861.04417/6–1247: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State

confidential

2123. Embtels 2093, June 10; 2120, and 2121, June 12.1 New Soviet decrees revising and strengthening security legislation bring up several aspects of US relations with Soviet Union.

It should be noted that decree which lists information constituting state secrets includes certain type of information which Soviet Union would be required to furnish to international organizations such as World Bank, Monetary Fund, presumably ITO and others if Soviet Union were to join these organizations. ‘Such classified information includes for instance: (1) Funds of gold and foreign exchange. (2) Information on finances of Soviet Union. (3) Information on foreign trade. While these security regulations have been in effect previously they are now broadened and strengthened. This serves to emphasize fact that one of reasons for Soviet reluctance to join such organizations stems from unwillingness to reveal information on Soviet Union which would be required by such organizations.

Decrees also should make clear by their extreme emphasis on the security of technical information including one clause which in effect classifies all new scientific and technical information, that no agreement on patents or on exchange of technical and scientific information with Soviet Union is practical or possible.

Decrees have bearing on possibility and practicability of agreement with Soviet Union on atomic energy. They classify, of course, all information on this subject or near this subject, by blanket clauses on [Page 572] scientific and technical discoveries and on geology and economy on non-ferrous and rare metals and rare earths. If in an agreement on atomic energy Soviet Union were to consent to make information on Soviet development this field available to international inspectorate, this inspectorate would still have to operate within limits imposed by general security system of Soviet Union as effectively symbolized by decrees under reference. Certainly there is absolutely no intention in USSR to let any international inspectorate freely roam about Soviet Union whenever they please with right to inspect anything they please and with right to question Soviet citizens freely. If this has not previously been clear, present decrees should make it so.

Further, decrees show how futile it is for this mission or for individual members of mission to attempt to get information from Soviet officials in various broad fields on Soviet Union. Embassy receives large number of requests from Washington agencies, particularly from Commerce Dept, for information on various industries, technical development, general statistics, etc. Almost all this information, to extent it is not included in publications available in Washington, is classified as state secret by law. Embassy has frequently made oral or written requests for information requested. Replies have been exceedingly rare in past and will be practically inexistent in future.2 It is now clear that any Soviet official so rash as to answer Embassy inquiries in vast majority of cases would receive 8 to 12 years in forced labor camps for his pains. In this [these?] circumstances it will be useless and indeed harmful for Embassy to submit such requests hereafter.

Embassy requests that this telegram be brought to attention all agencies who transmit to Embassy requests for information on Soviet Union, and that all future requests be carefully screened in light new decrees.3 Requests should be forwarded to Embassy only in cases where personal observation, consultation with colleagues or general local intelligence could reasonably contribute to reply.

Kohler
  1. Telegram 2120 only is printed. It was noted in telegram 2121 that the state secrets decrees appeared to end prospects for a program of exchange of scientists, and the widest possible publication of the contents of the decrees with the implications for scientific exchanges was recommended.
  2. According to telegram 2146 from Moscow on June 13, 5 p. m., not printed, the Department of Agriculture should be informed that henceforth there could be little cooperation expected in this field with the Soviet Union from individual discussions or in world organizations. The Soviet Union would be “in position to appraise weaknesses and strengths of rest of world from common fund of knowledge secured in these world groups and act accordingly to further her political and economic aims, but will not permit world to appraise her agriculture which now is apparently considered secret on nearly same level as military data.” (861.04417/6–1347)
  3. A circular incorporating all of this information was sent on July 15, to the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, and Treasury, and to the Central Intelligence Group.