Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

864.00/7–2247

The Minister in Hungary (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

secret
No. 3284

Budapest, July 22, 1947.

Sir: I have the honor to inform the Department that the rapid and grave deterioration in the Hungarian political situation which began months ago with a systematic and intensive preparation on the part of the Soviet Government and its agents in Hungary, the Communist Party, has continued to accelerate in pace and intensity even during the three weeks since my arrival in Hungary.

The methods employed are not new. They follow the now familiar pattern of infiltration, corruption, vilification, blackmail and intimidation, backed by the power, sometimes hidden, sometimes naked, of an occupying army directed by forces undeterred by any scruples to attain their aim. I have said that the pattern is not new for it has been used by the Soviets themselves elsewhere, by the Nazis and by other exponents of power politics. What is perhaps new is its perfection based upon Soviet experience in other countries and the whole derives from a firm and undeviating policy which has but one aim—the extension of Soviet power.

While I cannot from here attempt any evaluation of Soviet world policy, it is clear to me that the Soviet Government is determined, irrespective of solemn covenants or protestations of good faith, to bring Hungary under complete domination and to incorporate it into the general Soviet system. To do otherwise and permit Hungary to regain its independence and develop along Western lines would split the satellite Slav States and interfere seriously with the plan for domination of South Eastern Europe. Hungary, from its position in the center of the Danubian Basin, becomes therefore a springboard for further Soviet penetration of Western Europe with implications affecting the security of the Western occupied zones of Austria and Germany which cannot be ignored.

By “incorporation within the general Soviet system”, I do not mean to imply that the Soviets intend immediately to force upon Hungary a complete Sovietization of Hungarian economic and social structure in the Russian pattern. Most thinking Hungarians with whom I have talked agree that for the time being this is a secondary objective and that the Soviets and their Hungarian Communist allies are far too clever to arouse unnecessary opposition at this stage by enforcing collectivization in a strongly peasant community, or by upsetting urban economic life, or by direct attacks upon Magyar culture and religion. While some industrial organization along Communist lines is being attempted, care is exercised that this should not interfere too much with production which may be of assistance to the Soviet Union. According to well developed plans, however, leaders in industrial as well as in political life who show marked signs of initiative or independence are slated for elimination by one means or another, with the result that the country’s political and economic life will soon be directed by nonentities and Soviet puppets. The immediate aim, as stated above, is the extension of Soviet power; the digestive process can come later.

The Legation and the American press correspondents in Hungary have reported that this absorption of total control of Hungary is being effected in complete disregard of the known wishes and interests of the vast majority of the Hungarian people. The pro-Communist vote in a free election today would probably be even less than the seventeen percent registered in the 1945 elections, but most of the leaders of intelligence and character have disappeared or will shortly do so, and the new electoral law, when the elections are held, is so rigged as to ensure a complete control of Parliament by the extreme left or by its puppets. Legation telegram No. 1203, July 18.¹

I might remark that the predominating characteristic of the Hungarian people is their vitality—and this will to live in the Magyar way instantly registers upon the newcomer to Hungary. I have been struck with the lively building activity, not only in Budapest, but in the country towns I have visited. Dwellings are being repaired, churches and public offices rebuilt, roads and public facilities restored, automotive equipment made somehow to work, stores reopened and trade resumed; all with the aim of getting back some kind of normalcy and all with extremely limited facilities and reduced capital. Hungary, particularly Budapest, will present a ravaged appearance for years, but the energy and will power for reconstruction are lessons not only for the rest of Central Europe, but for France and England as well. This intense interest in the restoration of private property, not only in the countryside but in the cities, may be ‘another indication of a basic opposition to Communism. This physical and material vitality occasionally results in isolated displays of physical courage, demonstrated in political acts of a foolhardy nature or in futile plotting.

It is unfortunate that this physical activity and capacity for work is not accompanied by a corresponding amount of moral fiber. There is a supine quality or lack of stamina that seems to permeate the entire political and social fabric. Part of this may be due to the fact that the Hungarians have for centuries been dominated by other nations. Part is due to the fact that the majority of the natural or trained leaders of the nation were identified with former regimes and that the few who were inspired by genuine democracy have or are being eliminated, while others newly arrived to public life have succumbed to the material temptations of office and thus placed themselves, through threatened exposure, under Communist control.

