835.00/8–1546
The Ambassador in Argentina (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State
No. 583
[Received August 26.]
Subject: Observations on our Relations with the Argentine and with Particular Reference to a Memorandum Prepared by Assistant Secretary Braden for President Truman
Sir: I have the honor to refer to a secret letter dated July 30, 194699 with which Assistant Secretary Braden transmitted to me four enclosures. The first of these enclosures is a “Memorandum on the Argentine [Page 298] Situation” which Mr. Braden states in his letter to me of July 30, 1946, was prepared at the request of President Truman. The second enclosure is a memorandum dated July 12 from Acting Secretary Acheson to the President transmitting this memorandum and in which the Acting Secretary states that he has read the memorandum and recommends it to the President’s approval. The third enclosure is a memorandum dated July 22, 1946 from President Truman to Mr. Acheson as Under Secretary of State, in which the President states that he spent the previous day reading the appended report and that it seems to him that we should stick to Specification “C” on page 28 of the Alternative Courses of Action—which specifically backs up the Secretary of State in his statement of April 8, as set forth on page 23 of the memorandum of Mr. Braden. The fourth enclosure is a memorandum dated July 22 from the President to Assistant Secretary Braden1 attaching a copy of his memorandum of July 22 to Under Secretary Acheson.
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Before proceeding with this comment I wish to refer to the three Alternatives of Procedure—A, B, C, which Mr. Braden has set forth on page 28 of this memorandum. In my opinion, Alternatives A and B are not feasible or desirable, and I think in the memorandum itself Mr. Braden has set forth some of the important reasons why Alternatives A and B could not be carried through by us.
Alternative C, as stated by Mr. Braden in the memorandum, is “strictest adherence to Secretary Byrnes’ statement of April 8 that there must be deeds and not merely promises before we will sign a military treaty and deliver arms to the Argentine”. I wish to state that I have always been and am now in complete accord with Secretary Byrnes’ statement of April 8, and as my reports and despatches before I came to to the Argentine and since I am here as Chief of Mission will show, I have supported this point of view, and my actuation as Chief of Mission in the Argentine since May 22 has been controlled thereby.
President Truman in his memorandum of July 22 to Under Secretary Acheson states that he has read Mr. Braden’s memorandum and that it seems to him “that we should stick to Specification C on page twenty-eight of the Alternative Courses of Action—that backs up the Secretary of State in his statement of April 8, as set forth on page twenty-three. In his statement of the President in his memorandum of July 22 to Under Secretary Acheson I would gather that the President is not expressing complete accord with every statement made in the memorandum of Assistant Secretary Braden but is confining himself [Page 299] to the statement actually made in the memorandum that we should continue to base our policy with reference to the Argentine on the statement of Secretary Byrnes of April 8.
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… The Department has given careful study to these factors as has this Embassy and it is my understanding that the Department and this Embassy are in accord that Argentine compliance necessary for the normalization of relations is dependent upon four major factors. These are:
- 1.
- Ratification by the Argentine Congress, as required under her constitutional procedure, of the Acts of Mexico City and San Francisco;
- 2.
- Adequate action with respect to enemy property;
- 3.
- Adequate action with respect to enemy aliens;
- 4.
- Adequate action with respect to enemy schools and institutions.
I made these points definitely clear to the Argentine government, as the despatches of this Embassy since my assumption of this mission will show. There has been, therefore, no deviation by this Embassy in carrying through the policy of our government but rather emphasis thereon, and the action of this Embassy has been in complete accord with Secretary Byrnes’ statement of April 8. The action of this Embassy, therefore, has been and is also in accord with President Truman’s statement in his memorandum to Under Secretary Acheson of July 22, “that we should stick to Specification C which backs up the Secretary of State in his statement of April 8”.
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The memorandum of Secretary Braden on the Argentine situation would seem to carry at least the indirect inference that we were considering a change of policy or the abandonment of principles to which we are attached. I do not know on what such an assumption could be based, but it does not appear from any knowledge of mine that there has been any thought of sacrificing principles to which we are attached, and must remain attached. If the purpose of the memorandum of Assistant Secretary Braden was to seek reaffirmation of Secretary Byrnes’ statement of April 8, I am unable to determine what basis there should be for concern in this respect. If it was based on any actuation of myself or this Embassy, I believe that the despatches and letters which I have written to the Department since my taking charge of this mission will show that there has been no such action.
On the other hand, if it is assumed that, even if the Argentine complies with her inter-American commitments, we must keep our relationships with her on anything but a cordial basis and that we must carry on our relations with her on a basis other than that of complete collaboration, I am in complete disagreement, for this would assume [Page 300] that we have a quarrel with the Argentine which we do not wish to compose. It is my assumption, and I am sure that I am correct in this for we could not base our policy on any other consideration, that it is our desire to normalize completely our relations with the Argentine and to collaborate with her in every field in the same measure and in the same cordiality and with the same effectiveness that we collaborate with every one of the other American republics.
