Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

111.99/64

Final Report by the United States Military Representative on the Allied Control Commission for Hungary (Weems)¹

secret

[Budapest,] 15 September 1947.

1. Scope of Report.

This report, covering the period from assumption of duties by Brigadier General George H. Weems to the dissolution of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary (5 July 1946–15 September 1947), supplements the report of Major General William S. Key which covers the period from the activation of the United States Representation to the relief of General Key by General Weems.² Below are summarized the important developments in Hungary, together with activities of the Allied Control Commission, during the period of present report, with emphasis on the nature of United States participation. Organization and administrative activities of the United States Representation and a brief note on relations with other representations, are described in Annexes “A” to “E”, as indicated in the Table of Contents.³ The final meeting of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary on 15 September 1947 was held too late for incorporation in the text of this report; the minutes are ‘added as Annex “I”.⁴ Most of the matters summarized in this report have been described in detail in previous communications to War Department agencies having primary interest, in accordance with standing operating procedure.

2. Political Developments.

The first of July 1946 found the five-months-old Hungarian Republic facing its first serious crisis, as a result of a demand by Allied Control Commission Deputy Chairman, General Sviridov, that the Government purge itself and other organizations of alleged reactionary and anti-Soviet elements. British and American protests in the Allied Control Commission against this unilateral action were dismissed on the grounds that the threat to Soviet Occupation Forces had required immediate action. Thus the position of the Smallholder majority in Parliament was weakened and machinery of political police control under the Communist-dominated Interior Ministry gained speed, reaching high gear by the year’s end, when evidence appeared that hundreds of persons accused of plotting against the Hungarian Republic had been arrested. Discussion in the Allied Control Commission emphasized Soviet insistence that only Hungarian internal affairs were involved.

Implication of Smallholder Secretary Béla Kovács in the alleged plots tightened on 4 March 1947 with announcement of his arrest by the Soviets on charges of conspiracy against the Occupation Forces. Essential security measures were the reasons cited in the Allied Control Commission. Meanwhile the Hungarian People’s Court was sentencing alleged plotters to long imprisonment and, in a few cases, death.

Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy left an outwardly calm Hungary for a Swiss vacation in mid-May, leaving his Communist Deputy, Rákosi, in charge, but the storm broke when General Sviridov, in refusing a request Nagy had made earlier for custody of Kovács, handed over alleged confessions by Kovács and others to Rákosi. After communicating with Budapest by telephone, Nagy resigned and fled to America, strengthening Communist propaganda that he was implicated by Kovács’ confession. Repeated demands by United States and British representatives on the Allied Control Commission for copies of pertinent documents were bluntly refused by Sviridov on grounds that only Hungarian internal affairs were involved. Similar reasons were given in Moscow.

After a flurry of Smallholder resignations the situation was stabilized by 2 June 1947 with the appointment of Lajos Dinnyés, a malleable Smallholder, as Prime Minister. On 24 June 1947 a White Paper gave the Government version of the alleged conspiracy, but no evidence for the defendants was included.

The two months preceding the 31 August 1947 elections were without political incident on the Allied Control Commission level; a United States note concerning widespread disenfranchisement of non-Marxists was delivered and rejected through diplomatic channels. The elections themselves were quiet and orderly. Opposition objections shifted from charges of disenfranchisement to vigorous protests against the highly organized system of multiple voting by which the Communists obtained a 22 percent plurality. Marxist Social Democrats, having polled 15 percent, were also bitterly critical of election abuses, demanding an arbitrary 30 percent plurality and certain Ministerial posts (including vital Interior) as the price of concurrence. As this report is written, Sviridov is said to have taken a hand in the game, and the outcome is not yet clear.

