Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

860F.51/11–1447

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Beam)

secret

[Washington,] November 14, 1947.

Participants:	The Secretary
	Mr. Beam
	Mr. Masaryk
	Ambassador Slávik

Mr. Masaryk said he had the following specific points to raise:

Cotton Credits. The Secretary recalled that Czechoslovakia had applied for an additional $20,000,000 cotton credit and stated he had just received a telegram¹ from Ambassador Steinhardt, which was under consideration.

Czechoslovak Share in Gold Pool. The Secretary pointed out that restitution claims were determined by the Tripartite Commission and he understood that the validity of the Czechoslovak claims was still under consideration.²

International Bank Credit Application.³ The Secretary indicated that the Czechoslovak application for a credit was still under advisement by the International Bank and that this matter related more directly to the work of the Bank than to that of the Department.

Interest in Food Shipments. Mr. Masaryk mentioned that Czechoslovakia had been badly hit by drought, which affected the wheat and potato crops. The 200,000 tons of wheat offered by the Soviets was slow in coming and he wanted the Secretary to know that Czechoslovakia would be grateful for any shipments that could be accorded it. As he put it, his country was one of those “standing in line”.

Mr. Masaryk then presented a survey of Czechoslovakia’s general position. (See also memorandum of Mr. Masaryk’s conversation with Mr. Lovett dated October 29, 1947⁴). US prestige and popularity were high and seven times more American films were being shown in Czechoslovakia than before the war. He regretted that the US cultural program had been curtailed by shortage of funds. The Czechoslovaks were more culturally advanced than most of the other Slavs and had a long history of western orientation which they wished to continue. At the same time, they were separated by a great distance from the western nations which could give them help directly and they were forced to make the best of a difficult situation caused by their contiguity to the Soviet sphere. Mr. Masaryk pointed out that he was not always free to adopt the kind of position he would like to take and that Czechoslovak policy frequently had to cut across that of the US. At the same time he would return to his country prepared to do all he could for the survival of constitutional democracy.

The Secretary said he appreciated the fact that Czechoslovakia had originally wished to join the European Recovery Plan. He mentioned that the US hopes there will be a general reactivation of trade between all the countries of Europe as a result of western European rehabilitation. He had in mind that US assistance would get normal trade circulation started again and would promote an increasing volume of exchange between east and west. In his view, a reestablishment of European confidence was the essential point and he referred to the recovery which the US had quickly made from the depths of the 1933 depression. He appreciated that this might take some time to get started but that hope of recovery lay essentially in the revival of European initiative.

The Secretary mentioned that in response to a question from the Polish Ambassador as to why Russia had not been consulted in the original plans for the recovery program, he had given the assurance that there had been no prior consultation with either the British or the French, who themselves had immediately acted upon his general proposal. This was the truth, although he recognized that it might have been difficult for the Polish Ambassador to understand it in view of Soviet propaganda against the program.

The Secretary asked Mr. Masaryk if he could account for Soviet Russia’s actions since the end of the war, which seemed incomprehensible in the effect they had produced in destroying the good will which Soviet Russia enjoyed with all the world in 1945. Mr. Masaryk thought these actions sprang from suspicion of the outside world and from Soviet obsession that the US is bound to suffer an economic collapse, which will withdraw it from world affairs and leave the fate of Europe to Soviet decision.

In taking leave of the Secretary, Mr. Masaryk expressed his personal admiration for the assistance which the US was giving Europe and again indicated his regret that his country could not be a direct participant in the program.

1. The reference here is to telegram 1518, November 13, from Praha, supra.
2. On September 26, 1946, the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France established the Tripartite Commission for the Restitution of Monetary Gold. It was the function of the Commission to scrutinize claims received and to determine the share of each claimant Government in the pool of monetary gold found in Germany or found in a third country to which it had been transferred from Germany or found in a third country to which it had been transferred from Germany. Regarding the establishment of this commission, see Department of State Bulletin, September 29, 1946, p. 563.

   Czechoslovakia had submitted to the Tripartite Commission a claim amounting to 45,000 kg. or about $50 million. It was the Department’s policy that once the claim had been submitted to the Commission, it was for the Commission to make the decision whether the claim was wholly was wholly or partly admitted for participation in the gold pool. At this time, the Commission had not made a decision regarding the recognition of the Czechoslovak claim.

3. The reference here is to the credit of $350 million which the Czechoslovak Government informally requested in July 1946 and for which a formal application was filed in February 1947.
4. Ante, p. 237.