Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume X

Marshall Mission Files: Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, September 11, 1946, 10:35 a.m.

Nanking, September 11, 1946, 10:35 a.m.

Also present:	Colonel Caughey
	Captain Soong
	Mr. Chang

General Chou: I have received your memorandum (OSE 424). Have you anything more to add?

General Marshall: Nothing that I think of at the moment.

General Chou: At the moment I have two questions to ask. First, referring to paragraph 1a. The Generalissimo refers to three things. Namely; the restoration of communications agreement, the redistribution of troops in Manchuria, and the stipulations of the places where Communists troops are to be stationed. I am not very clear whether the Generalissimo refers to the agreements reached in June. As I recall a full agreement has only been reached on the restoration of Communications but not on the other two matters. Is it the Generalissimo’s idea that these stipulations advanced by him at that time should be accepted?

Second, also refers to the settlement of the military terms in the cessation of hostilities. Does he mean that the various agreements just referred to or does he want to have a separate document covering military terms for the cessation of hostilities?

General Marshall: Answering the last first, regarding military terms. As I understood him, he meant first that he was not demanding that the State Council should settle the military terms. He was agreeing to the point you had brought forward that the Committee of Three should settle the military terms. And he was using the expression “terms” in contradistinction to the political matters to be discussed by the State Council.

Now as to the various points mentioned in that paragraph, as I understood him he meant that he agreed to the Committee of Three action with the understanding that it was not merely confined, we will say, to an unconditional termination of hostilities, though he did not use the word “unconditional”. But the action was to include the various issues we were discussing in June and to carry them to completion.

I should explain to you that the Generalissimo made no such succinct statement as I have here in this memorandum. He talked in general terms and then I would ask him pointed questions to explain himself. Sometimes I could not understand and sometimes I felt that he did not understand the complications involved in what he was discussing. He would make a certain statement and then I would ask a number of questions about it to make certain I understood and he also understood just what was meant, so that there would be no surprise on my part later on. At times the replies were contradictory and I would have to ask a number of questions in the endeavor to clear up the point. I dictated notes immediately after the talks and then yesterday on the plane, from these scattered notes, I put this memorandum together in the form I thought could best be understood by you. I first stated his agreements on two points. Then I recited certain general statements that he made which could not be characterized as agreements. Then I have gone still further to indicate certain impressions I got which I could not put down as his statements but which were my impressions from a series of prolonged discussions. You should understand that a great deal was said. There would be a discussion of the entire Communist position and the Communist intentions, and why the Government did this and why the Government did that. Then I would ask questions, and finally resolved the statement in my memorandum.

You should also understand that in all of the procedure which has resulted in this statement, I have been struggling to find a way to terminate hostilities. In other words, a basis for agreement. I had considerable difficulty in persuading the Generalissimo to go ahead with the proposition for the Stuart group towards the immediate formation of the State Council. Having succeeded in doing that, I have recently been confronted, or confounded, by the accusations that the Communist Party did not choose to do this. So I have been forced to struggle against that argument. You have explained to me why you have hesitated about going ahead with the Stuart group, and I am aware of your reasons. But the fact remains that I have had that reluctance used against me in my struggle to find a basis for the termination of hostilities because the procedure proposed was not of Government conception or choice.

With further reference to sub-paragraph 1a, I immediately endeavored to clear up in my own mind the Generalissimo’s idea about the military reorganization matter. We had reached certain agreements and we had been stopped by certain disagreements, largely the question of local government. Now here apparently we have gotten clear of the issue of local government, at least I assume so, but on my questioning I have indicated in sub-paragraph 3b another complication regarding the military reorganization progress that we had already made in June. That is, the continued Government military occupation of areas recently taken over. So, on the one hand I seem to have cleared away the issue of local government so far as the Committee of Three is concerned, and on the other hand we have this new complication.

