Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The American Republics, Volume XI

835.00/7–2246

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

[Washington,] July 12, 1946.

I hand you herewith a memorandum on the Argentine situation⁶⁵ prepared by Assistant Secretary Braden pursuant to your suggestion during your recent talk with him.

I have read the memorandum and recommend it for your approval.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum on the Argentine Situation by the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs (Braden)

Summary of Conclusions

There is both a long-term and an immediate Argentine problem.

The essence of the long-term problem is that Argentine Governments have long aspired to create and control an anti-United States bloc of Latin American states and to become the dominant power in South America. Perón’s aim, already partially accomplished, of forming a totalitarian-type state, with almost absolute power in his hands, increases the danger which this traditional Argentine policy represents to the inter-American system.

There is no quick, easy way to change this attitude which is the root cause of Argentina’s obstructionist role in every phase of inter-American politics and of Argentina’s so called “neutrality” in both World Wars. But by continuing to stand for the principle that agreements must be honored by performance; by continuing to identify ourselves with economic progress, democracy and liberty rather than with opportunism and totalitarianism; and by continuing, within the framework of the good neighbor policy and on a practicable basis, a constructive program for improvement in living, health and educational standards throughout the hemisphere, we can demonstrate the vitality and utility of democracy and lay the foundation for a sound and enduring solidarity of governments and peoples.

The immediate problem is whether we should sign a military pact with Argentina and furnish that country with arms and munitions before Argentina has performed its inter-American agreements to liquidate key German business enterprises and repatriate dangerous German nationals.

Since 1942 our consistent policy has been to insist on performance of these undertakings. To waive real compliance by Argentina prior to the negotiation of a mutual assistance pact would not be a just and honorable compromise within our principles. It would be an abandonment of the principles and declared policies of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman and Secretaries Hull and Byrnes.

An abandonment of this policy now would be interpreted as proof of our vacillation, weakness and defeat. It would seriously impede a lasting solution of the important long-term problem referred to because:

a) Argentina will have demonstrated her ability to violate her agreements

i) to regard an act of agression against the United States as an act of aggression against Argentina (Declaration of Havana⁶⁶),

ii) to eliminate Axis influence and activities in Argentina (Rio, Washington and Mexico City Agreements⁶⁷),

and nevertheless force us to sign still another agreement—a military pact;

b) It will appear to contiguous Latin American states that they cannot safely rely on consistent United States support in resisting Argentine pressure;

c) It will encourage the Argentine Government to continue to demand tribute under the threat of associating itself with a European power;

d) It will encourage the Argentine Government to proceed with its current National-Socialist program with all the attendant dangers for United States capital investments and influence; and

e) It will mean loss of political prestige and moral influence throughout the hemisphere; and it will be regarded as an abandonment by us of democratic elements and encouragement to others to adopt Peronista-type programs in their own countries.

The postponement of the signing of a military pact until Argentina has performed need not delay the separate program for standardizing arms throughout the other American republics.

By continuing to stand on our announced policy we will effectively demonstrate that, if Argentina is to enjoy the fruits of equal partnership in the inter-American system, it must honor the principles of that system and its freely contracted obligations thereunder.

Treaties are of no value unless they rest upon the good faith of the parties involved. In a treaty such as the contemplated mutual assistance pact, which would affect the security of the United States and the defense of the Hemisphere, the Government of the United States must be in a position to assure the American people that it has not entered into any such treaty as long as a doubt exists about the good faith of any of the other parties thereto.

Alternative Courses of Action

There are three possible courses of action:

A. Acceptance of the Argentine thesis that there are no outstanding problems between the two governments and agreements to provide arms and to collaborate with Argentina in a military defense pact.

B. Acceptance of a majority decision of the other American republics as to whether or not we should require compliance by Argentina.

C. Strict adherence to Secretary Byrnes’ statement of April 8⁶⁸ that “there must be deeds and not merely promises” before we will sign a military treaty and deliver arms to Argentina.

Each of these alternatives must be analyzed by reference to our national interest.

