Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

740.00116 EW/6–1147: Telegram

The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Cabot) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Belgrade, June 11, 1947—4 p. m.

629. I must again express to the Department my respectful but very serious concern at manner in which Yugoslav quisling matter is being handled.¹

From Leghorn’s 15, June 7, 9 a. m.,² I gather that McLean [Maclean] is being excluded as much as possible from work of joint screening teams and that some arrangement has been worked out with Vatican and Argentina by which collaborationist Yugoslavs will be helped to emigrate to Argentina.³ I scarcely need point out to Department that Embassy cannot properly handle this matter at this end unless it is kept adequately informed and that both these points if true have very serious connotations in local scene. I should imagine that if they became publicly established they would furnish most effective argument for Communist propaganda to sway world opinion and would greatly strengthen Yugoslav case in event they take it to UN.

Embassy’s note of April 8⁴ states that US and UK “are determined to apprehend and surrender to Yugoslav Government all quislings requested by Yugoslav Government to whose surrender two first named governments agree and who can be found in camps under Allied control.” I find it impossible to reconcile this commitment with paragraph 7 of Leghorn’s 15⁵ and feel very strongly that we must bestir ourselves to fulfill our commitments in letter and in spirit.

Reference Rome’s 1338, May 29, I regret any injustice I may have done military authorities and I trust I have made it clear in my telegrams that I do not favor handing over to Yugoslavs anyone against whom they have not established a prima facie case. Nevertheless, it is crystal clear even on basis of material available in this Embassy’s files that we have flouted our own commitments and that by our attitude we are protecting not only quislings but also been [those?] guilty of terrible crimes committed in Yugoslavia.… But so far as I can ascertain record now is, despite our commitments and moral obligations (1) we have failed to take effective action, (2) we have prevented British from taking effective action, (3) we have not insisted that Italy take effective action, (4) we are apparently conniving with Vatican and Argentina to get guilty people to haven in latter country. I sincerely hope I am mistaken, particularly regarding latter point. How we can defend this record before UN if Yugoslavs take it there I do not know, and there are increasing evidences they will. As I see it we may then be forced either to accept a humiliating decision against us or so to manipulate things as to show that we also consider UN a mere instrument of power politics. I also trust Catholic Church realize how extremely damaging this affair might be to its position in this country.

Further reference Rome’s 1338, our position will not be improved if Italians hand over Yugoslav quislings and war criminals under Yugoslav pressure after we have failed to do so or if Italians refuse under pressure from us to do so or point out manner in which some of those wanted by Yugoslavs have left Italy.

Reference despatch No. 7, May 16, from USPolAd at Leghorn,⁶ I see no harm in connecting extradition of quislings with question of the Italians deported from Venezia Giulia provided it is made quite clear that any action on our part is taken in light of failure of Yugoslavs to act for over year assuming, of course, that this is the case. We cannot, however, in good faith take this attitude until we have taken effective action to round up Yugoslav quislings and war criminals in Italy preparatory to delivering them to Yugoslavs.

Sent Department 629, repeated Rome 51 and Leghorn.

Cabot

1. The Department of State responded to this telegram by referring the Embassy in Belgrade to telegrams 44 to Leghorn, June 12 (infra) and 932 to Rome, June 16, p. 813. No other reply was sent.
2. The reference here is to telegram 89 from Leghorn, June 7, p. 808.
3. Argentina was one of the principal reception countries of Yugoslav refugees being resettled at this time by the International Refugee Organization. Attached to the source text is a memorandum, dated June 13 and prepared in the Division of Special Inter-American Affairs which explains the settlement of Yugoslavs in Argentina as follows:

   “Specifically, the U.S. is not giving Argentina persons who have committed crimes, or who have given aid and comfort to the enemy (Germany) for which the present gov’t of Yugoslavia now desires their repatriation. Such persons would be ‘blacks’ and are subject to be returned to their homeland, to a certain death, it seems. The ‘greys’ are those Yugoslavs, displaced in Italy, who may have served under Mihailovitch—Chetniks—or, perhaps, who enlisted in the German army or otherwise disqualified themselves for IGC–IRO care (these are ‘whites’) but are not bad enough, in our opinion, to be [sent] back to Yugoslavia as ‘blacks’. True enough, the Yugoslav gov’t would like to see returned to it even the ‘greys’, but this is where the U.S. has taken a strong stand. We will not hand over people we do not really think are guilty. Thus, Argentina, in taking some of the ‘greys’, takes persons whom Yugoslavia would like to have, but takes them with the approval of U.S. authorities and after full screening to be sure no really guilty individuals are among them.”

4. Regarding the delivery of the note under reference here, see telegram 355, April 8, from Belgrade, p. 785.
5. Leghorn’s No. 89 to the Department, supra.
6. Not printed.