One more thing. I have [given] the Generalissimo orally an outline of the various points you had made in your proposed message last Friday. That is how this Committee of Three issue came up. I explained to him the statement Dr. Stuart and I made; that we would support the Communist position if an agreement were reached in the Stuart group and confirmed by the Steering Committee. I also told him the Communists declined to nominate their members for the State Council until hostilities had ceased. But I did not give him a copy of the paper, nor did I read from the paper. Also I did not inform him of my reply to General Chou as to my possible attitude regarding the direct issue of the termination of hostilities.

General Chou: I am not clear about Paragraph 3e. In the last part the Generalissimo expressed that he felt that practically all the issues covered by the five demands are or will be automatically taken care of by the Committee of Three. Does that mean that those points will be raised again in the Committee of Three?

General Marshall: This is almost exactly what he said and I did not quite understand it myself. I said to him: “So far as I can see you have indicated an amendment to the five demands by agreeing to the reference of local government question to the State Council.” As I recall the following discussion by him was confusing and I gained the impression, which I have indicated here, that he intended to insist on the continued military occupation of the places taken over by recent government operations and that this is probably what he meant by the use of the word “automatically”. I do not think I can give a clear explanation regarding that. That is the reason I have put those items under the heading of “impressions” he gave rather than “statements” he made. I might say that during the discussions there were frequent lengthy periods of questions and answers between Madame Chiang, who was interpreting, and himself because she did not understand him; and that often lead to an abandonment of the point under discussion and a new general statement.

I should explain another point. I think sub-paragraph 2b should really be 2a and 2a should be 2b for this reason: The Generalissimo stated that before the promulgation of the order for the cessation of hostilities the Communist Party must designate their representatives for the National Assembly. I immediately argued that such a procedure would inevitably prolong the fighting. The fighting would develop entirely beyond Government or Communist Party control by that time, unless, in my opinion, the Constitutional Draft Committee was immediately convened and a basis, in keeping with the PCC agreement, was established as a condition precedent to the organization of the National Assembly. As a result of that discussion he made the statement indicated in 2a and for that reason that sub-paragraph really should be 2b because it followed the 2b statement.

Now whether or not I was right in my assumption that the prompt resumption of work by the Constitutional Draft Committee and the completion of its work was regarded by the Communist Party as a matter of first importance, I do not know, but that was my assumption. I rather gained the impression that the Generalissimo did not agree with me on that; that is, he did not think I estimated the situation clearly from the viewpoint of the Communists. General Chou will know whether or not I did estimate correctly but whether I was right or I was wrong, I insisted that the Constitutional Draft Committee should be promptly brought back to work or there would not be an acceptable basis for the Communists to nominate their delegates to the National Assembly. Is that correct?

General Chou: After receiving your memorandum yesterday I made a very careful study and I must say that you have made a great endeavor to go over with the Generalissimo all the points. I have however the impression that the issue is getting more and more complicated. Also your memorandum has one advantage in that it makes it even more clear what the intention of the Generalissimo is. Previously when we realized that cease fire order could not be obtained because the Generalissimo did not feel secure with the Communists, we made the suggestion that we would first work out a formula for the reorganization of the State Council. This would give the Generalissimo a sense of security and also assure him that the Communist Party is not seeking a national split but instead cooperation. We hoped by such a move to obtain the assurance of a cease fire order. Later on it turned out that was not possible since despite the fact that the State Council may bring results there will still be no guarantee for the assurance of a cease fire order and probably the five point demand will be raised again for discussion. This led to our hesitation to participate in the Stuart group. We again turned to thinking over whether we might put to the Committee of Three the discussion on the assurance of cease fire order so that we might perhaps expedite action. You have in your latest trip just obtained the Generalissimo’s answer that discussion can be brought before the Committee of Three but the subject that will be discussed by the Committee of Three is getting more complicated.

At the present time we certainly cannot talk about an unconditional cease fire because there are already many terms imposed. As a matter of fact, even the June discussion was not a discussion on the basis of unconditional truce as many conditions were involved, the overwhelming part of which were brought forth by the Government side. When I was talking about the unconditional cease fire just now, I had in mind that the terms on which agreement has been reached in our June discussion will still hold. Those points on which we disagreed will not be brought up again. Now according to the Generalissimo, not only the agreed points of June will hold but the points which he advocated, but which were not accepted by the Communist Party, should also hold.

