Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

860H.00/7–747

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Cabot) to the Secretary of State

confidential
No. 1063

Belgrade, July 7, 1947.

Sir: Having now been in charge of this Embassy for five months and the arrival of Ambassador Cannon being imminent,¹ I have the honor to summarize herewith some reflections on the Yugoslav situation in the hope that the Department may find them interesting.

1. A great deal of confused thinking regarding the world situation could be avoided if observers first answered the question: Would the Communists be willing to conclude and abide by any settlement short of world domination? Too often the comment offered would be valid only on the assumption that the answer was yes, yet the observer in other passages shows that his answer is no. On the basis of the Communist record, both in word and deed, this must be the answer at present to the above question. In the light of our experiences with Hitler and Mein Kampf we must not disregard the plain warnings which have so freely been offered us.

2. Communist propaganda emphasizes world revolution rather than the aggressive war glorified by fascist propaganda. Moreover, communist propaganda regarding world revolution is predicated on the inevitable aggressivity of monopoly capitalism. This affords some slight ground for hope that Communism would find naked military aggression difficult. However, piling up arms for “defense” and making revolutionary forays into non-communist territory are likely to lead to end results not dissimilar from militarism and aggressions.

3. Communism is preparing for war. For example, Yugoslavia reeks with evidences of militarism (budgeted military appropriations for 1947 are 13.5 billion dinars as against 10.5 billion for 1946). Yet strangely enough it appears that these preparations are really inspired by fear. There is good reason to believe that our aid to Greece has augmented the Communist jitters.

4. The biggest monopoly capitalists in the world today are the self-perpetuating cliques running the communist countries, who have concentrated all political as well as economic power in their hands. Possibly the Communists are right in insisting that monopoly capitalism breeds war.

5. The Communist bloc can scarcely afford to challenge the United States for some years at least. During this period we must strive to deflect Communism from its present course, which makes an eventual clash almost inevitable if and when Communism feels itself strong enough. Since we cannot be optimistic of success and must not think to mollify Communism by making material concessions we are confronted with a fundamental dilemma as to the course we should pursue. For an indefinite period the peace of the world must depend on our having a superiority of force and being willing to use it to defend the peace if necessary. Yet we must never despair of an eventual understanding; Communism has shown itself before to be more flexible in deed than in dialectic, if more flexible in its scruples than either.

6. Communism in Yugoslavia (as I gather in Russia) is not a political creed; it is a faith. Its adherents are passionately sincere in spouting the party line, and this must not be discounted. It is not mere cant, as is often assumed. As a new faith Communism is filled with fanaticism and drive, just as Christianity and Mohammedanism were when they were young. It is a subversive, dissolving doctrine, as was early Christianity. As Christianity, it faces a civilized world which has generally lost faith. The parallelism is disturbing in every sense, since Christianity was a popular but not a democratic movement in its inception. It is also important to note that in time of storm and stress, when bewildered people admit they can no longer think things through, they are likely to turn to a confident new faith which states without any reservation that it has all the answers.

7. Communism has great weaknesses: in basing its doctrine on materialism, in holding that the means, however tortuous, justifies the end, and in trampling on the spontaneous yearning of humankind for freedom (note, however, the play on the other great yearning, security). A faith which teaches that anything is fair to promote its spread, ascribes every human act to cynical motives and rejects the ethical concepts common to all enduring faiths must contain the germ of its own destruction. Already in Yugoslavia it is noticeable how the Communist clique is not only enjoying power for its own sake, but also for its perquisites and prerogatives—elaborate houses with costly furnishings, decorations and expensive uniforms, sumptuous official banquets, and magnificent parades and ceremonies. Absolute power must inevitably corrupt, as must material possessions. Will not zeal be chilled, ideology forgotten and individual ambition shatter the monolithic structure of the faith? If Christianity after nineteen centuries has fallen so far short of realizing its ideals, how much more rapidly is Communism likely to show its weaknesses, and disillusion its followers? As Communism spreads and becomes respectable as Christianity did, will not this also dilute its force and fanaticism? On the other hand, we must remember the force that Christianity remained even when it disregarded its fundamental doctrines; the Inquisition was no less repugnant to the concepts of charity and brotherly love than the OZNA is to “liberty for the people”.

