Defense Files: Telegram
The Commanding General of the British and United States Forces in Trieste (Airey) to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
GO/020 (Taf 20) 1. Now that the appointment of a Governor of the FTT may be imminent I feel bound to draw your attention to certain factors regarding the situation likely to obtain here on his arrival. These factors have been thrown into sharp relief in the light of events since 15th Sept and directly affect the security not only of the crowded [Page 109] civil population and the police of the British-American Zone but of the Allied troops and their dependents. I am not aware of the sequence of events contemplated once the Governor has been accepted nor the extent to which action is possible by the UK and US Governments to safeguard the security interests mentioned above. I consider it my duty, however, to set out my views on this subject.
2. The present Bi-Zonal arrangements, while it can be maintained, serves to a large extent to keep Trieste free from contamination by the Communized zone now under Jugoslav Military Government. The Jugoslav Zone has doubtless been organized as a base for Communist influence in the FTT in preparation for the day when the inter-zonal frontier is abolished and expansion into Trieste can begin in earnest. It is clear from the events reported in Taf 161 that the Jugoslavs had hoped to begin immediately on ratification of the Treaty, by means of a form of military coup d’état. Now that this has been frustrated I appreciate that they are waiting for the appointment of the Governor. In this connection it should be noted that I have no liaison whatever with Banina2 as I am convinced that this could only lead to further demands to bring his troops into Trieste. In the Jugoslav Zone a substantial body of police has been trained and is being expanded through a special police school in Capodistria. This police force is clearly intended for inclusion in the future FTT police force when the zones are united.
3. In my opinion the danger to Anglo-American interests in the FTT and to its security in general lies in the possibility of the Governor allowing the 2 zones to be fused, and in his redistributing the troops, before he has appointed a Director of Public Security and before the latter has thought out and implemented a sound police policy to cover both zones. If this should happen a situation might well arise similar to that which the Jugoslav Military Command attempted to create by a show of force on the night 15th/16th Sept.
4. The effect of stationing Jugoslav troops in Trieste does not appear to me to be comparable to that now obtaining in Berlin and Vienna where garrison duties are shared with Russian troops. In the first place Trieste contains 2 strongly opposed factions, Italian and Slav-Communist, of which the latter has always maintained through its press and local organizations, a violent campaign against the civil police. In the second place experience shows that Jugoslav troops in this area (in particular the Jugoslav Detachment now apparently earmarked for Trieste) will not accept a non-Communist police force and are [Page 110] specially groomed as an agency for supporting political and terroristic activities.
5. Question will inevitably arise of the administration of FTT during period between Governor’s assumption of office, when Article 1 of Annex 173 to the Treaty will automatically cease to apply, and establishment of Provisional Council of Government as a functioning body. From a practical viewpoint, the most satisfactory solution would be for the two zones to continue to be administered separately under AMG and Jugoslav Military Government until the Provisional Government was ready to operate. In case this should prove to be unacceptable however, plans are now being made, the knowledge of which is confined to the staff of my headquarters, to earmark officials and others who are available in the zone to replace the Allied personnel of AMG exclusive of the police. This would provide for a purely civil administration which, in the absence of a better team, could function as a temporary measure.
6. In my opinion, the police force in the zone could only continue to operate after the civilianization of the remainder of the government if a backbone of Allied officers or of officers who are nationals of some disinterested country were maintained.
7. As regards problems connected with formation of his Provisional Council of Government and administration of territory as a whole once the two zones are fused, any attempt by me to offer advice to Governor might be interpreted locally as an attempt to exert unfair Anglo-US influence. The British and US Political Advisors are however forwarding annotated lists of personalities in British-US Zones of [to] Foreign Office and State Department, which they may find useful as a basis for advice to the Governor. In this connection, British and US Governments no doubt have in mind the question of counteracting the violent pressure which will almost certainly be applied to induce Governor to accept the exponents of Communist and Jugoslav views.
8. In conclusion I assume that the Governor will not enter the territory until he has studied the situation and evolved a definite plan for [Page 111] its administration. I would strongly recommend that, if at all possible, he should not attempt to unite the two zones until he has appointed his Director of Public Security and made full provisions for the preservation of law and order and the prevention of political terrorism. It may well be that this end could best be achieved by planning the reorganization of the police and the creation of a neutral security force which could replace the three national contingents as soon as possible.
9. I consider that the factors discussed above are of first importance if the Balkanisation of Trieste is to be prevented and if the security of the local population and the Allied troops and their dependents is to be maintained on a stable basis.
- Not printed. See footnote 2, p. 99.↩
- Gen. Ante Banina, Commander of the Yugoslav contingent in the Free Territory of Trieste.↩
- The reference is to article 1 of Annex VII which
states: ↩
“The Governor shall assume office in the Free Territory at the earliest possible moment after the coming into force of the present Treaty. Pending assumption of office by the Governor, the Free Territory shall continue to be administered by the Allied military commands within their respective zones.”