Now I estimate the Generalissimo’s intention as follows: Of course I do not know whether or not I am right or wrong: It appears to me that the Generalissimo’s intention would be, speaking of Manchuria, to permit the Communist troops to withdraw only in places which he has mentioned in his previous conditions, namely the north part of Hei Lung Chiang and Hsin-An and north Nun-chiang and a small region around Yenki. He would certainly oppose the proposal brought forth by the Communist Party; and as to China Proper he would persist in his original condition that the Communists should evacuate North Kiangsu, Tsinan-Tsingtao Railroad, South part of Jehol and such other points, likely all of Wensi and Tun-Hsien. Should the discussion follow such a line considerable time will be consumed and as a matter of fact the points on which we disagreed previously would all be brought forward by the Government. The Government is adding new conditions to the old ones. I also recall that in the previous discussion the Generalissimo raised the point that the places occupied since June 7th should be restored in a period of seven to ten days. That was the Government proposition at that time and to that was further added that all points occupied since January 13th should also be restored. Now the Government changes this position and raised a new demand to the effect that the places occupied by the Government troops would not be withdrawn but as to whether the Communists would withdraw from areas they have occupied it was still left open. So when the Committee of Three comes to discuss the cessation of hostilities, obviously it will not be an unconditional truce but one with many conditions. Should the Communist Party at this moment bring forth new conditions we may well anticipate that the war will just go on indefinitely. While we are sitting in the meeting the war would be carried on. If we should have, before the meeting is convened, the feeling that it will be useless then that is certainly dangerous.

Now as to sub-paragraph 3c, we are not yet clear as to what the true intention of the Generalissimo is. It seems that he has something of this sort in his mind; that he could at any moment he feels circumstances would require, bring up the five conditions again for discussion. The five conditions, as conveyed to me by Dr. Stuart, involves both the military disposition as well as the local government—particularly the latter because the Government has assumed that the Communists will withdraw troops from those places, then the Government will demand local administration of those places. Therefore, I have the impression that in case the State Council could not resolve the question of local government promptly, the Government will just, on the basis of the impression you have given, bring the whole question of the five conditions—both military and political—to the Committee of Three for discussion.

Speaking about the Committee of Three, it seems that its prospects are also rather complicated. The Generalissimo is always thinking from his point of view—from what is advantageous to himself—and he pays no concern to the purpose of the opposing party. He also explained that his actions are justified and that everything the Communists are doing is wrong, but he never questioned whether the terms he imposed would be acceptable to the Communists or not.

Now I wish to speak about the political affairs. The original proposition we have agreed upon is that we would first have an informal discussion on the reorganization of the Government in order to see whether we can find some basis of agreement and which will then be conveyed to the other parties and groups. The Steering Committee of the PCC will then be convened to discuss the reorganization of the Government and, of course, the Constitution Draft Committee will also resume its work. This was the procedure we had in mind and there seems no other procedure to follow. This procedure is the procedure of reviving the PCC agreements.

Another matter that we have to resolve is, of course, the cease fire question but I will not refer to that at this moment.

The Generalissimo had asked the Communist Party to designate its representatives to the National Assembly. I believe you are fully aware why that cannot be done and so I will not go further into this to explain it.

Another question is the Generalissimo’s intention to defer the reorganization of the Executive Yuan until after the National Assembly. This, however, is not in conformity with the PCC resolutions because the PCC resolutions prescribed that the State Council and the Executive Yuan should practically be reorganized at the same time; that is, through consultation among the various parties and, of course, through the PCC Steering Committee in order to reach an agreement on the nomination of delegates. As a matter of formality the State Council will be ushered in and then the members of the Executive Yuan will be nominated by the State Council. In case the Executive Yuan would not be reorganized until after the National Assembly, then the State Council cannot exercise its proper function. Just take the example of the local governments. The local governments are responsible to the Executive Yuan and if the State Council can merely discuss the matter, but exercise no power over the effecting agency, then the State Council will immediately become powerless in their decisions. This would merely make the situation more complicated. So in the political field, the Generalissimo is also merely thinking about himself and his propositions. He does not pay attention to, and even ignores, the PCC agreements. This would not only meet the opposition of the Communist Party, but the opposition of other parties which abide by the PCC resolutions.

