740.00116 EW/5–547

The Second Secretary of the British Embassy (Solly-Flood) to the Acting Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs (Barbour)1

confidential

Ref: 527/348/47

My Dear Wally: You will recall that I raised with you informally some days ago the question of divergence in attitude between our two [Page 792] Governments about Yugoslav applications for the surrender of alleged war criminals. We told the Foreign Office that you were considering tentatively at the working level the establishment of a cut-off date, after which no further applications would be considered. We also informed them that you were not too happy about the category of agreed quislings. In addition, the Foreign Office have, of course, noted your refusal to allow the surrenders of Messrs. Kuvezdic, Grdjic and Dujsin.2 We have now received the Foreign Office’s comments both about the principles involved and about your attitude with reference to these individual applications.

The Foreign Office have asked us to remind you that on 9th October, 1945, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom addressed a communication to the Yugoslav Government stating that they would surrender those traitors and collaborators in their hands, provided that in each instance the Yugoslav Government was able to establish a prima facie case of guilt. Subsequently it was agreed by His Majesty’s Government to hand over all proven active members of the Ustashi. His Majesty’s Government have repeated these two undertakings to the Yugoslav Government ad nauseam, finally giving a further undertaking to honour them when our two Governments made their joint communication to the Yugoslav Government on 8th April, 1947.3 His Majesty’s Government are unable to renounce their public undertakings and they can see no reason to do so. They share the view of the United States Government that especial care should be taken to hand back none but genuine collaborators, but they consider that sympathy is wasted upon persons who whatever their motives gave their support to the regimes of Pavelic and Ljotic.4 British courts have condemned [Page 793] to death or long sentences of imprisonment British subjects whose aid to the enemy was limited to broadcasts on the German wireless, and the Foreign Office consider that there is at least no certainty that in general quislings and collaborators handed over to the Yugoslav Government are likely to receive unduly harsh treatment. His Majesty’s Ambassador at Belgrade in a recent telegram to the Foreign Office pointed this out very forcibly and drew attention to the fact that even prominent collaborators such as the former head of Nedic’s Propaganda Service only received five years hard labour. He is of the opinion that since the rank and file in the Yugoslav refugee camps abroad are in the majority ignorant and bewildered peasants, they are likely to be interrogated upon their return to Yugoslavia and perhaps detained for a week or two in repatriation centres. After that, if they keep their mouths shut and do as they are told, he does not believe that they are likely to be victimized. He believes that the Yugoslav Government are genuinely afraid that His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government intend to maintain Yugoslav émigrés abroad as a means and centre of anti-Yugoslav activity.

The Foreign Office are most anxious to concert their policy with yours, but they cannot do this to the length of repudiating an international undertaking freely given. They note, however, that in the case of General Damjanovic, the leader of Chetniks, you declared that a decision about him must be taken by His Majesty’s Government alone, and that you so informed the Yugoslavs.5 They therefore assume that the removal of all the occupants in British camps in Italy to Germany means an end of joint responsibility for their treatment and that the disposal of persons thus transferred will be effected in the way in which that of the Yugoslavs in the British zone of Germany has always been effected, namely, on the decision of His Majesty’s Government without reference to the United States Government.

In the light of the foregoing, the Foreign Office hope that you will now alter your views and agree to the surrender of Kuvezdic, Dujšin and Grdjic, or that you will at least withdraw your objections to such action.

Yours very sincerely,

Peter
P. Solly-Flood
  1. Copies of this memorandum were sent as enclosures to instruction 653, May 20 to Belgrade, and instruction 7030, October 30 to Berlin, neither printed (740.00116 EW/5–2647, 9–3047).
  2. Zivan Kuvezdić had been a member of the Parliament of occupied Croatia and Minister without Portfolio, 1943–1945, in the Croatian puppet-government headed by Ante Pavelić. Ignacije Dujšin had been a journalist in wartime Croatia. Radmilo Grdjić, a pre-war Minister of the Royal Yugoslav Household, was alleged to have served as an agent of the Italian Secret Police in wartime Croatia. All three fled to Italy in 1945 where they were arrested by British authorities in April 1947.

    In letters to Solly-Flood dated April 30 and May 5, none printed, Barbour stated that the United States was unable to concur in the handing over of these three individuals to the Yugoslav authorities. Barbour maintained that the Yugoslav authorities appeared to have requested the delivery of these individuals primarily because of their opposition to the current Yugoslav regime. Willful and active collaboration with the enemy or commission of atrocious crimes had not been satisfactorily established. (860H.00/4–847 and 740.00116 EW/4–1646)

  3. Regarding the delivery of the note under reference, see telegram 355, April 8 from Belgrade, p. 785.
  4. Dimitrije Ljotić had headed an authoritarian political movement in German-occupied Serbia and had cooperated with the puppet-regime of General Nedić. Prior to his death in April 1945, Ljotić had played a leading role among those Yugoslav forces who were resisting the Communist-led Partisan movement.
  5. In response to a Yugoslav request of February 21 that Gen. Miodrag Damjanovic be turned over to Yugoslav authorities for trial on war crimes charges, the Department of State informed the Yugoslav Embassy on March 10 that General Damjanovic was in British custody and that his return would be a matter of British responsibility (740.00116 EW/2–2147).