868.00/8–2147: Telegram
The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to the Secretary of State
1426. While lengthy Greek memo undoubtedly intended partly for local political effect (Deptel 1341, August 15), I believe it fairly presents situation and my criticism in Embtel 1342 August 91 meant merely express view such general recapitulation unnecessary since Dept already fully advised of facts. Believe no mistake could be [Page 304] greater than to fancy situation Greece other than deteriorating—steadily and dangerously. Besides depressing effect of veto and consequent collapse of faith in UN, main facts this connection are:
- (1).
- Guerrillas now terrorizing more extensive areas than ever, despite repeated sweeps of Greek Army;
- (2).
- Bands, as reported by Miller from Salonika as well as by US press, which not “panicky” this connection, growing larger and bolder;
- (3).
- Numbers of refugees from rural areas mounting rapidly in all cities; and
- (4).
- Indications of approaching early increased involvement of satellite states in Greek internal struggle multiplying daily.
Believe, in view this situation, that Dept and War Dept may soon, if not immediately, have to consider whether AMAG, which geared to cope only with situation existing last winter, can be expected provide all necessary answers to present and future problems involving Greek national security and Greek sector of security of Near and Middle East. Judgment cited by Dept that military situation does not justify increasing Greek armed forces (Amag 75, August 112) was based on idea that Greek Army can be trained and utilized to better advantage than presently, which will take time, and also on idea that enemy will remain limited to only Greek guerillas (Amag 41, August 13 and mytel 1261, July 31 [August 1]4), which may prove fallacious. Believe wisdom and foresight now require wider judgment based on estimate of military situation including strong possibilities:
- (1)
- That present deterioration may proceed too rapidly to allow time for reformation in Greek Army tactics and administration; and
- (2)
- That recruitment and increased armament may be provided to guerrillas from outside Greece.
To help form such judgment, perhaps larger staff military observers, to be attached Embassy so as to be free of limited logistical view imposed AMAG, and under superior officer of broader vision and higher authority than present Military Attaché, would be useful. In any case cannot but feel that from now on, as properly emphasized in Greek memo, prospective US planning as regards saving Greek integrity and independence must transcend present arrangements if we are not to risk falling into British error of “too little and too late”.