Now speaking of considerations within the Committee of Three and Dr. Stuart’s group. Previously we have tackled those two considerations separately. Now we have linked them together. In doing so, we must, however, draw a distinct line between them so we will not confuse one with the other. But it now appears that the two are so much dependent upon each other that I am afraid it is difficult to get results.

Now suppose we called first the Dr. Stuart group with a view to reaching some way of cease firing. But if there is no guarantee that the cease firing will be ultimately effected, then it is very difficult for me to see how we can enter into the discussion with the Stuart group. There, of course, may be a second procedure that can be followed. We can convene the Committee of Three and the Stuart group at the same time. It seems that it will take considerable time before we could agree to a conditional, not an unconditional, cessation of hostilities. In the meantime the war would still go on and the discussion on the government reorganization by Dr. Stuart’s group would certainly be much affected by this delay. If it were certain that cease firing order would be issued a psychological effect would be created. Then I could go ahead with the political concessions. But if the fighting were still going on, it would be difficult to make concessions. This refers not only to the Communist side, but refers to the Government side as well.

Now as you just outlined, the issue of local government will be taken up by the State Council after its organization. The Committee of Three will tackle the military question; that is, the cease firing question alone. So I came to the idea that, since the cease firing is the predominate question, which we are all trying to solve, we should first call the Committee of Three alone to solve the cessation of hostilities. If we could accept the previous agreements without introducing new terms for the issuance of the cease fire order that, of course, would be the most practical solution. But as a matter of fact, I doubt it very much because the Generalissimo has already imposed new terms. In addition, the Government now has the feeling that it may occupy more places. Therefore, they feel they are in a strong enough position to introduce new demands. But since these demands would not be acceptable to us and since we might also bring up counterproposals, the result will be that there will be no cessation of hostilities. But anyway it can show with whom the responsibility should rest. If we cannot bring about a cessation of hostilities, then the 5 man committee, the Stuart group, will also be of no help.

Now, except for the reorganization of the State Council which will be discussed by the Stuart group, the entire procedure in connection with the political consideration as outlined by the Generalissimo is actually contrary to the PCC agreements; such as in the case of deferring the reorganization of the Executive Yuan or such as the demand for Communist nomination of National Assembly delegates. We may well expect that once the Steering Committee is convened, there will be hot arguments among the parties.

Now I wish to come back once more to sub-paragraph 3c referring to the 5 conditions. It is very ambiguous. But of course we may leave it aside for the time being, just assuming that the political and the military question will be dealt with separately. But here in paragraph 1b the Generalissimo referred only to the Kiangsu local government, not referring to all the local governments as we have advocated. Now I wish to point this out. Maybe this is merely a technical misunderstanding; maybe not exactly what he meant. But I have stated from the very beginning that the local government question should not be involved in the discussion of cease fire, but rather should be referred to the reorganized State Council.

I still think we may perhaps approach the question by tackling the cease fire first. Otherwise, I am afraid that it will take too much time before we will come back to the cessation of hostilities. It may just be dragged out indefinitely so that the whole negotiation will lose its significance because it would not bring any result.

So in sizing up my impression I have the feeling that it is advisable to immediately convene the Committee of Three and try to find the common ground so that we may reach a basis for the cessation of hostilities. In this way it would also greatly facilitate the proceeding of the Stuart group.

General Marshall: As I understand, you have gone back to the June 30th impasse, which I have been endeavoring to break through. As one method, Dr. Stuart and I proposed the procedure for the organization of the State Council. I see no reason why meetings of the Committee of Three could not be had. But if they are not at least paralleled if not preceded by, an effort to organize the State Council, we are back exactly where we were on June 30, which is a rather hopeless position. I won’t endeavor to argue the issue with you. The time factor and the nature of the impasse which I have been endeavoring to clear away are what concern me. It seems to me, judging from what you have just said, that the proposal of Dr. Stuart and myself towards finding an agreement of the organization of the State Council is a futile procedure. I do not now know where to turn.