It is important also that Hungary does not have a tradition and real experience in democracy and that as a result issues are not seen clearly. On resistance to or acceptance of Soviet and Communist domination the issues are clearly drawn, but the means of resistance are too varied, ranging from the fantastic belief of the Social Democrats that independence lies in “cooperation” with the USSR to the foolhardy intransigence of the followers of Sulyok, and muddled throughout by the aims and interests of such diverse groups as the former land owners, the peasants, the formerly landless agricultural workers, the bankers, the industrialists, the white collar class, the workers and the Catholic Church. These and other groups all have their own aims which conflict to a greater or less degree and when coupled with an opportunism which appears to be characteristically Hungarian the result is a confusion which is of positive aid to the single-minded directness of the Soviet and Communist approach.

The geographic fact remains that Hungary is dependent militarily, economically and politically on its position as a Danubian State and hence its fate is involved with that of its neighbors. Most importantly there is an Army of Occupation in Hungary which shows no immediate sign of retiring and which even should the Treaty of Peace be ratified could be continued under one pretext or another as a force for the maintenance of the line of communication to Austria,

The complete domination of the Allied Control Commission by the Soviet Chairman gives the Soviets a unilateral authority which is strictly enforced over any step positive or negative which may affect Hungarian or Soviet interests either in domestic or external politics. An illustration of this is the decision to abstain from the recent Paris economic meeting—presented as a unanimous interparty decision—after three party caucuses, including that of the party nominally holding fifty-seven percent of the seats in Parliament, had recorded themselves as favoring attendance.

There is little doubt as to the dislike and fear on the part of Hungarians, as a whole, of the separation of their country from the West and its inclusion in a sphere of States subordinate to the power interests of the Soviet Union. There is also little doubt, unfortunately, that the Hungarian people can, in existing circumstances or in the foreseeable future, be counted upon to produce of themselves alone the moral and physical force which can reassert for Hungary the true democratic development within their own independence which they so much desire. It must be conceded that the Hungarians, with a long tradition of passive resistance, tend to rely much too heavily upon foreign support for the realization of their own aims and that they tend to gravitate, irrespective of their own best interests, to the prevailing dominant power in this area.

Historically, Hungary has looked much to Great Britain for friendship and guidance, but it is evident that for one reason or another Great Britain no longer is in a position, even should it so desire, to extend much assistance to this nation. In fact it seems almost as if British diplomacy in this area has been hypnotized by a fantastic hope that somehow the forces of Social Democracy, which is presumed to have a sympathetic link with the British Labor Party, can be galvanized into taking the leadership in the political life of Hungary. Actually this party, with unbelievable fatuity, seemed bent, despite the lessons of history and of contemporary Balkan politics, on playing the suicidal role of the Mensheviks in Russia and the Girondins in the French Revolution. However, there are signs that the Social Democratic leaders now realize the peril of their position and will attempt to close their ranks preparatory to making a stand.

Confronted then with the realities of Soviet proximity, threats and pressures, and an impotent British policy compounded of much wishful thinking, the Hungarians have little recourse but to turn primarily towards the United States for support of their national aspirations.

In discussions with Hungarian leaders of varying shades of democratic opinion, I have found an almost pathetic faith in the United States as a possible savior of Hungary, although much of their confidence is evaporating under the impact of a long series of Soviet unilateral actions and faits accomplis affecting every phase of Hungarian life. Although a part of this trust springs from the tradition of freedom and prosperity which every European associates with the United States, much of the ideological content is based upon the promises, actual or implied, as contained in utterances of American leaders and upon such documents as the Yalta Declaration and the charter of the United Nations promising attention to the situation of oppressed people. I find democratic elements in Hungary discouraged, grieved, and even embittered by what they regard rightly or wrongly as a “letdown” by the United States which they believe encouraged them to fight for democratic aspirations and for independence, but which has failed to follow through with its promises and to extend effective concrete help to local efforts against the contrary actions of the Soviet Union.

Experienced Hungarian political observers have pointed out that however idealistic may be our motives on the international scene, and I find that a surprising number have genuine admiration for our high principles, the practical moves of United States policy were designed for use in a free world which does not, unfortunately, accord with the realities in Eastern Europe today.

To paraphrase the contention frequently made by Latin American political observers that our expressed doctrine of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another country often constitutes intervention itself, it may be said that non-intervention in the face of persistent and brutal intervention by a power seeking domination of another country may not only constitute an invitation to that power to intervene but does in fact constitute positive support of that power’s aim to dominate.

Democratic elements in Hungary receive with politeness our oft repeated assurances of interest in their welfare and that of Hungary and, perhaps with more enthusiasm, our expressions of indignation at the course of developments in this part of Europe, but when these assurances and our notes of protest are followed by no action which can be shown as having had effect locally, the rumor once again circulates that we have abandoned Hungary to Soviet domination. These same elements find it difficult to reconcile our denials that we have abandoned Eastern Europe with our refusal to use the instrumentalities which they assume we hold as a dominant world power.

