The data in the enclosed memorandum should be very useful to the
Department in the event of bilateral aviation discussions with Cuba.
Moreover, I believe that this resume will be of great value to American
companies who are considering operations to Cuba, but owing to its
nature should be made available with discretion.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Commercial Attaché in
Cuba (Howard)
Habana
, October 21, 1946.
Having no Cuban airlines in a position to handle but a small part of
the international air traffic between Cuba and abroad, the Cuban
Government is in a rather awkward position as regards civil
aviation, and the gradual evolving of a policy has been a struggle
between the desire to have excellent connections by air with foreign
countries and at the same time preserve a trading position for Cuban
operators.
Up until late 1945 Cuba was prepared
to grant licenses to practically any company desiring to come in
from any country, either as a scheduled or a chartered service,
under fairly simple procedures and without demanding reciprocal
treatment for its national companies. However, gaining impetus
largely from pressure brought upon it by Pan American in connection with its desire to operate
Habana–Mexico through its subsidiary Compañia Cubana de Aviación, as
well as by Cubana and Expreso for accelerated CAB action on their applications to
operate scheduled passenger and mail services between Habana and
Miami, the Ministry of Communications, through the National
Transportation Commission, began adopting a series of regulations
aiming to establish for Cuban companies the right to demand
reciprocal treatment, and to protect these companies in so far as
possible on the routes which they were already operating or might
later establish.
The first ruling was in respect to granting to foreign airlines
permits for scheduled services, all of which from the end of April
1946 carried the proviso that applications by Cuban companies must
be honored in reciprocity.
The second of the Government’s pronouncements was that no permits
would be given for charter operations except for a limited number of
flights over a restricted period of time. This was modified, [Page 751] in fact, by their action
in granting, in cases of emergency, two fairly long-term permits,
the first of which was to aid the moving of the heavy tourist
traffic between Habana and Miami during the winter of 1945–1946, and
the second the licensing of 421 flights to a United States charter
operator to assist in moving the Cuban avocado crop in the summer of
1946.
The third was a regulation originating with the Minister of
Communications that no further licenses to carry passengers, mail or
freight between Habana and Miami would be granted to any foreign
company, in the belief that existing services were entirely adequate
to handle the ordinary traffic.
The fourth and latest evidence of the Government’s rapidly developing
nationalistic attitude came in October 1946 when instructions were
given the Transportation Commission by the Minister of
Communications that certain regulations with some real teeth be
issued. These were to provide that no foreign operators could be
given permits to operate as scheduled services into Cuba, unless
they were duly certificated by their own national authorities to
operate the route; that experimental flights should be limited to
four per company; that the Commission has the right to fix specific
conditions regarding capacity, frequencies, etc.; that the
Commission shall determine whether or not the flights applied for
are of public utility and convenience for Cuba, taking interests of
Cuban air transportation companies into consideration, and that
foreign companies already operating into Cuba under Cuban
authorization must present documentary route authorizations from
their own governments within 180 days of the promulgation of the
regulations or have their permits suspended. These instructions were
given in the form of a letter to the President of the National
Transportation Commission, and a copy thereof, which was given
confidentially by the Minister to the Commercial Attaché, is
attached.72
Regulations were likewise drawn up, but not as yet issued, by the
Transportation Commission making procedure more complicated for
individual charter cargo flights to obtain Cuban Government
permits.
Unfortunately for the accomplishment of the intention of these
existing and proposed rulings, Cuba has no company at present fully
in a position to take advantage of the reciprocity demands; the only
company identifiable as a truly Cuban company, namely Aerovías Q. is
operating on a shoestring and, although it is under Government
protection to an extent where it may be regarded as a subsidized
line, is not expected to succeed; Expreso Aéreo, which was nearly
identifiable [Page 752] as a Cuban
company, seems on the verge of bankruptcy; and Compañía Cubana, the
majority of whose stock is owned outright by Pan American Airways, lacks equipment with which to
undertake even its Mexican run, which has already been authorized by
the Cuban government. Furthermore, in so far as demands for
reciprocity are concerned, the Transportation Commission now regards
both Cubana and Expreso as United States controlled entities.