3. United States Beneficial Interests in Alleged German Property Expropriated by Soviets.

Throughout the period of this report, the United States Representative had frequently to request return of property claimed by American citizens which the Soviet Union had expropriated as German external assets. The Soviet position, based on Potsdam,⁵ maintained the right to expropriate apparently German assets without United States participation in the proceedings. Sviridov, however, professed complete willingness to restore interests later proved to be American. The United States position, based on Article 8 of the Armistice Agreement,⁶ insisted on tripartite machinery for authorizing any German property transfers by the Hungarian Government. Failing to establish this, the United States Representative’s efforts were directed to restoration of American interests, and agreement was obtained on 15 August 1947 to the appearance of American and British officers at hearings conducted in theory by the Hungarian-Soviet Reparations Commission (in practice by Soviet representatives only). This procedure might possibly have resulted in return of some property had the American claimants been able to produce satisfactory proof of ownership, but evidence available consisted largely of affidavits and left many gaps from the Soviet point of view. Production of acceptable evidence was complicated by inability of the United States element of the Control Council for Germany under its terms of reference, to concern itself with specific cases involving German external assets. The dissolution of the Allied Control Commission leaves unsettled some half dozen cases of this type.

4. Entry and Exit Clearances.

The mechanics of obtaining entry and exit clearances for United States citizens absorbed much administrative effort by the United States Representation and much discussion in the Allied Control Commission. Unlike most matters with which the Allied Control Commission was occupied, clearances involved no jurisdictional battles; the right of the Soviet Occupation Forces to control entry and exit was accepted de jure. It was necessary, however, to exert considerable pressure in order to expedite action in many individual cases.

Although the Soviet attitude toward granting clearances fluctuated somewhat with political conditions, the purpose of the applicant’s visit was generally the guiding consideration. United States military and State Department personnel for duty in Hungary were usually cleared promptly. Miscellaneous military and diplomatic requests followed no particular pattern. Press representatives were invariably given prompt clearance until the pre-election period, when delaying tactics were employed, and some were never cleared. American business men were denied clearance in 75 cases out of 100, and relief workers encountered even greater difficulties. Compassionate or family visits were almost invariably denied.

5. Restrictions on Flights of United States Military Aircraft.

An important matter of principle was involved in an arbitrary reduction, in August 1947, of flights by United States military aircraft into and over Hungary and other Soviet-occupied areas. As long as ample air support was available to the Mission, the United States Representation had accepted de facto the right of the Occupation Forces to control aircraft flights by means of clearances. This reduction, however, appeared to be in contravention of paragraph 5 of Annex I to the text of the Potsdam Agreement.⁷ A formal protest which had been prepared was withheld, however, in view of information from the War Department which indicated that the matter was being considered on a governmental level.

6. Commercial Aircraft Agreements.

At the instance of the American Legation considerable pressure was applied for initiation of interim United States commercial airline operations in Hungary, but the Hungarian Government professed inability to proceed without Allied Control Commission approval. The Soviet element on the Allied Control Commission consistently blocked negotiations under various pretexts. In late July 1947 a request by the Soviet-Hungarian airline Maszovlet for a single over-flight of United States-occupied territory was denied by the United States Government; the result was tentative Hungarian offers of reciprocal arrangements, subject to Allied Control Commission approval, but the United States Legation had not requested further action in the Allied Control Commission at the time of dissolution.

7. Visits to Hungarian Army Units.

During the spring and early summer of 1947, repeated requests for permission to send United States officers to visit Hungarian Army units were flatly refused by the Soviet representative on the Allied Control Commission as contrary to Occupation Forces policy, despite the provisions of Article 1(d) of the Armistice Agreement. Sviridov finally stated that the difference of views could only be reconciled on a governmental level, and a proposed note was accordingly transmitted to the United States Minister and to the War Department.⁸

8. Other Matters with which the Allied Control Commission was seized.

The past fourteen months have seen the following additional matters of interest to the United States discussed in the Allied Control Commission:

Soviet interference with Swabian deportation (Annex “F”⁹) and with repatriation of Hungarian nationals (Annex “E”¹⁰), confiscation of the Hungarian edition of Count Ciano’s Diaries, suppression of American-Hungarian newspapers, formation of new political parties, procurement of various reports from the Hungarian Government, and misrepresentations in the Hungarian press. The Soviet Deputy Chairman handled these matters with a skillful but superficial appearance of frankness and logic; when pinned down, however, he had recourse to standard evasive tactics discussed in paragraph 9 below.

