864.00/6–1947
Memorandum by the Secretary of
State to President Truman
1
confidential
Washington, June 19,
1947.
We have just received a paraphrase of a telegram from the British Foreign
Office to the British Ambassador at Moscow, directing him to deliver an
aide-mémoire to the Soviet Government on the
Soviet reply to the British Hungarian note.2
The instructions to the British Ambassador are well worth reading. I have
marked in red those portions that are particularly important. Mr. Bevin
is quite evidently irritated by Mr. Molotov’s reply to his cautious
request for information.
A paraphrase of the telegram is attached and I would appreciate its
return when you have read it.
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The British Foreign
Office to the British Ambassador in the Soviet
Union (Peterson)
[Annex]
confidential
[London, 16th June, 1947.]
You should request a further interview with M. Molotov and should
inform him leaving an aide-mémoire for
purposes of record that His Majesty’s Government are gravely
disturbed by his unhelpful reply to my perfectly legitimate request
for information. You should repudiate emphatically the contention
that His Majesty’s Government have intervened in the internal
affairs of Hungary by any improper means or to any extent not
justified by their position as signatories of the armistice and the
peace treaty.3 You should further enquire to what
specific acts of intervention not made through the instrumentality
of the A.C.C. Mr. Molotov was
referring. You should point out that the British representative on
the A.C.C. has always taken
particular pains to act through the agency of the Soviet chairman
and that neither you nor he nor Mr. Helm have sought to defend Mr.
Nagy or Mr. Kovács. His Majesty’s Government have indeed
insufficient information either to defend or to condemn. The Soviet
Government have received nothing but a civil request from one ally
to another such as is justified by the agreements they both have
signed for information which would permit His Majesty’s Government
to judge the facts of the situation. The reply which Mr. Molotov
gave was not such as would in the normal friendly relations between
great powers be expected from an ally and it has therefore caused
amazement both to His Majesty’s Government and to Parliament.4
2. There are certain points made by Mr. Molotov during your interview
on 9th June5 which I
wish to contest:
- (1)
- He stated that the policy of the U.S.S.R. was
non-intervention in Hungarian politics. This statement seems
hardly consistent with the pressure which the Soviet
authorities and the Communist party with Soviet backing have
brought to bear on the Hungarian Government, on the
Smallholders party and on Hungarian institutions such as the
General Credit Bank. In this connection you should also
refer to the note of 28th June, 1946, mentioned in Budapest
telegram No. 704.
- (2)
- Mr. Molotov says that the A.C.C. is not involved in these proceedings
because it is not directly concerned. Since General Sviridov
and his staff have played so active a part in this whole
affair how can
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it
be said that the A.C.C. are
not involved?6 You should moreover reiterate the
point about Article 15 of the armistice agreement to which
you refer in paragraph 6 of your telegram under reference
and should point out that since under Article 6(c) of the statutes of the A.C.C. the representative of
the United Kingdom has a right “to receive copies of all
information accounts and other documents which can interest
the government of the United Kingdom”, His Majesty’s
Government certainly have the right to obtain through the
A.C.C. copies of
documents relating to the alleged existence of a Fascist
plot.
- (3)
- To meet a request for information with the statement that
the Allied representatives had presumably read about the
plot in the newspapers is an answer to which Mr. Molotov can
hardly expect me to take seriously. Mr. Molotov knows full
well that what His Majesty’s Government have asked for is
information about the Soviet Union’s intentions in Hungary
and for evidence against the displaced Hungarian Ministers
which was in General Sviridov’s possession. They obviously
cannot accept as authentic allegations against Mr. Nagy
merely because they appear in the press. General Sviridov’s
statement that his only copy of the evidence in question had
been sent to the Hungarian Government is so absurd that it
must seriously be asked whether it was not intended to be
deliberately offensive to his British colleague.6
- (4)
- Mr. Molotov states that recent events in Hungary have not
threatened the interests of any Allied power particularly
not of Great Britain. Hitherto it must be admitted that no
action had been taken by the Hungarian Government which
threatened the interests of Great Britain. It is however
regrettable that the Soviet authorities in Hungary have
shown so little willingness to cooperate with their British
colleague in respect of the few matters relating to British
interests which have been referred to them. In particular
you should draw Mr. Molotov’s attention to the points about
clearances and civil aviation contained in paragraph 4 of
Budapest telegram No. 704 (of 10th June) which is clear
evidence of Soviet obstruction of legitimate British
activities in Hungary.
3. You should ask Mr. Molotov to believe that His Majesty’s
Government in all sincerity have no other desire than that Hungary
should regain her full independence and retain a system of
government which would enable her to be on equally friendly terms
with Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. (against whose rightful
influence in Hungary His Majesty’s Government have no designs
whatever). Finally, you should say that the Soviet Government by
dissipating the suspicion unfortunately widespread at present in the
United Kingdom, that it is their intention to frustrate true
Hungarian independence and to transform the country, by force and
through the instrumentality of new and unfree elections, into a
closed preserve of the Soviet Union now having a striking
opportunity of impressing opinion in the United Kingdom and of
proving by their action that the Anglo-Soviet alliance is a
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living reality and not the
pretentious facade which, in consequence of this apparent disregard
of the other party’s rights and interests, so many well disposed
people in this country are inclined to regard it.7 A
first step towards this end on which I personally set the greatest
store would be a frank discussion of the Hungarian situation and the
provision of the information for which I have asked. For my part I
should be quite ready to agree to this discussion taking place in a
three-power commission as proposed in the United States note to the
Soviet chairman of the A.C.C. in
Hungary dated June 11th.
