Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

864.00/10–247

Memorandum of Conversation, by Frederick T. Merrill of the Division of Southern European Affairs

[Washington,] October 2, 1947.

Participants:	Rustem Vámbéry, Hungarian Minister,
	Mr. Paul Marik, Counselor of the Hungarian Legation,
	Mr. Armour—A–A
	Mr. Merrill—SE

The Hungarian Minister, Rustem Vámbéry, called on the Assistant Secretary to pay his respects.¹ Mr. Armour recalled to Mr. Vambery the latter’s acquaintanceship with our former Minister in Hungary, Mr. Grant-Smith, and the Minister then reminisced at some length about the Hapsburg days and the respected position of his father in Hungary of the early twentieth century.

In reply to a question regarding present conditions in Budapest, Minister Vámbéry stated that in his opinion the Hungarian people were working harder and were more full of cheer and hope than many people in Europe, including the Czechs. He attributed much of the economic activity to the dynamic leadership of the Communist Party, a leadership which he later contended operated reasonably independent of Moscow’s direction.

In discussing the political dilemma in which Hungary found itself, the Minister said that it was unfortunate that a vicious circle existed between economics and politics. For example, the low salaries of civil servants made them dependent on bribery or membership in a political party. The Communist Party thus benefited by the poor economic conditions of the middle classes, and strengthened its position among the more favored laboring classes.

In connection with the election, Mr. Vámbéry said he felt that the abuses, whether resulting in 10,000 or 100,000 votes one way or another made very little difference. He could not understand how the events of last June could be construed by the United States as a Communist coup. He felt that there had been no essential change in the complexion of the government and that neither Nagy or Dinnyés differed in their lack of resistance to the Soviets. The presence of the Red Army was the determining factor in any case.

In spite of the Soviet pressures, he felt that there was an amazing amount of civil liberties still existing and pointed to the numerous political parties in opposition which had their own papers and which castigated their rivals freely. There had been, however, a few unfortunate incidents in the election campaign, but these could happen anywhere. The Hungarians were still able to express freely their political opinions, he thought. Mr. Vámbéry, warming to his subject, disclosed that Pushkin, the Soviet Minister, had told him that the USSR could have had Hungary in 1945 if it had so wished. But Moscow wanted Hungary independent, so it could trade with the West to rehabilitate its economy so that in the end it might be exploited more profitably by the USSR.

The new Minister expressed great appreciation for the courtesies shown him by Mr. Chapin while he was in Budapest. At a farewell luncheon, which our Minister tended to Mr. Vámbéry, the latter had said that as Hungarian Minister in Washington he would be able to look after American interests (sic). Mr. Vámbéry said in closing that he had never aspired to be a Minister and now at seventy-five years of age he was being impressed into service. He hoped that the Department would be sympathetic to the Hungarians, and in appreciating their difficult geographic situation give them time to evolve in line with Western concepts of democracy.²

1. On September 30, Minister Vámbéry called on Acting Secretary of State Robert Lovett and presented his letters of credence. That meeting is recorded in a memorandum of conversation by Acting Chief of Protocol R. D. Muir, September 30, not printed (701.6411/9–3047). Minister Vámbéry presented his credentials to President Truman on October 8.
2. On December 30, Minister Vámbéry made a courtesy call on Samuel Reber, Acting Director of the Office of European Affairs. A memorandum of conversation by Robert McKisson of the Division of Southern European Affairs, dated December 30, not printed, concludes as follows:

   “After leaving Mr. Reber’s office, the Minister remarked to me in the hall that these were rather difficult days for him at the Legation. His staff, he explained, was inadequate, and several members of it were Communists. He said that a committee representing three ministries in the Hungarian Government was scheduled to come to Washington within the next several months for the purpose of reorganizing the Legation. He then said that he would like to tell me confidentially that he had recently called Hungarian Foreign Minister Mohnár (a Communist) by long distance telephone and had told the latter that he thought they could speak plainly to one another. He said he then requested Molnár not to assign any more Communists to the Legation in Washington, since ‘the American people just didn’t like them’.” (864.00/12–3047)