8. If my understanding of Russian Communism is correct, Yugoslav Communism already shows significant divergences from Russian, despite its position as favorite child and the basic similarity of race and political tradition.² Yugoslav Communism is as suspicious, arbitrary, brutal, intolerant of opposition, fanatical and tortuous as Russian. On the other hand, it leads by no means the hermit-like existence led by Russian Communism. It is secretive, but by no means as secretive. It discourages by terror contact between foreigners and “reactionaries”, knowing full well what the latter will say if given half a chance. On the other hand, people not suspected by the government are freer in their contact with foreigners and in their willingness to discuss ideology and international politics than is generally realized. This is particularly true of some avowed Communists. Despite the fact it is rarely easy to reach an agreement with them in such discussions, they give every evidence of having the same motivations as people not subject to Communist indoctrination—for example they respond to simple courtesy, friendliness and straightforwardness even from a capitalist representative. I have no doubt however, that this varies among individuals.

There are other important differences between Russian and Yugoslav Communism. For example, the upper classes and the churches, though sorely oppressed, have not been liquidated to the extent they were in the early days in Russia. The peasants continue to own their land. But considering that the last open political opposition has only just been liquidated and that the nationalization law was promulgated as recently as last December, we should perhaps not draw too hasty conclusions regarding end results.

9. It is vital to remember that most of the qualities attributed above to Yugoslav Communism and ascribed to its influence are in fact often Yugoslav rather than Communist characteristics, and were as much a part of the pre-war as of the present scene in this country (just as I believe Communism introduced few of the basic factors that characterize it in Russia). One is struck time and again by this when reading descriptions of pre-war Yugoslavia. Having suffered for half a millenium under the Turkish blight, it is not surprising that Yugoslav standards and customs differ from those of the west.

10. It is equally vital in seeking to appraise the present regime to do so not by western standards but by standards set by previous regimes. The former regimes also were often dictatorial, suspicious, tortuous, brutal and arbitrary as well as corrupt, reactionary, and ineffective. Many of the features we particularly detest—the arbitrary and brutal actions of the police, the lack of personal guarantees, the tortuous and capricious diplomacy, etc—were only less characteristic of previous regimes; we notice and resent them more now primarily because they are aimed now at us rather than at nations we dislike, and at cosmopolitan Yugoslavs with a superficially western outlook whom we like rather than at humble agitators of whom we had never heard. In part, because of earlier abuses, some scions of the ruling clique joined the Communist movement and have even played a leading role in it.

11. In the crisis of World War II, Yugoslavia’s internal hatreds proved stronger than hatred of the enemies; hence even Mihailovitch’s³ eventual collaboration with the Germans and Italians. Because Mihailovitch represented the conservative elements who had something to lose, he was unwilling to provoke brutal reprisals by ineffective activities; because the Partisans were led by men serving Russia rather than their own country, they were not deterred by reprisals—on the contrary these were grist for their mill. Easy though it now is to criticize the abandonment of Mihailovitch, continued support might have produced incalculable consequences on Western-Soviet relations during and since the war. The decision nevertheless forced Mihailovitch into the Nazi-Fascist camp.

The Partisan triumph has undoubtedly redounded to their credit among the Yugoslav populace. Compare Mihailovitch to the Federalists during and after our war of 1812.

12. The Yugoslavs are suffering among other things from a severe war neurosis, inevitable in a people who have had so many harrowing experiences in so short a time. In dealing with them this fact must always be remembered.

13. A fundamental difficulty in relations with Yugoslavia at the moment is the overturn of personnel in the bureaucracy. After four years of fighting and destroying, guerrilla fighters were brought from the woods and put at government desks, while trained personnel was discharged if the Communists considered them for any reason untrustworthy. They not only had no tradition or training; they were often illiterate. Purge trials since have thrown further sand into the administrative gears. The amazing thing is not that there has been inefficiency, inconsistency, chaos and confusion, but rather that under the circumstances the job has been as well done as it has been. Yugoslavia is well up in front in her recovery despite her terrific war losses and the social overturn which has taken place. Much that we lay to Yugoslav malice when we seek effective action of them and fail to get it is really caused by this situation in the Yugoslav bureaucracy. It is not surprising that delay is chronic, blunders are very frequent and officialdom does not show the care and restraint which might normally be expected of it.

14. To Communism’s credit it has softened hatreds between Serb and Croat, Serb and Slovene, Croat and Slovene, Serb and Bulgar, Serb and Hungarian. It has done this however, in part by polarizing all hatreds on the Communist vs. anti-Communist issue.