9. The Issue of United States Participation in the Allied Contol Commission.

Fundamentally, the issue between the United States Representative and the Soviet Deputy Chairman had to do with extent of United States participation in the actual machinery of the Allied Control Commission. The American position called for full tripartite concurrence in all Allied Control Commission decisions, under the provisions of Article 18 of the Armistice Agreement. Unfortunately, the Armistice Agreement is worded so loosely that the policies of the Allied (Soviet) High Command could be cited with some color of legality to block most United States proposals. The Statutes of the Allied Control Commission, so called, (which were noted but not accepted by the United States and the United Kingdom at Potsdam as Annex I to the text of the conference) were also cited when the Soviet element found them convenient. And when the printed word failed him, the Deputy Chairman used the whole arsenal of Soviet diplomacy: delays, appeals to higher authority, failures to reply, pleas as to the unavailability of information, the fait accompli, and so forth. It cannot be said that United States participation in the ‘actual workings of the Allied Control Commission was ever successfully established; however, certain concessions, such as freedom of movement for United States personnel in Hungary, were occasionally obtained in practice as a result of persistent pressure.

On 15 September 1947, in the light of the impending dissolution of the Allied Control Commission, the United States Representative handed to the Soviet Deputy Chairman a letter in the sense of WARX 97667 of 8 May 1947, stating that the United States, in view of unilateral Soviet action on the Allied Control Commission, reserves the right to re-open any matter wherein American interests were jeopardized or impaired by Soviet action which was not accepted or concurred in by the United States.¹¹

10. Conclusion—Evaluation of United States Participation in Allied Control Commission.

During the period of this report the hold of the Hungarian Communist Party and its Soviet masters was strengthened tremendously. United States interests have suffered, both materially and ideologically; it could not be otherwise in a Soviet-occupied country. However, it is the considered opinion of the undersigned that the United States Representation on the Allied Control Commission, together with that of the United Kingdom, successfully performed some of the functions of an opposition party in limiting overt manifestations of Soviet power. The necessity for preserving at least an appearance of legality in the Allied Control Commission has restricted the Occupational Forces to some sort of compliance with the Armistice Agreement. It is believed that the way is still clear, should the United States Government determine that the effort is worth while, to establish effective bonds between Hungary and the Western Powers under the terms of the Treaty of Peace which comes into force today.

Geo. H. Weems

Brigadier General, U. S. Army

Repatriation of Hungarians

[Annex “E”]

The repatriation movement which began in September 1945 ran quite smoothly as far as it concerned United States and Hungarian authorities, but difficulties were frequently caused by Soviet interference. The Soviets interrupted the movement in June 1946 and refused to let trains coming from United States zones pass through the Soviet zone of Austria. This was apparently done in retaliation for the suspension of the Swabian expatriation movement by the United States (see Annex “F”¹²). As soon as the expatriation movement resumed, the Soviets permitted the resumption of trains of Hungarian repatriate’s. However, instead of six or seven trains a week as were formerly cleared, the Mission was successful in obtaining clearance for no more than two trains a week. Up to 1 July 1946 a total of 232,000 Hungarian repatriates were brought back to Hungary, whereas in the period from 1 July 1946 to 31 May 1947 a total of only 18,499 repatriates actually returned from the United States zones.

In July 1947 the Communist-inspired Hungarian press attacked the repatriation policy of the Western Powers. The following corrective press release prepared by the United States Military Mission received some publicity and will serve as a summary of the situation:

“Recent articles in certain local papers have stated that the Hungarian Government has appealed to the Western powers for the release of Hungarian prisoners of war still held in the Western Zones.

“For the proper information of the public, the following information is released by the United States authorities:

(1) There are no Hungarian prisoners of war in United States custody.

(2) Contrary to recent publications in the local press, the appeal or request for release of POW’s has never been received by United States authorities in Germany, Austria or Hungary.

(3) There are still an estimated 30,000 Hungarian nationals in the U.S. Zones in the status of displaced persons. None of them are POW’s. For the repatriation of these Hungarians, United States authorities repeatedly have offered their help to the Hungarian Government.

(4) The repatriation of these Hungarian nationals is awaiting action solely by the Hungarian Government.

“All Hungarian prisoners of war have been discharged under the standing procedure of United States authorities in Germany and Austria. Most of them have already returned, and the remainder reverted to displaced person status, free to return to their homeland.

