Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

711.60H/3–347

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chargé in Yugoslavia (Cabot)¹

confidential

Belgrade , March 1, 1947.

General Velebit gave me an appointment at my request to continue our conversations of February 25.² I said that in our previous talk I had asked him to mention any further specific grievances he had and make suggestions as to what might be done. He immediately referred again to Trieste. I pointed out that this was a matter which had already been determined and that nothing could be done about it. I said that the only matter which he mentioned that I thought anything might be done about was the question of war criminals. He said that another very important matter for Yugoslavia was the question of reparations. Yugoslav representatives had been to the British and American Zones in Germany but had not been able to get any German machinery and equipment as payment in kind for reparations. Yugoslavia was a poor country which had been much devastated by the war and desperately needed these German assets. Why should the United States block their delivery?³

I replied that I frankly was not familiar with the matter but that I would immediately inquire about it. With regard to the broad matter of reparations we were paying large sums of money to keep the German and Italian people from starvation and we therefore did not want reparations to be paid indirectly out of our relief funds. We also had a claim to reparations, but we were not pressing it.

General Velebit launched into a lengthy dissertation about how Yugoslavia needed reparations and how unnecessary they were to the United States. He pointed out that American productive capacity had increased very much during the war, and that the United States did not need the German reparations, whereas Yugoslavia did. He said that at the recent Brussels Conference Yugoslavia had received but 6,000 tons of shipping, despite the fact that their merchant fleet had sunk from 450,000 to 80,000 tons. Despite the enormously greater American expenditures and losses, Yugoslavia should receive more proportionately in reparations because of its greater needs.

Having let this talk run its course, when he ended I pointed out that I had mentioned our right to reparations only to illustrate the fact that we had an interest in reparations and in the demilitarization of the fascist powers which conflicted at only the one point I had mentioned with Yugoslavia’s. I said that I would immediately seek to ascertain what my Government’s views were in regard to the use of German machinery and equipment for Yugoslav reparations. General Velebit emphasized that Yugoslavia had been waiting for two years for these much needed reparations.

I asked whether he had any other matters to mention and he said that there were many other matters but that these were the principal ones. He again insisted that the fundamental point was that we had been unrelentingly hostile to them and that this had awakened a deep resentment in Yugoslavia. He referred again to the Trieste ultimatum and said in answer to a question on my part that Marshal Tito had only promised General Alexander⁴ to keep open Allied communication lines with Austria, not to stay out of Trieste.

I then said that I would like to mention some of our grievances to him. I said that from our viewpoint Yugoslavia had shown unfriendliness to the United States before the United States had shown any unfriendliness to Yugoslavia. I remembered how at the San Francisco Conference⁵ Yugoslavia had invariably voted with the Soviet Union. At that time relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were relatively friendly but as they deteriorated it was natural that relations between the United States and Yugoslavia should also have deteriorated. Yugoslavia was an independent nation which had every right to choose whatever course in international affairs it chose to adopt, as it conceived its national interests. Any nation had that privilege but any nation having adopted a course must accept its implications as they affected its national interests for better or for worse. I said that this situation had been accentuated by a number of incidents which had arisen between the United States and Yugoslavia and which had resulted in lasting resentment against Yugoslavia.

General Velebit showed signs of annoyance and said that if that was the reason I had come to talk to him that it was quite useless; that he had thought I was anxious to clear up the disagreements between Yugoslavia and the United States but that this was an entirely different matter.

I said that I had merely wished to speak frankly on the situation as I saw it. I had no desire to discuss the general framework of the international relations but I believed that even within that framework it would be possible to take constructive action to relieve the tension. I hoped that by clearing away specific grievances something might be accomplished. I said that the United States deplored the controversies which had arisen with Russia and hoped that they might be settled because we fully recognized that the peace and prosperity of the world depended on understanding and cooperation between the two greatest powers in the world. I said that we felt it was particularly unfortunate that misunderstandings should now have arisen when there had never before been a serious clash of interests between our two nations. Unfortunately that was, of course, a situation which I could do nothing about, but that I did hope that constructive action might relieve the tension in the area of Yugoslav–American relations. I said that I would like to mention to him some of the specific matters which gave us concern.

I first mentioned the whole matter of the Embassy immunities. I pointed out that all Embassies were entitled to certain immunities and that they were given others by binding international custom. These immunities had been invaded, in my opinion, in a series of cases. In the Wedge case,⁶ although Wedge was undoubtedly guilty of serious misconduct there were many precedents establishing that the nationals of a country sending a mission who was attached to that mission in any capacity enjoyed immunity. We had offered an indemnity, and we felt that Wedge’s immunity should be recognized.