Although Hungarians are apt to indulge in wishful thinking and hence attribute more ready power to the United States in Europe than we may possess, it would appear that the situation in Hungary might not have reached its present state of desperation had we taken more positive steps in the past. For example, we might have given stronger support to Hungarian minimum claims at the peace negotiations after weighing the possibilities of which country could or could not be saved. Likewise there was the possibility, which now appears too late, of founding a daily newspaper in Budapest backed by United States Government resources in newsprint, money and protection, perhaps under Army auspices, which would have guaranteed at least one organ adhering to the principles of a free press. It might well have paid its way and could have combatted effectively the distorted propaganda of the officially Russian sponsored Red Army newspaper. Early aid to Hungarian economy on a generous scale would have been effective, whereas now such aid might be used against us unless surrounded with guarantees. It was unfortunate that the United States interpretation of “German assets” as used in the Potsdam Declaration was not defined promptly and openly. Moreover, the lack of experienced and politically tutored military personnel to implement United States policy in the Allied Control Commission when that organization was set up was a serious handicap.

All this, however, is water over the dam. The prime question is what can we do now. It is interesting in this connection to note that in a recent letter from the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Warner, to my British colleague instructing him to concert with me on measures respecting Hungary, it was said that we might be able to suggest some measures which might “be taken by the Americans and ourselves to slow up the process of Communist dictatorship in Hungary” rather than reverse or even arrest the process. I have noted however, in the United States press, occasional references to a line of thought which postulates a containment of the USSR within its present sphere of influence which presumably would include Hungary.

Although a decision for an active policy was, so far as I am aware, never formulated in so many words by the Department during the year, it was legitimate to conclude from the plans for the staffing of this Legation and for the acquisition of property in Budapest, that at one time there was a serious thought of pursuing an active policy in this area and of using Budapest as a centre. Up to the events of the end of May, such a hope, even though not yet implemented, seemed at any rate a real possibility.

The deterioration in Hungary since that date, which has apparently been accompanied by similar developments in other countries of this area, is proceeding, as stated at the outset of my despatch, at a highly accelerated rate, and unless something positive is done immediately, all hope of saving Hungary for the constructive part which it might play in a stabilized democratic Europe needs must be abandoned, barring unforeseen miracles. The Department may best judge how such a concession would affect our efforts to establish an Austria free from Soviet influence.

As reported in my telegram 1202, July 18, the Sulyok Party and such other opposition elements as remain are now terrorized at the prospect of liquidation following the dissolution of Parliament and the expiration of the Parliamentary immunity of their leaders. In the last few days I have been approached by at least three deputies desiring to know whether the United States Government, and more specifically our Legation and offices abroad, could get them safely into Czechoslovakia or Austria and beyond. I have had to reply that aside from the fact that we have no entirely safe or adequate means for such an operation, this is a practice which we have never followed. Their reply is interesting in that they observe that while this normally might be construed as intervention, new situations make for new practices. My British colleague informs me that he himself has had no such approaches recently, but that he has standard instructions to discourage such persons unless they are severely compromised (presumably for having served British interests) should they apply to him, and to advise them to stand courageously at their posts. While this advice is indeed sound from a British or American standpoint, it is difficult to give, without some feeling of hypocrisy, to an individual already badly beaten, when one knows that his party is being dissolved, himself declared ineligible to hold public office and the Communist wolves already at his heels. Even though many of these men are far from ideal leaders, some of them have shown moral courage of the type so lacking in present day Hungarian public life.

Admittedly the case for presentation to the Security Council of the United Nations of Russian aggression in Hungary might be a difficult one to prove, especially in view of the Soviet control over official communications and the Hungarian reluctance to make official formal statements of events. The Soviet Government and their agents, the left wing bloc in Hungary, have been extremely astute in following constitutional and democratic forms, and although everyone knows that each step is only achieved by pressure of a most brutal and illegal nature, the outward appearance is one of legality. Furthermore, although one may obtain plenty of even direct oral contradictory evidence, documentary proof is fragmentary.

However, since we are not prepared to use military measures, and have no other visible means of exerting pressure in Hungary, it would seem that recourse to the United Nations, difficult as this may be procedurally and dangerous as it may be to our prestige if not pressed or to the structure of the organization if successful, appears to be the only practical instrument in hand.

In conclusion, I express the hope that, even though it is now late, we should not abandon all effort to save Hungary, and I earnestly invite the Department’s attention to the need for a comprehensive and resolute review and precise redefinition of our policy with respect to Hungary.