“Over 230,000 Hungarian nationals, both POW’s and displaced persons, had been returned from the United States Zones to Hungary by 30 November 1946. To facilitate the return of the remainder of Hungarian displaced persons still in the United States Zones, the United States authorities notified the Hungarian Government on numerous occasions of United States readiness to resume repatriation. A recent notification was made in a letter of June 5, 1947, sent through the Chairman of the Allied Control Commission to the Minister of Interior, stating that the United States authorities in Germany were prepared to dispatch each week beginning in June 1947 two trains of Hungarian nationals.

“The Hungarian Minister of Interior appointed new repatriation officials in July to organize the homeward movement of Hungarians. These newly appointed officials have received on July 19 United States clearance for travel to Germany.

“United States authorities in Germany and Austria, therefore, have always been ready to facilitate the homeward movement of Hungarian displaced persons, of whom there are an estimated 30,000 in the United States Zones. It is understood, however, that a number of Hungarian displaced persons have indicated unwillingness to return to their homeland. The official United States view with respect to displaced persons was stated by Secretary of State Marshall on May 20, as follows:

‘It is the the fixed policy of the United ‘States Government to oppose any forced repatriation of displaced persons. It is also the policy of the United States Government to facilitate the repatriation of those displaced persons who desire of themselves to return to their homelands. This is in conformity with the principles approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations.’”

Expatriation of Swabians¹³

[Annex “F”]

Note: The following summary of the Swabian expatriation movement, prepared as a memorandum for record on 9 April 1947, indicates the repercussions of the movement in the Allied Control Commission for Hungary and the administrative task of the U.S. Military Mission. Subsequent to the preparation of this summary an exchange of correspondence with OMGUS took place which is added as Appendix “P”.¹⁴ The views of Ambassador Murphy, also subsequently obtained, have been appended at “Q”.¹⁵

1. Article XIII of the Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin (Potsdam Declaration) states in part as follows:

“The three governments having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.”¹⁶

2. On 20 November 1945 the A.C.C. for Germany by a decision cited as CONL/P(45)57, agreed to commence the immediate transfer of Swabians from Hungary to U.S. Zone Germany under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The decision authorized 500,000 deportations over a period of 7 months. The Hungarian Government, however, after further investigation into its Swabian population, submitted a plan for this movement based on a revised estimate of only 350,000 Swabians, and the movement started in January 1946. It was to have been completed in July 1946. (See CONL/P(45)57), App. A.¹⁷)

3. On 4 June 1946 the expatriation program was suspended on orders from U.S. authorities in Germany. The reasons given for the suspension were abuses observed in shipping out the Swabian trains, the disorderly manner in which the program was executed, and the inhumaneness consequent to burdening German welfare agencies with penniless and destitute people. During the period from January to June 1946, a total of 118,474 Swabs were expatriated.

4. After the stoppage in June discussions were begun between Hungarian authorities and U.S. authorities concerning a resumption of the program. U.S. authorities insisted that certain conditions be met by the Hungarian authorities in order to ensure that the program would be executed in an orderly and humane manner. After a series of conferences, an agreement on the conditions to be established for the execution of the Swabian expatriation program was reached on 22 August 1946. The agreement provided detailed conditions concerning the execution of transfers such as amounts of food, baggage, personal possessions, and minimum amounts of money for each expellee, health requirements, rate of flow, limitation of 1100 expellees on each train, conditions under which the movement may be suspended, and similar requirements for an orderly and humane program. The agreement stated that the expellations would [be] resumed on 1 September 1946, and provided for a rate of flow of 20 trains per month up to 90,000 expellees to the 1st of April 1947. After 1 April 1947, the agreement stated that the Hungarian Government would consider the program ended if the U.S. Zone of Germany accepted a maximum of 100,000 expellees by the end of the year. (See copy of agreement, Appendix B.)

5. During the months of September, October and November 1946, a total of 52 trains were scheduled for movement of Swabs, but only 6 trains were utilized during the latter part of November due to the inability of the Hungarian authorities to provide Reichsmarks for the Swabs. Only 6090 Swabs were expatriated up to 30 November 1946.