I went on to say that one Embassy translator had been shot and two were now in prison. With regard to the man who had been shot, he was dead and the officer who was alleged to have connived with him (although he denied it) was no longer in the service. That was a closed issue. But with regard to the other two translators I said I had no information regarding the charges against one and the other was vaguely charged with “inciting against the regime”. In the absence of clear evidence of a serious crime by these translators we naturally felt in the Embassy that these arrests were an effort to harass us and impede our legitimate activities.

I went on to point out quite apart from any question of Embassy immunities I could not understand how it was practically advantageous to the Yugoslav authorites to act as they had in these cases. These incidents awakened a resentment wholly out of proportion to their intrinsic importance not only in the Embassy but also in Washington. He had referred to our hostility to Yugoslavia in major questions; it was difficult for officials in making policy decisions to overlook incidents which though petty were nevertheless very irritating.

I said that a relatively minor matter which I wanted to raise was the restriction placed by the Yugoslav authorities on travel by Americans in this country. I pointed out that the Treaty of 1881 (Commerce and Navigation)⁷ clearly prohibited such restrictions and I consequently hoped that it would be possible to rescind these restrictions. I said with a smile that they were particularly annoying for Embassy personnel who liked to leave the city for a picnic. General Velebit’s only comment was that he was familiar with the treaty.

I said that another source of petty annoyance to us was the fact that we had not been able to obtain visas for the men assigned to the Graves Registration Unit. We were anxious to clear this matter up and I hoped that they would shortly be forthcoming. We greatly appreciated the courtesy of the Yugoslav authorities in offering 400 soldiers to help with the Graves Registration work. I mentioned that I had given instructions that the 75 Yugoslavs who were going to Austria to bring back the Yugoslav river boats should be granted visas even though it might have been possible to have held these visas up until we received visas for the Graves Registration work. He said rather testily that the United States occupied Austria on behalf of the Allied Powers. I replied that there was a more important consideration in my decision; since we had agreed to the return of the river boats I felt that our good faith was involved in facilitating the men’s departure. Nevertheless I felt that this evidenced my desire to prevent unnecessary controversies.

I said that one other matter I wished to mention to him was our plans for our celebration of Memorial Day. Last year an unfortunate incident had arisen and I said that we would be very sure that nothing like that happened again this year. We were planning a simple ceremony but would appreciate any participation which the Yugoslav civil and military authorities might wish to take in this ceremony. I would appreciate it if he would let me know the views of the Yugoslav authorities in this connection.

By clearing up these relatively minor matters I hoped that we might get to some more important ones such as the Yugoslav gold and our claims. General Velebit said that we were going at the problem from entirely different angles. He wanted major problems dealt with first whereas I was suggesting that we handle minor ones. I said whereas it was true that I had brought up relatively minor ones, at the same time I had, as I already informed him, telegraphed to find out the Department’s views regarding the war criminals situation⁸ and I would immediately try to ascertain the Department’s views regarding German reparations in kind.

General Velebit rather brusquely mentioned that he had an appointment at one o’clock and the conversation then ended. The entire conversation was distinctly less affable than our conversation of February 25.

John M. Cabot

1. Transmitted to the Department as enclosure 2 to despatch 673, March 3, from Belgrade, not printed.
2. See Cabot’s memorandum of conversation, p. 765.
3. For documentation regarding the attitude of the United States on the problem of German reparations, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. v, pp. 481 ff.
4. British Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander served as Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, 1944–1946.
5. Chargé Cabot had served as a member of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference at San Francisco, April–June 1945. For documentation on that conference, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. i .
6. On May 1, 1946, William A. Wedge, who had for some time been employed as a guard by the Embassy at Belgrade, ran into and killed a Yugoslav officer while driving an Embassy jeep without authorization and allegedly under the influence of alcohol. Wedge was taken into custody by the Yugoslav police, and in early September 1946, he was tried and convicted by a Yugoslav court and sentenced to 8 years in prison. The United States Government considered that Wedge was entitled to diplomatic immunity, regardless of the circumstances attending the incident in which he was involved, and continued to press the Yugoslav authorities to recognize that immunity and to effect Wedge’s release. In this connection, see the record of the conversation of September 17, 1946, between the Acting Secretary of State and the Yugoslav Ambassador, Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vi, p. 951. In March 1947, Wedge’s sentence was reduced to 6-years imprisonment. Wedge was finally released from prison and allowed to leave Yugoslavia in March 1949.
7. Department of State Treaty Series No. 319.
8. See footnote 9 to Cabot’s memorandum of conversation, p. 768.