Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

864.00/7–147

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

[Washington,] July 1, 1947.

Subject: Hungary

background

In November 1945 free elections were held in Hungary in which the moderate Smallholders Party obtained a 57% majority, the Social Democrats 17% and the Communists 17%. The ensuing Hungarian Government was, as a result of a pre-election interparty arrangement, a coalition headed by the Smallholders who took 9 portfolios including the Premiership, and with 4 Communists and 4 Social Democrats.

Since those free elections, the Soviets have, through their occupying forces, the Allied Control Commission, and Soviet diplomatic representatives in Hungary, openly but more often covertly, intervened directly in the affairs of Hungary for the purpose of nullifying the will of the Hungarian people by the establishment of Soviet dominated Communist political and economic control of the country. In this process, the Soviets have assisted their Communist sympathizers to infiltrate the services of public order, have exerted pressure through the abuse of the authority of the occupying power to intimidate the majority elements into abdicating their Parliamentary authority, and have by unilateral interpretation of the armistice, in violation of that instrument and the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, obtained exclusively Soviet domination of the economy of Hungary. In culmination of this campaign the Soviet occupation authorities arrested a leader of the majority party and, by the use of testimony attributed to him, brought about at the end of May 1947, the resignation of the Hungarian Prime Minister, the flight from Hungary of the President of the Parliament, and the formation of a reorganized Hungarian Government which, though nominally still a Smallholder led coalition, is in fact wholly subservient to Communist and Moscow orders.

discussion

Soviet objectives in Hungary are clearly integrated with the general framework of Soviet expansion Westward through Eastern Europe and, with the consolidation of her exclusive control of the Danube Basin, the USSR is in an immediate position to threaten an independent Austria.

Soviet action in Hungary, and also in Rumania and Bulgaria, has been in clear violation of the Yalta agreement which provided that the policies of the USSR, the UK and the US in regard to liberated Europe should be concerted. The Soviets have likewise violated the Armistice agreements and, in the course of their economic penetration, the Potsdam accord as it relates to German assets. Soviet forces are in occupation of Hungary as well as Rumania and Bulgaria and Soviet troops will remain in Hungary and Rumania until an Austrian treaty comes into effect.

Hungarian developments have precipitated a situation clearly posing the question whether there are effective means, short of war, by which Soviet aggression through infiltration can be successfully combatted by the forces of democracy. The President has said that we will not stand idly by² and Senator Vandenberg has publicly advocated reference of the Hungarian case to the UN.³

We have made strong representations to the Soviets during the evolution of the situation in Hungary, three times requesting international investigation. We have likewise protested repressive measures taken by the authorities in Rumania and Bulgaria. The British have supported us and, in regard to Hungary, the British Ambassador in Moscow made similarly forceful representations to Mr. Molotov. No satisfaction has been forthcoming.

SPA is studying the possibilities and procedures in regard to the submission of the Hungarian case to an appropriate organ of the UN. On the basis of preliminary consideration various factors affecting such course are apparent. The Security Council is now considering the Greek case and the introduction of the Hungarian case into that body might well deflect attention from that important matter. The case would have to be taken to the UN, seemingly, as a dispute between the US and the USSR. It could not be taken as an isolated situation relating only to Hungary, as Soviet action in Rumania and Bulgaria constitutes equally flagrant violation of her Yalta pledges and the armistice agreements. However, there is little likelihood that, even if, as EE is inclined to hope, the Soviets might in the face of world condemnation be disposed to recede to some extent in Hungary, they would equally compromise in Rumania or Bulgaria where their domination is further advanced; and it may be questioned whether we should risk a major test of the UN in regard to ex-enemy countries subject to the provisions of Article 107 of the Charter. There is also the question as to the amount of support we would get from other United Nations. Though the British have now made strong representations in Moscow, they were at first lukewarm and did not join in our formal protest in the Allied Control Commission. Mr. Spaak, Belgian Prime Minister and first President of the General Assembly, who may reflect the general reaction of small nations, has indicated misgivings as to the advisability of Security Council action.

It would presumably be our objective in the United Nations to obtain the appointment of an investigation commission in accordance with our previous requests, such a commission to be empowered to recommend measures to restore the rule of the majority in Hungary, possibly through international supervision of new elections which are now proposed for next fall. At this point, however, it is difficult to assess the probable advisability of such a commission or such supervision. Conceivably the latter could be so hamstrung by Soviet manipulations as to preclude its affecting the course of the elections with the result that international blessing might be given a Soviet rigged result.

In the circumstances, it would seem unwise to propose immediate action in the Security Council. Subsequent developments may, however, suggest the desirability of raising the matter of Hungary or of the wider problem of Soviet action in Eastern Europe as a whole at the General Assembly in September. Considerations affecting such decision would be the outcome of the Greek case which will obviously have a general influence in the Balkans and intervening developments in relation to the “Marshall Plan”.

In the meantime, it is believed that we should sound out British views as to possible further steps in the matter including United Nation action and ask for any suggestions they may have as to further US or British action. At the same time we should keep the matter alive, as encouragement to the peoples of Eastern Europe, through the release to the press of appropriate information and statements of our views concerning developments in Hungary. If the British should be so disposed and on further reflection it seemed advisable, we could announce that US–UK discussions are going on in this connection. It is possible that such public expression of our continuing interest might in itself serve in some measure to slow the Soviet hand.

recommendations⁴

1) That continuing consideration be given to the submission of the Hungarian or general Eastern European case to the UN, but that such submission to the Security Council be postponed for the time being;

2) that the attached telegram⁵ soliciting British views in the matter be dispatched, and

3) that public expression of our attitude toward developments in Hungary and Eastern Europe be made as frequently as occasion warrants.

attachment

Draft telegram to AmEmbassy, London.

1. This memorandum was also sent to Under Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett. A handwritten marginal notation indicates that he approved. Mr. Lovett assumed his duties as Under Secretary on July 1.
2. The reference here is to a comment about Hungary made by President Truman at his news conference of June 5; see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 265–266.
3. Senator Vandenberg’s statement under reference here was made during a speech to the Senate on June 3.
4. A handwritten marginal notation at this point by the Secretary of State reads: “OK GCM”.
5. No draft telegram is attached to the source text, but the reference here is presumably to the message sent as telegram 2877, July 3, to London, not printed, which repeated most of the arguments and considerations set forth in the section marked “Discussion” of this memorandum (864.00/7–347).