6. On 1 December 1946 the acceptance of Swabians into the U.S. Zone of Germany was again suspended on orders from the U.S. authorities in Germany because of a backlog of 100,000 expellees in German distributing centers, thus precluding acceptance of expellees in a humane and orderly manner. Anticipated severe weather during the winter months was also assigned as a reason. (See letter to General Sviridov of 9 November 1946, App. C.)

7. The Hungarian Ministry of Interior protested this action by U.S. authorities. The Hungarian authorities, in giving their views, stated that they accept and support the 22 August agreement and agreed that U.S. authorities had the right to suspend temporarily the acceptance of Swabians for bad weather and/or for resettlement conditions. They argued however, that the 100,000 backlog of expellees in the German camps was not a good reason because the U.S. authorities should have cleared these people out in anticipation of the number of expellees the U.S. had agreed to accept. They further argued that this should have been done during September, October and November when no movement was taking place, although U.S. authorities had agreed to accept up to 90,000 Swabians during the 7 months beginning 1 Sept. and the Hungarians were only able to expel 6090. The Hungarian authorities maintained that after overcoming their many difficulties, they were now able to expel up to 90,000 Swabs before 1 April 1947, and insisted on their right to continue the program until they had an opportunity to expel up to 90,000 Swabians by 1 Apr 47. (Msg to OMGUS App. D)

8. The Russian Element of the A.C.C. for Hungary supported this Hungarian protest and in a separate letter, General Sviridov protested the suspension on the grounds that it contradicted the plan of the Control Council for Germany of 20 November 1945, CONL/P (45) 57. (See App. A.) He stated that on 26 November 1945 the Coordinating Committee of A.C.C. for Germany affirmed that they would fulfil the plan of 20 November 1945, CONL/P (45)57, concerning the expatriation of Swabians and requested an early resumption of the Swabian program. (See message to OMGUS Z–4711 of 3 December 1946, App. E. see also extract from CORO/M(46)63, App. F., which is a record of the action taken by the Coordinating Committee referred to by General Sviridov.)

9. In a reply to the Hungarian and Russian viewpoints, OMGUS stated generally as follows. U.S. authorities in Germany have the right under the 22 August Agreement to suspend transfers throughout the winter months based upon the anticipated severe cold weather and congested resettlement conditions. (See first sentence Par. 10 of the 22 August Agreement, App. B.) OMGUS stated that the program will be resumed at a time and rate which will ensure humane transfers from Hungary and reception into the U.S. Zone, and that ample time would be afforded Hungarians to schedule the movement of 22 trains prior to 1 April 1947. This commitment was based on the fact that if an additional 22 trains were allowed to be scheduled prior to 1 April 1947, then the Hungarian authorities will have been allowed the possibility of scheduling the transfer of up to 90,000 Swabians, although they have not actually been able to move Swabians according to their scheduled trains. OMGUS further stated that the only action taken by the ACC for Germany in connection with the plan decided upon in CONL/P (45)57 was that the Directorate of Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons be “instructed to take all necessary measures for the speediest implementation” of the plan for transfers. OMGUS stated further that the 22 August Agreement is still in effect, and that no transfers can take place during December 1946, January and February 1947. They suggested a conference to take place in late February or early March to arrange mutually satisfactory resumption of transfers. (See message from OMGUS CC–7362 of 14 December 1946, App. G.)

10. Since OMGUS indicated in its message of 14 December (see above) that ample time would be afforded Hungarians to schedule movement of 22 trains prior to 1 April 1947, A.C.C. Hungary on 21 December 1946 advised OMGUS that, in order to allow Hungarian authorities to schedule up to 90,000 expellations prior to 1 April, the number of trains to be allowed should be a minimum of 30 rather than 22. This figure was arrived at as follows: in order to expel up to 90,000 Swabians between 1 September and 1 April on trains with a maximum load of 1100 persons, Hungarian authorities would have to schedule a minimum of 82 trains. They actually scheduled:

• 20 trains in September
• 20 “ “ October
• 12 “ “ November

of which only 6 were utilized. In order, therefore, to comply with the 22 August Agreement, a minimum of 30 more trains should be allowed prior to 1 April 1947. (See message to OMGUS Z–4805 21 December 1946, App. H.)