This situation has led to some corner-cutting. For example, in order
to act on the Miami–Habana application of National (which was
recently CAB certificated for
operations between Tampa and Habana and also between Miami and
Habana), the Transportation Commission squared its action with its
Miami–Habana ruling by giving the Cuban companies an opportunity to
object to the granting of the license, and the American company an
opportunity to rebut, with the final result that the operation was
licensed.
In the case of Chicago and Southern this same practice was resorted
to, even though no operation from Miami was contemplated, on the
basis that the Cuban companies should have an opportunity to present
their objections to the licensing of any new
operation coming into Cuba which they felt would detract from the
availability of passenger traffic from Miami. The attorneys for
Chicago and Southern secured statements from Pan American, Compañía Cubana, and Expreso to the
effect that they had no objection to this service, and presented
these statements with their applications. However, last moment
pressure now being brought by President Grau may make the issuance
of this permit a matter involving reciprocal treatment to Aerovias Q.
This protective attitude of the Transportation Commission shows an
intensive tightening up in its licensing program, for only three
months ago Trans-Caribbean Air Cargo Lines and Air Cargo Transport
Corporation were licensed to conduct scheduled operations between
New York and Habana, despite the fact that they had not been
certificated by CAB and were charter
operators from the United States whose services paralleled the
CAB certificated route of
National Airlines.
If further illustration is needed, reference is made to the
provisions of paragraph VII of the Minister of Communications’
letter of instruction, dated October 9, to the Transportation
Commission (see copy attached73) which will, if enforced, oblige these two lines
to produce CAB certificates for
their operations or have their Cuban licenses revoked.
A considerable amount of pressure for the adoption of even stricter
reciprocal regulations is being brought to bear on the Government,
[Page 753] both by the Cuban
operating companies and by persons in the Civil Aviation Committee,
which acts as advisor to the National Transportation Commission.
Formerly the Transportation Commission did not refer matters
concerning issuance of licenses to the Civil Aviation Committee,
which is not only composed in part of persons at present in the
employ of various airlines, but is under the direction of Captain
Torres Menier, long-time employee of Expreso (in whose interests he
is said to be working) and who is allegedly extremely politically
minded.
In particular this is being brought strongly by Aerovias Q through President
Grau, under whose protection it is operating, and Torres Menier has
likewise expressed himself as strongly in its favor. Their ideas go
to the extent of establishing a definite percentage of passengers
which can be carried by Cuban airlines and by foreign airlines
between Cuba and the country involved. Today it does not seem to
present an immediate threat for the reason that Cuba has not at
present the airlines to render an important contribution to such
services, but should a regulation of this kind be promulgated it
would enable Aerovias Q,
Expreso, as well as newer companies which have been formed and
licensed for operation by the Cuban Government but which have as yet
no equipment, to raise funds for a “sure thing” operation, which
they cannot now raise on the basis of free competition with United
States and other airlines.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Briefly to summarize the present position, the Cuban Government,
which formally adopted a laissez faire
attitude regarding civil aviation, has begun to show during the past
eighteen months a rapidly intensifying nationalistic attitude
towards its future. This has been evidenced by an increasingly
protective set of regulations in the interest of the development of
Cuban civil aviation. They are badly handicapped in these efforts
owing to the lack of a well developed Cuban industry, but it is
believed that the favorable conditions which the Government is
endeavoring to create through its regulatory devices will give to
Cuban services an opportunity to expand.
Meanwhile although certain instances, such as the President’s
insistence noted in the case of Aerovias Q, may arise, it is believed that the
direction of matters concerning civil aviation is in the hands of
fair minded and competent people who desire to see Cuba well served
by competent airlines and who will not take undue advantage of the
regulatory provisions.
