date.
Venizelos told me and Rendis that he thoroughly in accord with above and particularly anxious Sophoulis understand that partial government of Liberals could not fail be equally objectionable from foreign viewpoint as partial government of Populists, since in both cases large part of Greek electorate would remain in opposition, thus perpetuating lack of general confidence in government and continuation of internal political strife. In addition, Venizelos stated that if Sophoulis Liberals would now join Populists in coalition for duration emergency, Venizelist Liberals would give up present schism and reenter parent group.
Am giving so much attention this attempt bring in Sophoulis since believe unity between leading parties of Greece not only most desirable in itself but likely automatically result in adhesion many smaller groups. Cannot say am very sanguine of success, since Sophoulis obviously interpreting Tsaldaris approach as sign weakness, and possibly thinking that holding out a little longer may bring whole government [Page 313] into Liberal hands unencumbered. Should attempt fail, have impressed on Tsaldaris that widest possible coalition is still solution to be sought and have advised orientation his government toward center rather than toward right.1
- In reply, on August 26 (telegram 1420), the Department expressed its appreciation of the “vigor and pertinacity with which you are attempting to convince Greek political leaders of course of action which … offers only possibility for viable Greek Govt under present circumstances.” The Department concluded that “Prolonged bickering and disunity at this time is open invitation to propaganda from north to effect that nation incapable of uniting to preserve independence does not deserve to remain sovereign nation.” (868.00/8–2547)↩