15. It is very dangerous to generalize too much on the degree of popular support or lack thereof the present government enjoys. The glib estimates of 85–95% of the people against the government are obviously mere guesses. (Latest joke: the people are 95% for Marshal Tito; 5% for Tito and 90% for Marshall). My own guess is that the great masses, although sceptical and dissatisfied are not bitterly opposed to the government. Why should they be? Except for such matters as government controls and grain collections it doesn’t get much more in their hair than previous regimes: Note relative indifference shown even in the United States in Gallup Polls regarding many important issues. Note also comparative lack of guerrilla activities now as compared with period of Nazi domination. After what these people did to the Nazis, it is difficult to believe that only fear restrains them. The bitter diatribes of former political leaders and the cosmopolitan clique who have been particularly prejudiced by the overturn should not be taken as representing the popular feeling. Even assuming that a large majority of Yugoslavs are opposed to the Communist regime, this does not mean that more Yugoslavs would risk their lives to overthrow it than to defend it. Popular discontent is apparently not at the explosion point (this does not rule out a classic Serb coup d’état). Finally, Yugoslavs who dislike the government often dislike even more foreign philippics directed at it.

16. The present regime is taking many measures to gain people’s support, to indoctrinate the young and to stir the enthusiasm of the masses. It also has a creditable reconstruction record, particularly in comparison with the records of previous regimes and in other similarly placed countries. We should not too blithely discount its success. The ruthless indoctrination of the young has particularly sinister connotations for our future relations with this country.

17. The Partisans, though largely Communist inspired and led, are a very heterogeneous group. Differences of opinion clearly exist between them, even though they are very discreet. Effective opposition to Soviet domination is more likely to come from the Partisan ranks than from the opposition. Conflicts of interest with Russia are inevitable, and the intense nationalism of the country might play a decisive role if an acute situation arose. By the same token, there are moderates and fanatics in Yugoslav government ranks who might under special circumstances irrevocably split. On such a fundamental issue as peace vs. military adventures, it is pretty well established that differences of opinion exist.

18. In the months since my first call at the Foreign Office (February 11) there have been no perceptible changes in the fundamentals of our relations with this country. Its policy is as anti-United States and pro-Russian as ever. Official propaganda is violently hostile and not even the mildest or most justified good word can be said about us. The police state and militarism are as strong as ever. Guerrilla activities in Greece supported from Yugoslavia continue unabated. A few faint signs are beginning to appear, however, that a change in fundamentals cannot be altogether ruled out.

19. During this period definite progress has been made in clearing up specific problems: (a) negotiations are now under way in Washington looking to a settlement of outstanding claims and of the blocked assets question.⁴ (b) The Italian-Yugoslav provisional frontier demarcation has been practically completed, and the provisional demarcation of the Trieste frontier is now being undertaken, the Yugoslavs having persuaded the Russians to reconsider their twice-reiterated refusal to participate;⁵ (c) after stormy negotiations (including an accusation of spying) the Graves Registration Unit has been permitted to carry out its appointed tasks and is doing so smoothly, (d) Important progress has been made in tying together the broken threads of trade, and real cooperation is now being secured from the Ministry of Foreign Trade in this connection, (e) The Yugoslav authorities are showing a much more cooperative attitude in the protection and repatriation of American citizens. Most new cases have been settled without fuss. Marked progress has been made in the repatriation of the Volksdeutsche American citizens in concentration camps. (f) Pintar’s life has been saved, though his sentence is still severe, (g) Wedge’s sentence has been reduced by two years, (h) The Embassy plane is now flying freely, so far as the Yugoslav authorities are concerned, within and without the country, (i) The position of USIS is beginning to improve. The Embassy’s most conspicuous failure has been its inability to accomplish anything for its two arrested translators.

20. Even more important is the progress in intangibles—particularly what has been prevented from happening. On February 11, two Embassy translators were in jail; another had just been executed through the folly of a former American employee who was busy making diatribes against Yugoslavia from the safety of the United States; the Yugoslav employees were terrorized and the American staff demoralized; among other indiscretions the Embassy had been caught in several incredibly clumsy cloak and dagger adventures; a series of humiliating incidents had occurred; the USIS had just been permitted to reopen on humiliating terms and the Embassy plane to fly precariously out of the country; an American citizen had been condemned to death on frivolous grounds to discredit the Consulate at Zagreb; the Ambassador was ranging the length and breadth of the United States denouncing the government to which he was still accredited; Embassy prestige had vanished; relations between the Foreign Office and the Embassy were badly strained, confidence between them had disappeared, and it was almost impossible even to secure appointments with top officials; practically no Yugoslav, official or otherwise, would have anything to do with an Embassy official; and even such homely necessities as coal and transportation were short. (In fairness to Mr. Hickok it must be pointed out that he was not responsible for this mess, which he inherited).

