Report by an Ad Hoc Committee of the
State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee
[Enclosure]
secret
[
Washington
,] undated.
Enforcement of Military Clauses of Satellite
Treaties
the problem
1. To consider and recommend uniform guidance for the U.S. Heads of
Mission to Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania concerning their several
responsibilities for the execution and interpretation of the
military, naval and air clauses of the treaties of peace with those
countries.
facts bearing on the problem
2. See Appendix “A”.
discussion
3. See Appendix “B”.
conclusions
4. It is probable that the governments of the former satellite
countries will attempt to avoid some of the obligations imposed upon
them by the terms of the military, naval and air clauses of the
peace treaties.
[Page 22]
5. To cope with the possible situations which might arise, guidance
should be provided along the following lines:
-
a.
- Negotiating history of the subject clauses which might
indicate future positions other powers might take;
-
b.
- General U.S. opinion regarding the intent and
scope;
-
c.
- Anticipated or possible violations; and
-
d.
- Practical suggestions concerning implementation in
specific situations.
recommendations
6. That the attached policy paper be referred to the JCS for comment from a military point
of view.
7. That subject to favorable comment by the JCS and after approval by SWNCC, the attached policy
papers be forwarded to the State Department for integration with
such other guidance for the U.S. Heads of Mission in Bulgaria,
Hungary and Rumania as may have been prepared.
8. That the State Department be requested (draft memorandum
attached3) to furnish the three U.S. Heads of
Mission complete copies of the various SWNCC papers and CFM documentation referred to in
paragraph 4, Appendix “A”, in addition to Annexes “A”, “B” and “C”
of Appendix “C” attached hereto.
Annex “A” to Appendix “C”6
U.S. Policy Regarding the
Supervision of the Implementation of the Military, Naval, and
Air Clauses of the Treaty of Peace With Bulgaria
7
1. Because of the imminence of deposit of ratifications of the
satellite peace treaties by the Allies, it is now considered
practicable to define the policies and interpretations to be applied
to the military, naval and air clauses of the several treaties. It
is considered that the complete unanimity between the U.S. and
British which has existed in the preparation of this guidance,
should exist during the implementation of the treaty. This guidance
should be generally applicable concerning your responsibility in the
supervision of the military, air and naval clauses of the treaty of
peace with Bulgaria. The proper implementation of the military,
naval and air clauses of these satellite treaties is considered of
the highest importance in the attainment of U.S. objectives within
the countries concerned.
Background
2. Background information concerning the basic U.S. positions with
regard to the military, naval and air clauses and the negotiating
history, which might indicate to you the position the
representatives of the other Powers might take, are contained in the
SWNCC 244 series papers and in documentation recording the agreed
record of proceedings of the meetings of the Council of Foreign
Ministers and of their Deputies during consideration and preparation
of the peace treaties. Copies of these papers are being forwarded to
you by the State Department.
U.S. Interpretation
3. Concerning U.S. interpretation of the military, naval and air
clauses, the over-all interest of the U.S. is to permit the former
satellite states sufficient armed forces to maintain internal order
and to defend their frontiers while, at the same time, preventing
them from assuming an aggressive character or from attaining
proportions such that alone they would present a threat to peaceful
states, or in alliance with other states their military strength
could measurably contribute to a war of aggression.
4. Within the framework outlined in paragraph 3 above it is
considered that the majority of the military, naval and air clauses
are [Page 26] self-explanatory and
need no amplification. However, the following amplification of the
general clauses, applicable to all three treaties, should, in view
of the fact that violations concerning them are most probable, be
considered as the U.S. position, subject to such modification as may
be required by future changes in the situation.
5. Part III, Section I, Art. 9—Bulgarian Treaty.
The military establishment permitted under this article should
consist of the forces enumerated with strengths as specified. The
organization, training and equipment of these forces should not be
designed for offensive operations but rather must be planned for the
dual purpose of maintaining internal order in support of the civil
police and to defend the frontiers against local incursions. All
organizations not included in the tables of organization must not be
so organized, trained or equipped that being capable of assuming
military operations, they can readily be absorbed in the armed
forces.