11. On 6 January 1947, a representative of U.S. A.C.C. Hungary visited Berlin in order to clarify the situation with regard to the resumption of the Swabian program. On 5 January OMGUS sent to U.S. ACC Hungary a message which arrived after the departure of the U.S. A.C.C. representative visiting Berlin, stating that the 22 August Agreement should be strongly adhered to, and that it is wise under the Agreement to consider that up to 184,000 Swabians rather than 124,000 may yet be repatriated by Hungary and transferred to U.S. Zone, Germany. Those figures expressed in terms of individuals rather than trains indicated OMGUS’ agreement to allow the scheduling of a minimum of 30 trains prior to 1 April rather than 22 trains. (See message from OMGUS CC–7568 5 January 1947, App. I.)

12. The representative visiting OMGUS in Berlin, however, obtained a considerably different viewpoint concerning the continuation of Swabian acceptances into the U.S. Zone Germany. It was indicated orally to this representative of the U.S. A.C.C. by the Military Governor of Germany that the program was stopped, not suspended; that the program will not be resumed at any definite date in the future; that it is impossible to receive further expellees in an orderly and humane manner; and that the expellation program cannot be carried out according to the rates of flow prescribed in the 22 August Agreement due to the impossibility of accepting into the U.S. Zone Germany in an orderly and humane manner. (See Report of Conference with General Clay, App. J.)

13. Inasmuch as this different viewpoint concerning the continuation of the Swabian program was given orally, and prior official messages received on the subject have been at variance to this new viewpoint, U.S. A.C.C. Hungary queried OMGUS on 28 January 1947 as to its official views concerning the continuation of the Swabian program. (See message to OMGUS Z–4895 28 January 1947, App. K.)

14. On 10 February a message was received from OMGUS replying to query of U.S. A.C.C. The general view of OMGUS given in its message was that resettlement conditions within the U.S. Zone Germany must improve substantially before OMGUS can agree to the receipt of “further large numbers of expellees”. A full explanation of the congestion and deplorable resettlement conditions in U.S. Zone was given, and it was indicated that any reception of expellees under these present conditions could not bean an orderly and humane manner. OMGUS agreed, however, to meet with Hungarian representatives in March for further discussion of possible movement after 1 April 1947. (See message from OMGUS CC–7985 1 February 1947, App. L.)

15. U.S. A.C.C. Hungary queried Hungarian authorities concerning their reaction to a conference to be held in Berlin to discuss the Swabian expatriation program. No further information concerning the resumption of the program, however, was given to Hungarian authorities. Hungarian authorities did not react favorably to the suggestion of a conference in Berlin, stating that all conditions concerning the expellations had been agreed upon on 22 August, and felt that any further discussion would be fruitless. They stated that they expected the expatriation of Swabians to be resumed on 1 April 1947. The Russians supported this viewpoint and further stated that the expatriation of Swabians to Germany was decided upon at the Potsdam Conference agreed upon by the A.C.C. for Germany, and requested that U.S. authorities advise the Hungarian Government through the A.C.C. Hungary when the reception of Swabians into U.S. Zone Germany would be resumed.

16. In view of the unsettled situation developing in Hungary as the result of lack of information concerning resumption of the Swabian program, and the refusal of the Hungarian representatives to participate in a conference to discuss the subject, U.S. A.C.C. informed OMGUS on 6 March that the Hungarian Government should be advised definitely what to expect in the way of expellations during the ensuing 4–6 months. The unsettled conditions in Hungary resulting from the up-rooting and continuation of processing for expellation of Swabians by the Hungarian Government was pointed out to OMGUS, and specific questions asked concerning the resumption of the program. (See message to OMGUS Z–4964 6 March 47, App. M.)

17. OMGUS did not answer these specific queries but replied in the same manner as their statement of policy given 10 February, i.e. that they cannot agree to accept “further large numbers” of Swabians until economic conditions are greatly improved. (See message from OMGUS CC–8472, 21 March 1947, App. N.)