Today, despite at least two scares (flights of Embassy plane, March, and Yugoslav employees, May) and the growing tension internationally, the campaign against the Embassy seems to have practically stopped. There have been no incidents discreditable to the Embassy and the Yugoslav authorities have cooperated with the Embassy in taking prompt and reasonably adequate action to remedy those that have occurred. Entry to the Foreign Office has been restored; friendly contact with a number of Yugoslav officials has been established and their confidence secured (Col. Partridge, Mr. Leonhart⁶ and Mr. Kling have distinguished themselves in replacing previous officers, notably Mr. Fraleigh⁷ in this); government officials are again glad to accept Embassy invitations and to extend significantly cordial gestures (for example, May 30); the local American correspondents are no longer a thorn in the Embassy’s side; Embassy prestige is somewhat restored, and Embassy morale has improved. Means of coercion being in any case lacking, most of this has been accomplished by simply applying the principles of courtesy, understanding, justice, interest, consideration and straightforwardness as well as firmness. Although petty palliatives for specific sore spots could not change fundamentals, a policy adopted in part faute de mieux has achieved, surprisingly enough, a modest but real success. In two important respects, however, the situation is still unsatisfactory; OZNA pressure on Yugoslav employees of the Embassy for information continues unabated, and the housing authorities continue to treat the Embassy staff shabbily. It must be emphatically repeated that fundamentals have not changed, despite a few encouraging signs.

21. All of the above has been accomplished despite a deteriorating international situation and without any material concessions on our part. Since February 11, the Embassy has been faced with repercussions of our aid to Greece, the UN Commission’s report, Greek border incidents,⁸ the failure of the Moscow Conference,⁹ the Hungarian crisis¹⁰ and a number of less important developments. It had had to contend in its direct relations with our answer to their plea for food, our intransigeant attitude in the Carinthian and Austrian reparations matters,¹¹ the tourist ban, the continued blocking of Yugoslav gold and assets in the United States, the aftermath of the Nicoloff case, our jaundiced view of local UNRRA operations, etc. With the single exception of the Nicoloff case, the Embassy is in entire agreement with our position in all of the above cases, but they did not help in its task, let alone give it any trading assets.

22. My thoughts regarding future policy are set forth in Embassy telegram No. 141 dated February 15, 1947, and I see little need in the light of experience for modifying them. However, the following points may be mentioned:

(a) As a small, nationalistic country which has suffered much, Yugoslavia intensely resents scolding and hectoring. If we learn this lesson, Russia may some day be forced to also.

(b) Twice in my lifetime, Yugoslavia has been cast in a heroic mold—her resistance to the Nazis (alone among the occupied nations the Yugoslavs maintained a continued open resistance) but added to the glory of her resistance to Austria-Hungary in the first World War. She is not likely to be intimidated by choleric notes or by arrogance and bluster. On the contrary, we have seen that we are likely to be cast in the role of the banker exchanging epithets with the brat who has snowballed his silk hat. Words are no substitute for deeds.

(c) Experience has shown the futility of mere expressions of disapproval of this regime on the part of the Embassy. Quite apart from obstructing day to day business they resulted in retaliatory action which might well have put the Embassy out of business and which destroyed its prestige even among the opposition. There is practically no middle ground between getting what one wants through coercion and getting it because the other guy is perfectly satisfied to let one have it. If personal relationships between the Embassy staff and Government officials are bad the Embassy can accomplish practically nothing.

(d) It would be fruitless merely to find out what the Yugoslavs want and then oppose it. Our approach must be selective. Thought rather than emotion must be the basis on which each step is planned.

(e) Despite the fact that the Yugoslavs in power are chronic liars, and incredibly tortuous in their thinking, some do seem to appreciate a straightforward approach. In any case we can never beat the Yugoslavs at their own tortuous game.

(f) Being tortuous, the Yugoslav government will generally refuse to yield in the field in which it is pressed, but will often yield in another field. On the other hand, when attacked they will often reply with parallel charges which are sometimes childish.

(g) The Yugoslav authorities are desperately afraid of the truth, and equally afraid of the great prestige of the United States. Since at least all of Belgrade knows what comes over foreign short wave broadcasts, the Voice of America broadcasts could do an immense service (I have the impression a greater one than they are doing) to get across the truth about the United States and the falsity of the local propaganda about us.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(i) Almost everyone in Government circles is intensely resentful towards the United States. The resentment derives principally from our attitude in the Trieste and Carinthia questions, our failure to deliver war criminals, our aid to Greece, discreditable activities of the former Embassy staff, our unbending hostility towards them at international meetings, etc. It is exacerbated continually by less important incidents and developments. In our dealings with them we should never forget their deep, sincere and widespread sense of grievance.