A. Appeasement of Perón by giving him arms and offering him military collaboration before there has been compliance with international obligations would mean:

(1) A daring Argentine victory over and a body-blow to the inter-American system. Argentina alone of all the republics would have succeeded in repudiating obligations jointly undertaken to meet the threat of a common enemy.

(2) That a nation can ignore its solemn commitments, not only without detriment to itself but that it can even participate in the benefits to be derived from the very agreement whose obligations it has discarded. To acquiesce in establishing such a precedent would endanger the sanctity of all international agreements.

(3) The loss of United States prestige and moral influence throughout the Hemisphere by the abandonment of a policy enunciated by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and confirmed by President Truman and Secretary Byrnes.

(4) Proof that the persistent Argentine strategy of playing off a non-American power against the United States pays dividends and the conviction that the same game can be successfully repeated again and again for even higher stakes.

(5) Encouragement to Perón to go forward with the program of domination of South America.

The governments of the other American republics fully understand, as we do, that the traditional aim of Argentine foreign policy has long been to control a bloc of South American states in opposition to the United States. To the extent that we fail to adhere consistently to our declared policies, the ability of neighboring states to withstand Argentine pressure is lessened. Bolivia and Paraguay are already in the Argentine orbit and pressures have been exerted on Uruguay and others.

(6) Perpetuation in this hemisphere of a powerful German economic and political machine and the defeat of our repeatedly announced policy to destroy German militarism and Nazism wherever it is found. In addition to other dangers^* this would be inconsistent with and detrimental to our policy to press for elimination of German influence in Europe as we are now doing in the Safehaven negotiations⁶⁹ with Switzerland and Sweden and in respect of German property in Spain, Portugal, Turkey and Ireland.

(7) Abandonment of the liberal and democratic elements in Argentina and other American republics (who potentially constitute the only true friends we can count on for the long pull) and encouragement to military and reactionary leaders (who are innately inimical to our way of life) to follow Peronista-type programs in their own countries.

(8) Encouragement to Perón and other nationalistic leaders to believe that, since we are impotent to require compliance with intergovernmental obligations, we will be equally impotent to protect the rights of our own nationals.

B. Acceptance of a majority decision of the other American republics as to whether or not we should require compliance by Argentina.

This course would submit for decision by the other American republics the Argentine proposition that no further compliance should be required. If a majority of the other republics accepted this proposition, then irrespective of our own convictions, we would be obliged to sign the mutual defense treaty at Rio with Argentina.

Without our leadership and support many of the republics would be powerless to resist Argentine pressure. Argentina has already used its control of food supplies to put pressure on Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, and even Brazil.⁷⁰ Most of the republics—and particularly those in geographic proximity to Argentina—are afraid to incur Argentine enmity by taking a strong stand, particularly since they fear being left to face Argentina alone as a result of a change in United States policy. Should the United States evidence the slightest willingness to abandon its position, each in its own immediate selfinterest might vie with the others for Argentine favor.

Since 1942 our policy that Argentina must honor her agreements by performance has been repeatedly stated in the most unequivocal terms. The attitude of the other American republics, induced by fear of Argentina, is also known. Were we therefore to declare now that we are prepared to accept a majority decision of the other American republics, they would immediately understand that the United States accepts defeat.

They would believe that we were seeking to spread the onus for defeat at the last moment by reference to a majority decision. We would thereupon suffer all the ill consequences listed under Alternative A. Our prestige would suffer disastrously at home and abroad. The American people would be bewildered by such a reversal of our policy.

C. Strict adherence to Secretary Byrnes’ statement of April 8 that “there must be deeds and not merely promises” before we will sign a military treaty and deliver arms to Argentina.

This is our policy today. It is consistent with our world policy: We are prepared to compromise within our principles but we will not abandon those principles.

There is a possibility that the almost desperate desire of the Argentine armed forces for modern equipment and materiel will induce “the deeds” which we have been requesting since 1942. This would solve the immediate problem of Argentine compliance and on the basis of the April 8 statement would pave the way to conclusion of the military pact.