18. U.S. A.C.C. therefore decided that a definite statement of policy concerning further acceptances of Swabians must be given the Hungarians, and sent representatives to Berlin to obtain approval of a proposed letter addressed to the chairman of A.C.C. for Hungary for the information of the A.C.C. and Hungarian authorities. This letter stated in effect that due to deplorable resettlement conditions now existing in U.S. Zone Germany, no further expellees could be accepted until such conditions were substantially improved. No improvement was anticipated within a minimum of 12 months. The letter was approved by Major General Keating¹⁸ personally, and was despatched to General Sviridov on 27 March 1947. (See letter to General Sviridov 27 March 1947, App. O.)

19. The letter cited above now constitutes the policy of U.S. authorities Germany and U.S. A.C.C. concerning the Swabian expatriation program.

1. Copies of this Final Report were transmitted to the Department as enclosures to despatch 3448, September 25, from Budapest, not printed. Other copies of the Report were forwarded to the War Department.
2. General Key’s report is not printed.
3. The Table of Contents of this Report has been omitted. Except as is indicated below, the annexes to this Report are not printed. These annexes dealt with the organization of the American Representation on the Allied Control Commission, its administration and communications, the work of the Graves Registration Unit in Hungary, the repatriation of Hungarians, the expatriation of Swabians from Hungary, the restitution of Hungarian property, relations of the American Representation with other representations, and the minutes of the final meeting of the Allied Control Commission on September 15.
4. Not printed.
5. See Part III of the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference, August 1, 1945, Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 1485.
6. For the text of the Armistice Agreement between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom and Hungary, signed at Moscow, January 20, 1945, see Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 456.
7. Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 1494.
8. The proposed note under reference here and a summary of the correspondence and discussions on the subject of attempts of United States representatives to visit Hungarian military units and installations were transmitted to the Department in telegram 1413, August 22, from Budapest, not printed. Telegram 948, September 5, to Budapest, not printed, stated that in view of the impending entry into force of the Peace Treaty with Hungary, the Department of State was not disposed to make representations to the Soviet Union regarding the denial by General Sviridov of the right of General Weems to inspect Hungarian military units. The Department considered it preferable to defer further action on this issue until the Peace Treaty had come into effect (740.00119 Control (Hungary )/-8–2247). For documentation regarding the efforts of the United States to secure implementation of the treaties of peace with Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania, see pp. 1 ff.
9. Post, p. 374.
10. Infra.
11. General Weems’ letter under reference is printed supra.
12. Infra.
13. With the exception of the item cited in footnote 14 below, none of the appendices referred to in this paper have been printed.
14. This appendix consisted of an exchange of messages between General Clay and General Weems. In his message of April 24, General Weems, at the request of the Soviet and British members of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, recapitulated the situation resulting in Hungary from the suspension of the Swabian expellation program. The Hungarian Government, in anticipation of the resumption of the program in April, had processed and made ready for expatriation some 25,000 Swabians. Relations between the Hungarians and those persons whom the Government was determined to expel were strained and several fatal incidents had occurred. In his reply to General Weems on May 19, General Clay reviewed the conditions in the American zone of occupation in Germany. As of March 31, there were in the American zone nearly 2,900,000 expellees from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Austria, over 400,000 German nationals from Berlin and other occupied zones of Germany, and over 200,000 foreigners in Displaced Persons Centers, all of whom had to be maintained from the economy of the American zone. Clay concluded:

    “To summarize, I cannot foresee, at least within the calendar year, any relief to lessen the huge over-load of population now carried by the U.S. Zone of Germany through the return of expellees to the other Zones which should accept them, nor to the housing, food, employment and public relief conditions in our Zone which would permit the transfer of Swabians from Hungary under orderly and humane conditions.”

15. Appendix Q was the text of despatch 9919, May 15, from Berlin, not printed.
16. For the full text of the article quoted here, see Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, p. 1511.
17. The operative portion of document CONL/P (45), November 17, 1945, was the plan for the transfer of German populations to be moved from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland into the Occupied Zones of Germany. The text of this plan, as approved by the Allied Control Council for Germany, is included in telegram 1147, November 30, 1945, from Berlin, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, p. 1316.
18. Maj. Gen. Frank A. Keating, United States Deputy Military Governor for Germany.