(j) Despite their resentment probably a majority of the policy making figures in the government would like closer relations with us. Their views stretch all the way from those that hate our guts but who think better relations prudent or advisable to those who are potentially friendly. Some realize the dangers of an international explosion; others quite cynically appreciate the harm they have done themselves; another group wants markets for Yugoslav goods and the foreign exchange obtained thereby as well as the materials, machinery, consumers’ goods, etc., which they so desperately need from us if they are to carry out their five-year plan; and yet others want the intellectual and scientific contacts so needed by the leaders in this country in those fields, if the arts and sciences are not to retrogress and the country’s development not to be retarded. The Yugoslav policy makers want these better relations on their own terms; with skill and patience on our pail they may perforce come to accept ours.

(k) Although because of its organization and fanaticism it is very difficult to dislodge a Communist regime once established, we should not altogether despair that the present government will evolve into a more independent position or that it may be overthrown and replaced by a more friendly government. We must remember that:

(I) Sectional, racial and religious hatreds are traditionally violent and divisive.

(II) Serbian-Yugoslav history is full of violent overturns, despite the fact that the secret police are nothing new.

(III) In Yugoslavia personal ambitions have shown themselves to be particularly strong and ruthless.

(IV) A virile, nationalistic, independent people are likely to find the indefinite tutelage even of the Slav big brother galling. There is too much of it, and it is too arrogant.

(V) Even the Communist trained leaders, after the first flush of suddenly acquired power, must eventually be irked at Russian tutelage.

(VI) Even though this is a tough dictatorship there are within the government deep and strong cross currents. The government is by no means solidly communistic even though the real leaders are.

(VII) The Catholic and Orthodox churches continue to have a strong hold on the peasantry and they are basically opposed to Communism.

(l) By pin-pricking and unremitting hostility we drive the moderates into the arms of the extremists and the country into the Russian bear’s embrace. It is vital that the top people here should always have the feeling that our door is open if they want to come in and behave themselves. Sinners are generally saved by charity and understandings not by denunciations from the pulpit. There isn’t much chance the present gang will repent, but they should have the opportunity.

(m) I assume that our long-range policy towards this country should aim to promote a government ruling with the consent of the governed, responsive primarily to the will and needs of the people, and reasonably independent in its international relations, particularly of Russian directives. To accomplish this I believe we should hammer constantly on the clashes of interest between Russia and Yugoslavia, and that equally we should always be striving to drive a wedge between the moderates who, whatever their emotions may be, appreciate what the score is, particularly in their relations with us, and the extremists who are blinded by dialectic and hatred. It is for this reason that quiet acts which hurt, rather than public denunciations which infuriate, should be the weapons we use against this country.

(n) We must strive, within the principles and severe limitations set forth above, to reach an understanding with the Yugoslav Government, regardless of its stripe, which will help preserve the peace of the world. We should not be optimistic of success, but it would be criminal not to make the effort, and equally not to have patience or to despair of success. And if, though we have sincerely and honorably striven to keep the peace, it is again broken by totalitarian aggression, we can go to our people with clean hands, we can present an impelling case at the bar of world public opinion and we can be sure that even in Yugoslavia—even in the very government—there will be those that will fight sick at heart, because they know their cause is unholy.

Respectfully yours,

John M. Cabot

1. Cavendish W. Cannon was confirmed by the Senate as Ambassador to Yugoslavia on April 9. He arrived in Belgrade on July 9 and presented his letters of credence on July 14.
2. The wife of the French Ambassador, who was stationed for ten years in Moscow told me that Russian Communism was “a thousand times” worse than Yugoslav. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. Gen. Draža Mihailovich, leader of the wartime resistance forces (Chetniks) and Minister of War in the Royal Yugoslav Government in Exile, was executed by the Yugoslav Government on July 17 for collaboration with the Germans and Italians and for war crimes.
4. Regarding the negotiations under reference, see telegram 464, July 16, to Belgrade, infra.
5. For documentation regarding the demarcation of the Trieste frontier, see pp. 51 ff.
6. William K. Leonhart, Third Secretary at the Embassy in Belgrade.
7. William N. Fraleigh, Second Secretary at the Embassy in Belgrade during 1945 and 1946.
8. Documentation regarding U.S. aid to Greece, the Report of the United Nations Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents (May 1947), and Greek border incidents are included in the collection of papers on the interest of the United States in the problems of the Greek frontier, in volume v .
9. The Fourth Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers was held in Moscow, March 10–April 24. For documentation on this conference, see vol. ii, pp. 139 ff.
10. At the beginning of June, Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy resigned and went into exile. For documentation regarding the interest of the United States in the maintenance of democratic government in Hungary, see pp. 260 ff.
11. For additional documentation on the topics under reference here, see vol. ii, pp. 1167 ff.