We are, however, bound to acknowledge the contingency of continued resistance from Perón, and with it, postponement of the mutual assistance treaty contemplated by the Act of Chapultepec. The charge will then again be heard that our policy is breaking Hemisphere solidarity and that we are jeopardizing continental security. It is ironical that Argentina, which did break hemisphere solidarity and jeopardize continental security throughout the war, should be exculpated and we blamed. For the United States to assume a defensive attitude in these circumstances would be unpardonable.

The argument that a refusal promptly to include Argentina in a military assistance pact will destroy Hemisphere unity does not bear analysis.

“Hemisphere unity” which is achieved by waiver of solemnly contracted obligations can never be the basis for an enduring inter-American system. Security in the Americas is dependent upon the maintenance of the integrity of the inter-American system. If Argentina or any other one nation is held to be above the rules, then the rules have no meaning and insecurity takes the place of security. The people and the government of the United States desire to continue their efforts to create a genuine solidarity in the Americas. But a solidarity resting upon a failure to correct the conditions that undermine that solidarity would be worse than useless.

Delay in the negotiation of the permanent military treaty has not and should not block other substantial and important inter-American undertakings. Cooperation among the American republics is going forward today, with participation by all the republics, on a dozen fronts. The Governing Board of the Pan American Union has never been more active. That body recently sent a comprehensive draft “Charter of the Americas” to all the governments in preparation for the conference in Bogotá, Colombia, next year.⁷¹ The Inter-American Economic and Social Council⁷² is meeting regularly at the Pan American Union on a score of new assignments. Other inter-American organizations and committees are at work, and conferences, such as that on Copyright held during the past few weeks, are being convened on schedule and with attendance by all of the republics.

A further argument against postponement of the treaty is the claim of jeopardy to our national security. It is contended that our security requires that, irrespective of the consequences of appeasement by waiver of international obligations, we immediately conclude the treaty and enter upon a program of full military collaboration with Perón.

The primary interest of the United States in the mutual assistance treaty is the undertaking that an attack against any American republic by a non-American power shall be considered as an attack against all of the republics. This interest is, however, already safeguarded by:

(1) The Declaration of Havana, quoted at p. 12 above, which is binding, without time limit, upon all the republics and which was acted upon by all except Argentina in World War II.

(2) The Act of Chapultepec which is binding on all the republics until the state of war is formally terminated.

(3) All the security provisions of the United Nations Charter, which, it will be recalled, had not been agreed upon when the Act of Chapultepec was signed by the American republics.

In these circumstances there would seem to be little justification for the somewhat panicky insistence that our national security requires one more formal promise of mutual aid, immediately and irrespective of Argentine compliance with earlier promises of such assistance. Moreover, in respect of the security of the other republics against attack by a non-American power, they are well aware that, apart entirely from treaty obligations, the United States would, under the Monroe Doctrine and for its own security, immediately go to the assistance of any American state attacked by such a power.

A secondary interest in the proposed pact has been to induce the other republics to standardize their equipment with ours, thus facilitating the establishment of our military and naval missions throughout the Hemisphere and excluding those of non-American powers. This objective can be attained in all republics except Argentina immediately upon the enactment of the Truman Bill⁷³ and without waiting upon the treaty. In the case of Argentina, it must not be overlooked that under our present policy, by reason of effective agreements with Great Britain, Canada, and Sweden, we are preventing the export to Argentina not only of our own arms and matériel but also those of the countries mentioned. Although a military treaty which included Argentina would open the way to deliveries of planes, tanks, and guns by the United States, the treaty would also terminate our understandings with the countries mentioned. And no agreement is contemplated under which Britain, Sweden or Canada would respect our desire to standardize military equipment in Argentina.

Since early in the war it has been the primary objective of the Argentine armed forces to regain ascendancy over the forces of Brazil and Chile. In mid–1943 when we needed every plane and gun against the enemy, the Argentine government requested military aid to restore “continental equilibrium.” Perón’s objective is the same today. He wants “equilibrium” plus as against Brazil and Chile, and he seeks to participate in the military pact because he is aware that only through such participation will he be able to obtain modern military equipment from all of the exporting nations. There is no reason to believe that Perón will permanently abide by an agreement to standardize or to limit arms if such agreement would in any degree prejudice the relative strength of his forces. Standardization would, in other words, be attained only by our acceptance of Perón’s quantitative criteria.

