Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The American Republics, Volume XI

711.35/3–2246: Telegram

The Chargé in Argentina (Cabot) to the Secretary of State

secret

Buenos Aires, March 22, 1946—4 p.m.
[Received 9 p.m.]

825. Although Embassy has received no policy directives since Perón’s victory became obvious except circular of March 18, 2 p.m.,³ statements regarding our policy published in local newspapers indicate there is to be no change. Realizing that public statements cannot fully express Dept’s thinking respecting policy, I nevertheless feel it my duty to report that Embassy feels a modification would be desirable. I believe that frank exposition of Embassy’s views may be helpful to Dept; and transmission of supplementary instructions by Department will aid Embassy in striving faithfully to implement Department’s policy.

What is to be achieved by continuation of present policy?

1. Elimination of Perón? I doubt present policy will achieve this and I do not see how we can afford to assume responsibility for seeking to replace Govt based on will of people for one based on force. I feel our ideals and principles require that we accept Govt representing will of Argentine people and symbolic to majority (however repugnant its Fascist antecedents may be to us) of social progress.

2. Prevention of aggression and liquidation of Nazis? Suggestions in my 671, March 7, 8 p.m., seem to me clearly more effective to this end.

3. Respect and friendship of Argentine Govt and people? Our position and vicious local press campaign have naturally prejudiced Peronistas against us; anti-Peronistas are somewhat disillusioned. I believe that we are not now perceptibly worse off than in past but am somewhat apprehensive of long-term reaction of Argentine people particularly if present policy continues for indefinite period. There is also growing tendency to object to our attitude.

Continuation of policy would also entail following disadvantages:

1. Relations with Govt that has ample reason to hate us will be difficult in any case and Perón is now in stronger position than ever to intrigue against us. Embassy and Department would probably continue to be victims of infamous press campaign with no effective reply possible.

2. Inclusion of Argentina in hemispheric defense plans, and student training or military missions so necessary to achieve our military objectives and de-Nazify Argentine Army, would be indefinitely blocked.

3. Negotiation of mutual assistance pact would presumably be delayed for indefinte period despite our commitment to negotiate it (?) we would have no instrument against aggression in this hemisphere should President’s war powers expire.

4. Our inter-American relations might deteriorate under further strain of enduring crisis.

5. We would play directly into hands of other countries notably England and Russia.… Russians are moving in commercially and might find it convenient to move in in the political field also. Permanent injury may be done to our interests by giving foreign nations chance to entrench themselves in political, military and commercial fields, to make installations involving continuing commercial benefits, to send military and commercial missions, etc.

Further period of strained relations might be justified if reasonable prospect existed of yet achieving through our efforts original objectives of policy. However:

a. We cannot employ economic sanctions against Argentina in foreseeable future. On contrary present policy makes more difficult rectification of results of our earlier refusal to ship tires, rubber and fuel to Argentina. This is now contributing to starvation in Europe and consequent unrest harmful to our interests. Furthermore, neighboring republics need Argentine food.

b. I greatly doubt we are prepared to use force either unilaterally or collectively. Danger of eventual aggression is clear but by no means so certain as to secure support from other nations necessary for collective action. Use of force must be contingent on future aggressions.

c. Other possible measures to make Argentina feel our displeasure (such as expulsion from United Nations) would merely aggravate rather than help present unsatisfactory situation unless some specific objective sought.

d. An internal explosion which various observers predict as result of Perón’s inability to fulfill promises and evil influences surrounding him is in my opinion more likely to be promoted than prejudiced by removing our open pressure on Perón.

Since we neither can nor should take effective action against Perón regime under present circumstances and in light of disadvantages to continuation of present course, I believe our policy should be based on outline given in Embtel 671, March 7, 8 p.m. and following:

I. Appeasement or merely letting bygones be bygones must be firmly rejected. Our position should be that grave injury has been done to all of American Republics but particularly to us who bore such important score in fight for freedom of all. In full consultation with other republics we should determine how Argentina is to make reparation. Although point might be made of Argentine liability to damages for her conduct during war, I believe we should take position that American republics should not press claims for damages if Argentine Govt fulfilled other specific demands (we could point out we did not wish Argentine people to suffer). US meantime should make clear to Argentina that further anti-American intrigues would merely make US firmer in pressing demands against Argentina. But I emphatically feel our demands should specify exact steps Argentina must take to extirpate Nazi activities and should look to eventual restoration of normal relations with Argentina, subsequent cordiality of relations to depend primarily on public reaction in US to Perón administration’s line of conduct.

II. Unless Argentina refuses to meet our demands in reparation for her past record or fails in performance we should refrain from further attacks on Perón and Govt. (Although I am not particularly optimistic there is some reason to hope that Argentine conduct in future will be less obnoxious than in past. In view of unpromising alternatives can we not afford to wait and see?) It seems to me important that US should always have effective means of making Argentina feel our displeasure if her conduct deteriorates even further and I should, therefore, also hold in reserve such further sanctions against Argentina as expulsion from United Nations.

III. Republics more immediately threatened notably Brazil should assume responsibility and leadership at least equal to our own if renewed Argentine purpose of aggression becomes evident. Although we must ourselves be eternally vigilant Argentina cannot hope even remotely to challenge our military strength. Given Act of Chapultepec eventual cooperation by us in moderate rearmament program should lessen rather than increase possibility of Argentine military aggression and help us to control situation. Danger from our viewpoint derives rather from possible use of Argentina as Nazi base, subversive conspiracies against neighbors and unfriendly international intrigues; and our pressure merely increases dangers of last two. Calculating as closely as possible under what circumstances we would be prepared to use force (which presumably would require inter-American or United Nations backing) we should seek at that time to have moral and political factors as favorable as possible.

IV. By increasing unity of hemisphere along tested lines we should increase capacity of inter-American system to promote peace and stability in world greatly in need of them.

I recognize that domestic political considerations may make course I propose difficult. In that case, however, I believe our first efforts should be directed toward fully informing and reorienting US public opinion regarding policy matters.

Department will appreciate how difficult Embassy finds it under existing circumstances to accomplish anything constructive or even to know what, if anything, it should attempt. I should, therefore, be most grateful for detailed instructions at an early date.

Cabot

3. Supra.