711.35/6–1546
The Ambassador in Argentina (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I arrived in Buenos Aires on the evening of May 22 by commercial plane and in accordance with the arrangements made by the Argentine Government, presented my credentials to then President Farrell at eleven o’clock on the morning of May 23. …
… I have now been here about three weeks and as a result of my unremitting activity and continuous study, I am in a position to give you some conclusions which, while they are necessarily still somewhat preliminary, are sufficiently definite to bring them to your attention and consideration.
In the first place, I think that the President and you and the Department [Page 256] and all interested agencies of our government as well as our people are in accord that the basic objective of our policy in this hemisphere has to remain as before, and more than ever, the consolidation of the closest collaboration in the political, economic, social and defense field among all of the American republics. We cannot conceive of such close collaboration on the proper and effective scope unless the whole-hearted collaboration of the Argentine, as of every other American republic, is included in that picture. This we have not had for many years and have not had up to today and it is necessary in our interest and that of the Argentine and of every other American republic, as well as in the interest of world peace and security, to bring that about.
At the outset I would say that I think our basic objective in the present situation with regard to Argentina must be twofold. We must endeavor to get the Argentine to turn her eyes away from Europe, to which they have always been directed in practically every field, and to turn them to this hemisphere. She has in many ways considered herself in the past as more closely tied to Europe than to the Americas and has looked with a certain amount of deprecation on her American neighbors. She has in many respects not been an American country. This is one of the basic reasons—of course not the only one—why the Argentine has taken such a difficult position in practically all inter-American meetings. As a result of the repercussions of the first world war, and of the second, and as a result of the present world situation which at least to a measure is understood here, there is an increasing realization on the part of the Argentine Government and people that their orientation must be to this hemisphere rather than to Europe. This current must be accentuated and consolidated for until the Argentine Government and people realize that they must turn their eyes somewhat from Europe and more to the Americas, little real progress could be made. Some has already been made and particularly in recent months as the result of the intransigent attitude of Soviet Russia.
Our second objective must be to get the wholehearted and loyal collaboration of the Argentine Government and people, in the political, economic, social and defense field. I believe that the Argentine Government and people are prepared for this more than they have been at any time in a century.
I know that it is a primary policy of our government, which is very close to the heart of the President and of yourself, as it is to mine, and I believe to the great mass of our people at home, that this collaboration among the American States is essential to our peace and security in this hemisphere, that it is the first line of defense for us and all of [Page 257] this hemisphere, and that this collaboration among all of the American States can be one of the firmest bulwarks in the world structure for security and peace.
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After examining the situation very carefully, I have come to the conclusion that there are only three fields in which the Argentine has not met her inter-American commitments.
The first of these is in the field of enemy property, which I consider the most important. In this field there has been a greater measure of compliance, I find, than she has been given credit for, and emphasis has been placed by us on those things in which there has not been compliance and little credit has been given for what has been done. For the sake of the Argentine and her own economy and for purposes of hemisphere security, it is essential that the Argentine do take adequate measures in the field of enemy property.
The second important question remains, that of action with respect to enemy aliens and, particularly, enemy agents. In this respect, the performance of the Argentine Government has not been adequate but, again, she has not been given any credit for what she has done, and some of the difficulties in the way of her acting adequately have not been given due consideration and recognition. In this field, too, more adequate action by the Argentine Government is necessary.
The third field in which some action may still be necessary is that of German and Japanese schools and institutions. I find from my study in this field that the Argentine has perhaps complied as effectively as any of the American republics except ourselves in the matter of schools and institutions. What remains to be done in this field seems to be very secondary, but I am giving this further study.
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There is a good deal of talk about this Southern bloc in which the Argentine has been interested and there is no doubt that it has been in the minds of some Argentines for many years. There is a tendency to make it appear that this is an idea of President Perón, and in all justice to him it must be recognized that this idea of a Southern bloc is just as much nourished by some of his most angry and powerful enemies as it may have been and be nourished by Perón.
Whatever intentions the Argentine may have had in this respect or whatever thoughts Perón may have had in this respect, the question is not now an active one although it is one which we must always bear in mind. Such a regional bloc of course would be disadvantageous for American unity and cannot be tolerated and it is just as dangerous as the idea which persists among a good many of the Latin Americans that Latin American collaboration comes first, and American collaboration [Page 258] second. These are ideas which must be combatted by all of the American republics but if we carry through the defense pact, keeping in mind the two major circumstances as above indicated, any thoughts which anyone in the Argentine may have with regard to a Southern bloc are out. Incidentally, in this connection, Perón was asked a good many questions by the Chileans and others during the recent inaugural ceremonies about his attitude on a Southern bloc. He very emphatically stated that he had no thoughts in that direction. Personally I doubt whether he has abandoned them but, in any event, he is going to have too much to do in the next few years to think about that, and in the meantime we can get this defense pact enacted and in effect, and that will serve as a partial antidote to any regional blocs in this hemisphere.
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With all good wishes [etc.]