Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

867.20/8–1747: Telegram

The Ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Ankara, August 17, 1947—1 p. m.

655. [Foreign Minister said to me yesterday he wished consult US Government regarding serious problem facing Turkish Government which he described as follows: Turkish armed forces at present consist about 485,000 men exclusive of gendarmerie and border guards comprising three classes, 1925, 1926 and 1927. Next November class 1925 of 150,000 men will have done three years service and should be released. If no new class called Turkish armed forces which at present on basis, partial¹] mobilization will be reduced to about 330,000 men or peace time basis. Cost present armed forces represents 60 percent ordinary budget. If new class called will add 150 million liras next year’s budget which will have to be met either by increased taxes or by internal or foreign loans. Furthermore if new class called should be done soon in order give some training before old class released; this overlapping period would cost 40 million liras additional but this can be met from resources available Government during balance year. Decision must be taken soon since if new class to be called provision therefor must be made in next year’s budget, preparation of which begins next month.

Saka said Turk Government desires receive views US Government re international situation which will assist Turk Government in reaching decision whether justified reducing armed forces.

I asked how Turk Government this year met 150 million lira additional cost maintaining third class. Saka said partly by internal loans, partly by excess revenue over estimates. I asked what were views Turkey General Staff on this question. He said General Staff considered world situation too dangerous warrant reduction army.

I asked what was thinking inside Cabinet. He said many members Government favored not calling new class in order relieve economic burden country. Others, however, including himself, held view international situation deteriorated gravely of late and Turkey could not afford reduce armed forces. If Turkey reduced army he believed this would encourage Russia step up pressure this area feeling they had Turks on run. Also would discourage Greeks as indicating Turkey weakening in resolve resist aggression.

Saka said he intends consult British also on this.

In considering what reply we should make following occurs to me:

1. We can either

(a) limit ourselves to giving Turks info in our possession re international situation on basis of which they can make own decision or,

(b) We can go further and give them advice re what we think they should do. In latter case we may seem incur moral commitment assist Turks certain contingencies if they follow our advice.

2. On assumption Soviet policy re Turkey is to maintain pressure short of actual aggression in effort in long run break Turk economy, reduction armed forces would relieve economic burden and thereby tend defeat Soviet policy. Such action, moreover, instead of encouraging Soviets, as Saka thinks, might have opposite effect as indicating Turk awareness Soviet aims and ability counter them. This reasoning is valid however only so long as little risk actual war exists. Assumption this regard held year ago perhaps less warranted today.

3. Question arises whether present strength Turk army warranted and whether army one-third smaller would not be about as effective even in case invasion. On this point best advice I get is that reduction in size would correspondingly reduce effectiveness. Firepower army will be increased somewhat by US aid program but this not effective before at least one year.

4. Internal political considerations doubtless influence some extent Turk Cabinet’s reactions this problem. There is discontent over high cost living and strong criticism by opposition party of Government’s failure do something improve economic situation. Calling of new class, additional taxation or another budget deficit covered by loans would not add to Government’s popularity.

5. On balance, and looking at matter with obviously limited knowledge available here of overall world situation, I believe Turks would be well advised to maintain present strength armed forces for at least another year. While this would add to economic burden it would not break their economy. It would give them time to see where world is going in next few months whether western Europe collapses economically or whether US aid can bolster her in time lay basis for recovery. If conditions year hence no worse than today Turks could at that time with improved fire power of army from US aid envisage reduction army with perhaps less risk than at present. With foregoing in mind, I therefore recommend that in reply to Saka we follow course under 1 (a) above, namely limit ourselves to giving Turks full and frank view of international situation as we see it and let them make own decision on question armed strength. My guess is that if we do this Turk Government will decide either retain most 1925 class another year or call new class.

Please see cable 177 August 15 to War Department from Military Attaché reporting conversation with Chief Turk General Staff on same subject.

Wilson

1. The bracketed portion does not appear in the record copy of telegram 655. At the Department’s request, it was supplied by the Embassy in Ankara, in an unnumbered telegram, August 20, noon (867.20/8–2047).