Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

711.61/6–1047: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State

secret

Moscow, June 10, 1947—8 p. m.

2094. As seen from Moscow, it seems essential that we endeavor, through all possible means to counteract the intensive anti-American campaign now being carried on by all Soviet facilities and those of the Comintern apparatus abroad. While line taken is transparent to many and is based on falsehood and distortion of fact, it appears to us that unless effective measures on a planned and continuing basis are taken to counteract this campaign, it is bound further to confuse issues and undermine effectiveness of our democratic aid program, particularly abroad where unsettled conditions make people very receptive to present type Soviet propaganda. Our countermeasures must be objective, thorough and well substantiated and backed by positive policies.

Principal Soviet propaganda methods with examples are:

(1) To repeat falsehoods and half-truths more often and louder than others so that many people believe them or at least issues are sufficiently confused to cause hesitation and indecision to creep into many minds (i.e. Soviet system democratic, American aims “imperialist”).

(2) To distract attention by always accusing others of doing what they themselves actually are doing (economic penetration and subjugation of East Europe through 50–50 Soviet companies, Soviet military missions and military aid to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia).

(3) Minimum concern over complete reversal of propaganda line when politically expedient as public usually forgets past rapidly and energetic propaganda for new tack brings most people around (Ribbentrop-Molotov pact; Soviet recognition of Badoglio and King Victor Emmanuel; Soviet insistence of low level industry in Germany—1945 compared to demand for high level—1946).

(4) To quote statements out of context (Molotov’s October 29 speech to UN accusing Baruch of warmongering).

(5) To set up front organizations and their newspapers as source for quotations to give impression of mass backing for Soviet policies (Tudeh in Iran; front newspapers in France, etc.).

(6) To prevent, through censorship, smear campaigns, and falsehoods, outside world from obtaining true picture of Soviet realities (thus giving impression, for instance, that Soviet trade unions are independent workers organizations similar to Western unions; that Soviet elections are democratic in Western sense; while by censorship preventing full story of speed-up methods and high ration prices from becoming known abroad, etc.).

Both methods and lines of attack on American “capitalists” are most reminiscent of Goebbels at best. A plan to combat such comprehensive operation should be drawn up after careful study by recently established Policy Planning Committee.

Embassy suggests for consideration this connection following methods:

(1) Put into effect the proposal to translate in full important Soviet newspapers and periodicals in order that they may be rapidly available to American institutions and press (Embtel 4309, December 4, 1946¹).

(2) Set up in Department organization which will make available direct to press or possibly to a private press association research and analysis organization, “Voice of America” and foreign periodicals through AP, UP, INS foreign clients and particularly to our UN delegates and other official spokesmen, background research material on Soviet Union and other countries. This organization should have readily available: quotes from Lenin, Stalin and other prominent Soviet officials; analyses with examples of changes in Soviet propaganda line; full quotes from leading editorials, for instance, during periods of Soviet-German collaboration (OIR report No. 4250). It should be able to point out significance of such statements as Stalin’s answer to Stassen to effect that Soviet Union desired to continue collaboration with Hitler but Hitler did not desire it. (As seen from here, significance of this statement was missed by American press.) Soviet aims and policies are usually quite clear when shorn of verbiage, placed in proper perspective and analyzed over period of time.

This organization should amass from published Soviet sources true picture of Soviet trade unions; full data on periodical increases in production norms; on strict labor laws, laws on absenteeism, labor books and other realities of Soviet life.

To counter propaganda that US is militaristic, objective figures on size of Soviet army and air force should be made available. Publicity should be given to large-scale maneuvers undertaken by Soviet forces, such as those held in Hungary last year.

In other words, such an organization should not only make available, as soon as possible, from printed material picture of Soviet life but should also be in a position continually to remind people of past actions of Soviet which are usually forgotten: for instance, that eastern Galicia, Ruthenia, Tana [Tannu] Tuva, and Bukovina never previously formed part of Soviet Union or Czarist empire until absorbed recently, or that Soviet supplied large quantities essential materials to Hitler from 1939 to 1941.

Soviets frequently follow contradictory or alternative courses in conduct of their foreign policy that it should be easy to confound them with their own words if we maintain the proper reference files. For example, when question of Turkey or Dairen comes up again we should recall Gromyko’s remarks, in his speech to SC on June 6 on the MSC report, to effect that “the provision of bases would inevitably lead to the countries providing them renouncing their sovereignty with all the consequences arising out of this.”

Policies, achievements, aims and shortcomings of Soviet Union do not stand up under objective analysis, which accounts for strict censorship and increasing efforts to hide realities from outside world.

To maintain objectivity organization should have similar data available on other countries.

(3) We should endeavor to induce all reputable US newspapers to insert the word “censored” above every story coming out of Soviet Union, so reader can be on guard.

(4) We should use “Voice of America” and all other media to describe positive American policies and where appropriate, realities of Soviet policies and life.

(5) To counteract Soviet contention of a coming economic crisis in United States and the “failure of capitalism”, we should point out, for instance, that despite 1930 depression American productive capacity during and since war is greater than any other country in the world and no matter what recessions may take place, we have proved our power to recuperate and outstrip world.

(6) We should publish captured German documents in toto to show Soviet aggressive intentions in collaboration with Hitler, which correspond generally with Soviet aims today.

While in one sense it appears not necessary to convince majority American public Soviet Government not cooperating, US anti-Soviet attitude seems based principally on emotions rather than on objective, factual reasons and thus to lack balance and perspective. For instance, too many people wishfully interpreted alleged concessions December 1946 as change in Soviet policy when in reality no change took place. Therefore, if as suggested above, realities of Soviet life, past and future policies, aims and tactics are explained and interpreted objectively public reaction to Soviet policies and tactics at home and abroad will be less subject to propaganda influences and emotional extremes.

Durbrow

1. Not printed.