This evaluation of the Argentine purpose in relation to the pact also bears upon the interest of the other American republics in treaty protection against attack by any American state. Since the Mexico City Conference, such protection has been provided through the security provisions of the United Nations Charter. It is also assured by the Act of Chapultepec until the war emergency is formally terminated. In view of these binding undertakings, it may well be questioned whether the security of the other republics, and particularly of the immediate neighbors of Argentina, would be promoted by another promise of assistance—a promise to be obtained in this instance only at the cost of immediate modernization of Perón’s armed forces. Argentina’s neighbors are well aware, as we should be, that a modernized army, even though it were never employed in open aggression, would greatly strengthen Perón’s hand in promoting a southern bloc through economic pressure and political penetration, modern techniques of aggression which, unfortunately, are not readily checked either through the United Nations or through a military assistance treaty.

Conclusion

Because of the anticipated attitude of the other American republics under alternative B, that alternative is, for practical purposes and in end result, the same as alternative A. Both of these courses would make possible the early convening of the Rio Conference and would create the appearance of military solidarity throughout the Hemisphere.

It is not here maintained that alternative C, which may mean postponement of the mutual assistance treaty, will entail no disadvantage. It is maintained that:

(1) Alternative C is clearly and beyond all doubt preferable to any other course since the price of an immediate treaty would be abandonment of principles for which the war was fought and on which an enduring peace must be built;

(2) The only hemisphere solidarity worthy of the word is one based upon a proved common loyalty;

(3) If we were to waive Argentine default upon inter-American obligations and to subsidize the default by supplying her with arms, we would invite the contempt of Argentina herself, and of all the peoples who are looking to our country for leadership in the establishment of principle and morality in the conduct of nations.

We have taken this leadership in the counsels of the great powers To maintain the same leadership in the counsels of the small nations will often be difficult in the extreme, because our enemies will question our motive and the recalcitrant will charge abuse of our power. Yet we know, and must not be afraid to declare, that security for the small nation is wholly dependent upon the integrity of the international system and that if any one nation, be it large or small, is held to be above the rules, then the rules have no meaning, either for the great or for the small.

It is fitting here to recall that President Roosevelt acknowledged no difference in responsibility as between the great and the small when he declared in respect of Argentina:

“Unless we now demonstrate a capacity to develop a tradition of respect for such obligations among civilized nations, there can be little hope for a system of international security, theoretically created to maintain principles for which our peoples are today sacrificing to the limit of their resources, both human and material.”

65. Infra.
66. For text, see Resolution XV of the Final Act of the Second Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, Habana, July 21–30, 1940: Report of the Secretary of State (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 20. or Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1940, pp. 127, 136.
67. For the Rio Agreement see Recommendation V of the Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, held at Rio de Janeiro, January 15–28, 1942, Department of State Bulletin, February 7. 1942, p. 124. For the Washington Agreement, see Resolution I of the Inter-American Conference on Systems of Economic and Financial Control, June 30–July 10, 1942, summarized in Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. v, pp. 60–62. For the Mexico City Agreements, see Pan American Union, Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on the Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, February-March, 1945 (Washington, 1945), p. 55.
68. For text, see circular telegram of April 1, 11 p.m., p. 10.
69. The Germans in Argentina constitute a large, wealthy, unassimilated, politically influential group which enjoys a virtual monopoly in various scientific and industrial fields. Their representatives continue to advise with the Argentine Government. The extraordinary power which this group wields in Argentina continues to be used against the United States. [Footnote in the original.]
69. See Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ii, p. 852 ff.
70. See the documentation on the wheat-rubber problem of Argentina, Brazil, and the United States, pp. 111 ff., and references to wheat crisis under countries named.
71. The Ninth International Conference of American States which met from March 30 to May 2, 1948. For preliminary discussions concerning the Conference, see pp. 28 ff.
72. See Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ix, pp. 172 ff.
73. Concerning inter-American military cooperation; see Department of State Bulletin, May 19, 1946, p. 859.