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On page 4 of Mr. Braden’s memorandum3 reference is made to the fact that many Argentines believe that they are entitled economically and even politically to control Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Chile and parts of Southern Brazil. There is no doubt that this idea has persisted and still persists among many Argentines. On the other hand, the existence and persistence of such an idea cannot be an obstacle to our carrying on normal relations with the present Argentine Government, for it must be borne in mind that among the very considerable number who voted against Perón, there were the leading proponents of the idea. This pretension of the Argentine is not a policy of the present administration in the Argentine and, if there were to be another government in the Argentine composed of the elements which opposed President Perón in the last election, it is not improbable that this idea would be stressed more strongly. In this connection it is necessary to observe that, for as much as it may be worth, the present Argentine administration has declared that it does not have any thought of forming a Southern bloc or of carrying through any pretensions in the economic or political field against neighboring countries. As a matter of fact, in the past month this attitude of the present administration has been been translated into some concrete acts and there is no present proved indication of the Argentine Government intervening in the political affairs of its neighbors.
On page 5 of the memorandum reference is made to some sweeping decrees with reference to government control of commerce, finance, et cetera. There is no doubt that the present Argentine administration has issued several decrees which are of a far-reaching character, but when one considers that economically as well as politically the Argentine has been living in the world of 1910 and before, it is understandable that some of these measures come as a considerable shock and may be too far-reaching. I think before we form a definite opinion as to the objectives of the present Argentine Government in the social and economic field, it will be necessary to observe the manner in which these decrees are actually implemented and the degree to which new measures along the same line may be undertaken. …
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[Page 301]The implication in this part of the memorandum4 of Assistant Secretary Braden is that we have yielded something to the Argentine in permitting exports of goods other than war material and in releasing the gold and blocked funds. As a matter of fact, we had absolutely no reason whatever for withholding goods, except war material, from the Argentine with the end of the war. The war was over. We had not been at war with the Argentine. Even though she had been a poor partner in the war, she had declared war against our common enemies. In removing the restrictions on exports to the Argentine of manufactured goods, et cetera, other than war material, we were not yielding anything to “Perón and his associates”. We were simply carrying through a sound and proper policy in our interest and which we had to carry through. There was no basis whatever for not shipping goods other than war material and every obvious reason for doing so.
So far as the release of the gold and the unblock[ing] of the balances are concerned, we had no reason whatever for holding on to the gold which was the property of the Argentine Government and the Treasury and the Department of State realized that we had held on to the gold longer than we should have. In releasing the gold we were carrying through a belated action of justice and equity and we were certainly not doing it to please any government.
So far as the unblocking of the funds of the two banks is concerned, we did so when we had the adequate assurances that any German assets therein would be blocked by the Argentine Government and our action was only the proper and necessary and equitable action for us to take.
I am unable to say why the memorandum should state that these steps were taken on my recommendation as this statement carries a certain implication. I did recommend these steps but I recommended them as just and equitable and necessary steps, and I am sure that there is no one of understanding in the Treasury or in the Department of State or in the Department of Commerce or in any agency of our government who would question that these steps were imperative and equitable.
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What the course of events in the Argentine will be, no one at home or here is presently able to tell. That the Argentine will comply with her inter-American commitments seems now more likely than in the past. That the Argentine will incorporate herself more fully into the American picture and system also seems more likely. These changes are the result of a combination of circumstances. In some respects the Argentine is just beginning to live in the present. To a very considerable extent she is still living in the past. Out of this [Page 302] grew many of her political, social and economic ills. My own feeling is that the Argentine will have to go through some very definite suffering economically and perhaps politically before she will grow up to the stature of a country of her resources and live in her time. There is at present no reason to take any developments in the Argentine either too tragically or too pessimistically. If the Argentine will continue to give cause for concern to her neighbors and to us, she will also be giving concern to herself. So far as the present government is concerned, we have presently to give faith and confidence to its acts until it shows that such faith and confidence is not justified. The constitutional government has been in power only several months. It is struggling with great difficulties, many of them growing out of the circumstances through which it came to power. As we have nothing but friendly sentiments towards the Argentine people and as we have nothing but the most sincere desire for the development of the Argentine economy and as we desire her collaboration in the concert of the American nations, our attitude must certainly be one not of present condemnation and opposition and antagonism, but one of understanding what is happening in the country, observing carefully what is happening, and guiding our actions by the performance of the Argentine of her obligations. We have no quarrel with the Argentine and none of our procedures must give the slightest indication that we have a quarrel with the Argentine. To take such an attitude would be to create a situation for the long-range future which can be of no advantage to us nor to the Argentine nor to the other countries of the Americas, and if we took any attitude except one of receptiveness towards collaboration we would be destroying the basis of the whole American system and destroying the confidence in us of every one of the other American republics.
Respectfully yours,