I suggest, however, that the first decision which should be taken is whether or not, all things considered, we are prepared to take a positive line with respect to this nation. In the event that this should be decided in the affirmative, and we are prepared to follow an active policy, I believe that the existing staff of the Legation, including the officers now under assignment to this post and with additional clerical assistance, should be maintained. I would also concur in the pursuance of an active and comprehensive program of acquisition of suitable sites and the construction of fully representative buildings for a combined office, a residence and staff housing.

In this case I venture to submit the following recommendations for consideration by the Department:

1. That we should immediately press the case of Russian intervention in Hungary in the Security Council, raising it and reraising it when vetoed or knocked down until it can be brought before the Assembly. The important point, however, is that if such action is to have a salutary effect in Hungary, it must be announced or initiated prior to the elections in Hungary, now scheduled for the last week in August. A competent officer with legal experience and knowledge of United Nations procedure might be assigned to the Legation immediately to assist in collecting data.

2. That we should exert such means as we have at our disposal to obtain an early exchange of ratifications of the Hungarian treaty and hence remove the legal unilateral power of the Soviet Union to intervene through the Allied Control Commission and to reduce the forces of occupation to a line of communications guard.

3. That we should be prepared promptly, when suitable conditions prevail, to extend financial and other material aid on a quid pro quo basis. The first step under this would be restoration of the suspended portion of the surplus property credits, but only as conditions may warrant.

4. That funds and other facilities should be provided for the escape of key Hungarian figures who are compromised and cannot stay in the country without direct immediate danger of kidnapping and torture. I believe that we can use such persons eventually to rebuild a better Hungary if Soviet pressure is relieved as a result of 1 and 2. In the event that no assistance is possible, I should be instructed frankly to inform any individuals who apply to the Legation that we can give them no nope. The Department is, of course, also aware that the degree to which individual Hungarians will be willing to assist our cause in the future is largely dependent upon the record which we now establish in fulfilling our inescapable responsibilities to those who have undergone considerable risk to our benefit. Our reputation for humanitarianism is also at stake.²

5. Apart from point 4 above I strongly recommend that the Department empower me now to take the necessary measures, including assistance in departing from Hungary and issuance of temporary United States visas, to protect local employees of the Legation who will be scheduled for punishment at some future date on the sole basis of their service to the United States Government. This authority would of course only be availed of should circumstances demand.

6. That we follow in principle the recommendations submitted by the Mission in Sofia for an active role in the enforcement of the clauses of the Peace Treaty and as outlined in my telegram numbers 1174 of July 11³ and 1211 of July 19, 1947.⁴

7. That we pursue an active role in the enforcement of the economic clauses of the Peace Treaty, not only as they pertain directly to American interests, but also as they relate to the interpretation of such Articles as 28 and 30, paragraph 4.

8. That an active Cultural and Informational program should be maintained as our most important direct means of influencing the people of Hungary and supporting United States objectives in Hungary today.

Other suitable proposals for positive action will no doubt occur to the Department, and the Legation will be glad to submit additional suggestions.

Should, however, the answer be in the negative Budapest would, in the foreseeable future at least, be reduced to the status of a Central European listening post. Accordingly, I would then recommend a cut of at least one third in officer personnel, but would desire to be consulted on the selection of those officers to be retained. I would also suggest that our existing building program is inconsistent with our position now and in the future and hence should be immediately reduced and concentrated. However, the opportunity before inflation sets in again of availing ourselves of the existing credits for construction should not be missed, and such credits should be used to their fullest limit at once.

We need not of course admit publicly that we have written Hungary off the slate, but the continuance of a large building program with sites tall over the city and a staff much larger than any other Legation except that of the Soviet Union cannot but excite false hopes on the part of some and ridicule on the part of others, if we are to continue to play a passive role in Hungary. I should be grateful accordingly for an early indication of the Department’s decision.

Respectfully yours,

Selden Chapin

1. Not printed.
2. Telegram 2012, December 23, from Budapest, not printed, reported that members of the Hungarian Independence Party had discussed with Legation officers the desperate situation facing remaining party members, two of whom had committed suicide recently. These Hungarians had no hope of obtaining jobs and they appealed to the Legation for funds to help them through the winter. While the Legation discouraged the inquiry, Minister Chapin felt that as a result of continued Soviet intransigence in world affairs, the Department may have reassessed its policy on such a matter “and be disposed make known to our friends and real supporters democracy our interest and sympathy rather than deny them aid and destroy their faith in US”. Telegram 32, January 13, 1948, to Budapest, not printed, replied that while the Department was giving continuous consideration to the Legation’s proposals, policy with respect to matters of this kind had not Changed (864.00/12–2347).
3. Not printed.
4. Ante, p. 19.