6. Part III, Section I, Art. 14—Bulgarian Treaty.
The quantities of war materials, as defined in the treaty, which
should be permitted should not exceed those authorized in approved
tables of equipment plus a certain percentage reserve for
replacement. Facilities with a capacity for the manufacture and
maintenance of German designed war materials, or of other war
materials in excess of that above which cannot be technically
converted to civilian use, must be disposed of.
7. Part III, Section I, Article 15—Bulgarian Treaty
Under this Article war material presently available of either Allied
or German origin or design may be retained to the extent it is
required to initially equip the permitted armed forces as in
paragraphs 5 and 6 above. All war material in excess of these
requirements should be disposed of as specified in the several
treaties.
Possible Difficulties in Implementation
8. The greatest difficulty to effective supervision of treaty
execution will probably be encountered through lack of cooperation
engineered by the Soviets on the part of the Governments of the
former satellite states, and attempted restrictions of the travel
and inspection of the non-Soviet representatives. The fact that
Soviet troops will probably be present, at least for 90 days after
the coming into force of the treaties, will cause further
complications.8
9. Specific attempts to evade the obligations imposed by the
military, naval and air clauses might include action to organize,
train and [Page 27] equip groups not
included in the strength calculations of the armed forces in such a
manner that they can readily augment the armed forces.
Specific Guidance
10. Upon the coming into force of the several treaties, the U.S. Head
of Mission should assume a positive rather than a defensive attitude
toward his responsibilities for verifying treaty execution of the
military clauses. In this respect, since the Bulgarian Government
will have legally accepted the various obligations imposed by the
treaty terms, the U.S. representative should proceed on the
assumption he may exercise all rights and privileges conferred by
the treaty. It is not considered desirable that the question of
freedom of travel should be raised until restrictive action is taken
by the Soviets or by the Government of Bulgaria. During the 90 day
transition period, however, travel in the vicinity of Soviet troop
areas should not be undertaken, in order to avoid setting a
precedent for the necessity of obtaining travel permits.
U.S. representatives should assume that they may travel freely
elsewhere. In respect to the Greco-Bulgarian frontier, in which area
the U.S. has right to inspect Bulgarian fulfillment of Article 12,
the Bulgarian Government need only be informed of U.S. intentions
since it is desirable for this purpose to assume that there are no
Soviet troops in this area. Specific instructions for carrying out
the inspection of this area will be issued whenever such action
appears appropriate.9
11. Upon the coming into force of the treaty, the Government of
Bulgaria should be requested by the U.S. Head of Mission to submit
to him for his information and approval:
-
a.
- The present strengths, location and composition of the
armed forces.
-
b.
- The plans for implementing the treaty articles to include
proposed tables of organization and equipment.
At the discretion of the U.S. Head of Mission copies of these
requests may be dispatched to his British and Soviet colleagues.
[Page 28]
12. Organizations such as the national militia in Bulgaria
should,10 if its present military character is unchanged, be
classified as a military organization and either required to be
included in the strengths of the armed forces or reorganized on a
nonmilitary basis, information of which should be included in a above.
13. It is the U.S. Government’s interpretation that the U.S. Head of
Mission shall be entitled to receive through normal diplomatic
channels any and all information necessary for him to execute his
duties under the terms of the treaty, and that consequently he
should not be required to concert with his colleagues in this
connection.11
14. Normal procedure upon receiving evidence of inadequate treaty
compliance should be to bring the matter to the attention of the
other Heads of Mission concerned for consideration. Failure to
achieve satisfactory action by this procedure the matter should be
referred to the State Department, Washington, for instructions. In
the interests of uniform action in all three ex-satellite countries
maximum coordination should be maintained between the various U.S.
missions and between these missions and the State Department.
