Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, The Near East and Africa, Volume V

868.00/7–2247

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Jernegan)

secret

[Washington,] July 22, 1947.

Participants:	Constantine Tsaldaris, Greek Foreign Minister.
	Mr. Gouras, Counselor of Greek Embassy.
	Mr. Armour
	Mr. Villard, NEA
	Mr. Jernegan, NE

Mr. Tsaldaris called at his own request. He began by discussing the difficulties of coping with the present situation in Greece through a coalition government, saying that it was very difficult to take decisions and act when it was necessary to consult so many different leaders. He remarked that in his capacity as Foreign Minister he was frequently afraid to transmit information to other members of the cabinet, because as soon as he did so the information ceased to be secret. He said that, as leader of the majority party in the Parliament, he could still command the support of more than 200 deputies, and he had been wondering whether he should not dissolve the coalition and reestablish a one-party cabinet based on this majority. Mr. Tsaldaris did not appear to expect any comment on these remarks, and the Department’s representatives expressed no opinion.

Mr. Tsaldaris handed to Mr. Armour an aide-mémoire¹ setting forth his views on developments in the Greek case before the Security Council. These were in general similar to the thoughts set forth in his letter of July 20 to the Secretary of State. He emphasized the danger that the action contemplated under the United States resolution before the Council might prove to be inadequate even if it were not vetoed by the Soviet representative. Saying that in the event of a veto our course of action would be comparatively clear, the Foreign Minister suggested that the situation might be even more difficult if the Soviet Union abstained on the vote and so permitted adoption of the resolution. In that case, the Soviet representative or those of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia might assert: (a) that the resolution, being presented in terms of Chapter 6 of the Charter, could constitute only a recommendation which left the states concerned free to accept or reject it as they chose, or (b) they might assert that the constitution of a commission such as that proposed in the resolution was an infringement of the sovereignty of the states concerned and therefore not binding because contrary to the provisions of the Charter, or (c) they might make no statement at the time but later sabotage the work of the proposed commission by refusing to cooperate with it in the same way as they were now refusing to cooperate with the subsidiary group of the Balkan Investigation Commission. Any one of these three courses, Mr. Tsaldaris thought, would present us with a very dangerous situation. He feared that the proposed commission would become a screen behind which the USSR and its satellites could continue and expand their aggressive activities against Greece.

Mr. Armour and Mr. Villard told the Foreign Minister that we appreciated the dangers but felt they would have to be met when they arose. We believed that final decisions in this regard could only be taken after the vote on the U.S. resolution and in the light of the circumstances.

Mr. Tsaldaris asked whether he could not return to the Department for further consultation on this subject. He pointed out that he would soon be returning to Athens and would have to tell his Government what the U.S. had in mind with respect to further action and what part we desired Greece to play in this regard. Mr. Armour agreed that a further meeting would be desirable and said that he would always be at the disposition of Mr. Tsaldaris. He suggested that as soon as the Security Council should vote on the U.S. resolution we in the Department would formulate our plans and immediately thereafter get in touch with Mr. Tsaldaris to discuss them. The Foreign Minister said that he would wait in Washington until the vote had been taken, which was expected to be not later than Thursday, July 24.

Although he made no specific suggestions, it was clear from the trend of his remarks that Mr. Tsaldaris envisaged subsequent action following a vote on the present resolution as involving recourse to Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter and after that to Article 51 of the Charter, which provides for individual and collective action in self-defense. He again indicated his desire for the closest possible American-Greek cooperation in the present situation.

Before leaving, Mr. Tsaldaris and Mr. Gouras mentioned four relatively minor matters which they wished to bring to the attention of the Department:

[Here follows a discussion of the four matters.²]

J[ohn] D. J[ernegan]

1. Not printed.
2. Mr. Tsaldaris, accompanied by Mr. Economou-Gouras, conversed with Mr. McGhee on July 23 concerning various problems involved in the program of aid to Greece. A memorandum of that conversation by Mr. Witman states that Mr. McGhee informed Mr. Tsaldaris that “it was important to remember that U.S. aid would not be enough, but that Greece should also use all her resources to amplify the American program.… Mr. Tsaldaris replied that Greece needed not only advice but American experts to help. Mr. McGhee agreed and emphasized that strong action by the Greek Government was required.” (868.00/7–2347)