860C.51/9–3047

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Thompson)1

Mr. Garner,2 who was referred to me by the Acting Secretary, handed me the attached memorandum.

Mr. Garner said that while the Bank was anxious to maintain its position as an international institution, it was clear that in the case of this loan it could only go through if the United States Government actually supported it. If our attitude was simply one of not opposing the loan it would probably not be made. He said he was discussing [Page 453] the matter with Averell Harriman3 later this week but said that the Bank had not made an approach to any other Government. He added that the Bank would be interested to learn of any views Ambassador Griffis might have. I informed Mr. Garner of such information as we have received from the Ambassador and said we would continue to keep him informed.

In reply to my question Mr. Garner stated that some purchases of the supplies contemplated could be made through member countries other than the United States and in these cases the Bank contemplated endeavoring to get the agreement of the countries concerned to the use of their capital subscriptions for this purpose. In the case of any supplies coming from countries not members of the Bank, such as Sweden and Switzerland, an effort would be made to obtain credit terms.

With respect to the paragraph headed Debt Record, I pointed out that we had negotiated an agreement covering the nationalization of American property by Poland but that the conclusion of the agreement had been held up because of technical difficulties. I also pointed out that we would not wish the Bank to take any action which might imply that the German territory now being administered by Poland would be awarded to Poland in the peace settlement. I also pointed out that care would have to be taken in dealing with such matters as arranging for resumption of public debt service, not to provide the Poles and the Soviet Government with propaganda material in the event that the loan was not consummated.

I referred to the relationship of the proposed loan to the negotiations in connection with the European Recovery Program and said that in the event that the Bank was to negotiate a loan the timing of any announcement might be of importance and inquired how soon the Bank felt that a decision would have to be made. Mr. Garner replied that in his opinion a decision would have to be made shortly after the return of Mr. McCloy on October 25. He pointed out that Mr. McCloy was now visiting Czechoslovakia and Poland.

I said I would see that the matter received prompt attention in the Department and said that we were grateful to Mr. Garner for informing us of the Bank’s views on the matter. I indicated that I felt that the only loan justified was a limited one of this sort and that while I was personally inclined to think that a loan on this limited basis might be advisable, the Department would have to consider carefully the relationship of such a loan to the Marshall Plan.

Llewellyn E. Thompson
[Page 454]

Memorandum by the Vice President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Garner)

[Annex]
[Extracts]

Considerations Affecting a Possible Loan by the International Bank to Poland

In June we sent a fact finding mission, including a qualified coal engineer, to Poland to investigate conditions relating to the Polish request for a loan of about $128 millions to finance increased production of coal and directly related industries.

The group returned in August and reports that a loan of about $50 millions should result in substantial increase in coal production.

Poland’s rejection of the invitation to the Paris Conference points up the group’s own findings regarding the relations with Russia. Their investigation included discussions with several Socialist and Communist members of the Polish Cabinet, members of the opposition and minority parties, including the opposition leader, church authorities, senior members of foreign embassies, legations and consulates of some of the Bank’s member nations, and other foreign observers. Such discussions pointed to the virtually unanimous agreement that there is today a substantial degree of actual and potential domination by Russia of Poland’s political and economic policy, although, at present there appears to be little interference in the actual operations of the Polish economy.

In considering a loan to Poland, therefore, it is obvious that the Bank can not ignore the financial risks, inasmuch as Poland’s actions might be determined by Russia, a non-member of the Bank, whose policies and objectives appear to be hostile to those of most of the Bank’s members. However, the vital importance of Polish coal to our members in Western Europe, including those to whom we have already extended loans, convinces us that we should explore all possibilities for making a loan.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Debt Record—The Polish Government has announced publicly its intention to negotiate this autumn for the resumption of payment on its foreign debt, service of which was suspended following the invasion. The Polish authorities stated that with regard to the foreign debts of Danzig and the former German territories in the East and of Vilna, now incorporated in Russia, they would expect to negotiate settlements in accordance with the liabilities as fixed by the peace treaties.

[Page 455]

We understand that negotiations are under way for settlement of the claims of foreign owners of properties which have been nationalized.

We believe that it would be practical for the Bank to get satisfactory assurances from Poland regarding these matters.

conclusion

It is our opinion that the proposed loan of about $47 millions would support a substantial increase in Polish coal production, with definite undertakings on the part of Poland to ship the bulk of increased export coal to the West.

We are further of the opinion that the value of this coal to other members of the Bank is sufficient to justify the risk that Russia might force Poland to default on its obligations.

However, it is realized that it is futile for the Bank to proceed in this matter unless its largest stockholder, the United States Government, would be willing to support the Bank in making such a loan.

Furthermore, it would be necessary to obtain the unofficial support of leaders in the financial community and the press in order to avoid criticism of the Bank which might interfere with its future financing in the American market. Confidential discussions with a few representative American bankers indicate that it would be possible to get support for the loan in important quarters.

The management of the Bank realizes the risks in a loan to Poland but considers the potential benefits sufficiently great to justify this risk. It also considers that if it turns down the loan it will greatly strengthen Russian propaganda claims that Poland and other similarly situated countries have nowhere to turn except to Russia.

R. L. Garner
  1. Llewellyn Thompson was serving at this time with the Office of European Affairs. He became Deputy Director of that Office on November 14.
  2. Robert L. Garner, Vice President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
  3. Secretary of Commerce.