Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The American Republics, Volume XI

835.00/3–746: Telegram

The Chargé in Argentina (Cabot) to the Secretary of State

secret

Buenos Aires, March 7, 1946—8 p.m.
[Received 11:50 p.m.]

671. Although full returns will not be available for some weeks and Tamborini may still win, it now seems probable that Perón has won residence [presidency] and that he will have a great majority in both Houses of Congress. After careful discussion with senior officers of the Embassy, I offer, for what they may be worth, the following considerations with regard to future policy in order that the Department may have had a chance to study them in event Perón is in fact elected.

1. On February 28 Secretary said: “Essence of our democracy is our belief in life and growth and in right of the people to shape and mould their own destiny. It is not our tradition to defend the dead-hand of reaction or the tyranny of privilege.” On August 17 last Mr. Braden said: “To assure the peace of the world, we, the victorious democracies, must and will establish the only legitimate sovereignty, the inviolable sovereignty of the people.” On September 7 Mr. Braden said: “So soon as the Argentine people are satisfied that they have obtained (a constitutional representative democracy), automatically their confidence will be reflected among the people of the US, thus creating a true and solid foundation for the friendliest relations between our two countries in every direction.”

2. Voting procedure and counting of ballots have unquestionably been fairest in Argentine history. Although period of violence and oppression before elections prevented them from being wholly clean, there is no reason to doubt that Perón has been chosen by will of Argentine people.

3. I do not think that peace of world will be advanced by any effort on our part to get rid of government chosen by Argentine people. Perón is for Argentine masses symbol of social progress and nationality; further interference by US will accentuate our identification with privilege, reaction and pan-colonialism.

4. On basis of above, I believe that we must accept verdict of Argentine people and maintain relations with their chosen govt, unsatisfactory to US though it may be.

5. Election of Perón would in no way alter his past record of double dealing with US and connivance with Nazis.

6. Nevertheless basis for policy determination must be what Perón may be expected to do in future rather than what he has done in past. Only feature which would give us right to maintain crackdown policy would be clear evidence of purpose to make Argentine focus of some future aggression. What Perón has done in past should merely be one criterion on which to gauge future conduct.

7. I consider it vital that we continue and even accentuate extirpation policy on Nazis. I feel on basis of such information as is available to me that other American Republics will be even happy to give us real help in insisting on thorough housecleaning if they are not asked to take measures directed squarely at Perón. I would suggest drawing up a comprehensive list of measures against Nazis which Perón government must take. This should be done in consultation, perhaps in that now proceeding. I feel presentation of full list at early date advisable in order that Argentine Govt may not think piecemeal presentation of demands against Nazis is merely excuse to be disagreeable. We should equally make it clear that Argentina is on probation regarding fulfillment of commitments to other republics, both international and internal.

8. In presenting demands jointly to Argentina we should make it clear informally that we would not discuss either, whether Argentina has complied with Rio and Mexico resolutions or whether other republics have not complied with them. Basis of our joint action would be Blue Book prima facie case that Argentina during war tore to shreds her commitments to other republics and connived with our enemies. On basis these grave breaches in Argentina’s obligations to other American Republics latter demand specific performance in deeds not words regarding specified list in return for wiping slate clean. We would, of course, be prepared to discuss justice of charges of connivance and list of measures which must be taken. I feel above essential to give firm basis for our demands and to block any Argentine effort to stir up trouble by discussing Argentine performance or linking it with that of other republics.

9. It seems to me essential that we should negotiate at early date pact envisaged by Act of Chapultepec,⁹⁷ without Argentina if possible, but rather with Argentina than not at all (I appreciate Department may feel this impossible because of earlier statements or as result of Depcirtel February 22, 9 a.m.⁹⁸). If we are to accept Perón, I do not see how we can put off negotiating treaty for years. We might base willingness to negotiate an [on?] Argentine performance of demands. Greatest immediate danger of situation, as I see it, is that Perón will exploit his victory to dominate neighboring republics or undermine them by subversion, though danger he will form bloc against us must not be minimized. I reiterate my firm conviction that we must be in position through treaty to take effective action against outside subversion. Far from pussyfooting on this issue for fear of offending Russia, let us make it clear to Soviet once for all that we will not tolerate outside subversion of any kind, including Communist, in this hemisphere (I naturally do not extend this to legitimate Communist activities). We want no Azerbaijans in this hemisphere.

10. We must make clear to Argentine Government that resumption of cordial relations would be progressively predicated on Argentine performance of demands. It would be understood that only upon complete fulfillment of demands mentioned in Number 7 would cordial relations be fully resumed and Argentina accepted as a member in good standing of inter-American system.

11. We are placed in difficult position because of question of military collaboration, need for Argentine food exports and commercial competition.

A. I trust we are moving as rapidly as possible to establish control of exports of arms by principal producing countries. Without generally respected arms export control arrangements we cannot expect for any considerable time to keep arms from Argentina and we must recognize the apprehension their purchase would cause among Argentina’s neighbors.

B. I believe we must have a firm understanding with British and Russians regarding military missions. Perhaps French should be included in arrangement.

C. At early date (possibly as recognition of some important Argentine act of fulfillment) we should begin to invite Argentine officers to our military training schools in US. In view of army fulfillment of pledges to guarantee free elections, I also feel we should immediately adopt somewhat our friendly policy to it, particularly in exchanging information. (See Military Attaché’s report of February 28, 1946)⁹⁹. We should seek to maintain air and naval missions and should make it clear that we would be prepared to expand them upon substantial performance by Argentina of demands.

D. We should make it abundantly clear to Argentines that any effort by Argentina to slide down any non-American nation’s cellar door militarily speaking will be taken into full account in eventual reestablishment of friendly relations with US.

E. We must have definite objectives not merely to be disagreeable in trade matters. Unless possible harm to Argentina done by restrictions gives us trading point, I see no advantage to handing over this big market to foreign interests by continuing this indefinitely.

12. In view of personal interest involved, I make no recommendations about accrediting Ambassador. Nevertheless should Department for any reason feel that more cordial policy than above should be adopted, I should obviously be transferred since I am inevitably associated here with policy of toughness.

Cabot

97. For text, see Department of State, Treaties and Other International Acts Series No. 1543; for documentation on the Chapultepec Conference, see Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. ix, pp. 1 ff.
98. Not printed.
99. Not printed.