General Chou: With regard to the discussion of the State Council, the differences in the proposals seem more and more clear. The original idea of the Communist Party had been that we hoped, by resolving this issue, we would immediately obtain the cessation of hostilities. That is why we subscribed to the idea of bringing the State Council under discussion. But now the cease fire seems to be a very remote and uncertain thing. That leads me to hesitate with regard to participating in the discussion of State Council. Now of course we get the Generalissimo’s agreement that the cessation of hostilities can now be referred to the Committee of Three. But as a matter of fact that has always been the procedure. The real difference now is the cessation of hostilities. Many more terms are now involved and the discussion on State Council also seems to involve more terms; such as the reorganization of National Assembly or the Executive Yuan are not to be effected before the National Assembly convenes. I find it difficult to convince the other parties because they would say, “Now, by following such a procedure you will neither get to the cessation of hostilities nor to a complete reorganization of the Government in accordance with the original understanding. What is the use of all this negotiation?”

Now when we talked previously about the reorganization of the government, it was all calculated to bring about the cessation of hostilities. When in that discussion it would bring about the reorganization of the Executive Yuan it was merely because we had in mind that that was not within the function of the Stuart group, but rather would be taken up by the Steering Committee. But now it seems to get more and more complicated and the intention of the Generalissimo has become more and more clear.

In my previous discussion with Dr. Stuart with regard to the Stuart group, I had made an outline of possibilities. On the question of reorganization of the State Council itself we can make concessions regardless of whether we will have 10 or 8 candidates in the State Council. Anyway, the Communist candidates plus the Democratic League will still be in the minority and the change of one or two seats will not affect this status. As to the question of the veto power, as far as the joint platform is adhered to, the Kuomintang will have a free hand in dealing with the transactions. The veto power only comes in when the joint platform is jeopardized. Adherence to the joint platform can be done in two ways. Either the Communists plus the Democratic Leaguers will constitute a veto power regardless of how many seats they have, or else work out certain provisions under which the candidates can withdraw from the Government in case the joint platform is infringed upon. Along this line and with the assurance that a cease fire order will be issued, I can immediately take up the matter with the other parties with the hope that the whole question of the State Council can be straightened out in a single meeting. But in case there is no assurance for the issuance of the cease fire order, then I find no way to talk to the other parties and to ask their consensus or to make such concessions. Nor can I make such concessions for my own party. Hot arguments would ensue in the Committee of Three and the meetings would be devoid of positive result. It would merely mislead the public as if there is still hope for peace, but actually the Committee of Three as well as the Stuart group will be conducted without any progress while the fighting developed in greater proportions.

So, in the case of these circumstances, I find it very difficult to tell others whether there is assurances of cessation of hostilities or not. From the statements I have gathered there is no such assurance yet. If we called the Committee of Three there would still be a hope for cessation of hostilities, though I am very much uncertain about it. But I cannot conceive any other way to proceed. This also is my disposition toward the Stuart group. I do not know whether you have any further comment to make.

General Marshall: I have no further comment to make. I will have these notes sent to Dr. Stuart. It looks as though we are back to June 30 again.

General Chou: It is difficult for me to conceive any new means at this moment. It seems to me that too many things are involved in the issue. It is hard for me to give an answer right now as to the best method. There is one point that I would like to get clarified with regard to para 1b with reference to the local government in Kiangsu. Did the Generalissimo mean all the local governments will be put under discussion by the State Council or only North Kiangsu? I would like to get that clarified in order to make a report.

General Marshall: This was my impression. Heretofore, the Generalissimo had insisted that the Kiangsu question would be settled as a military proposition. Now that he (the Generalissimo) agreed to the Kiangsu question being settled by the State Council, the implication is quite clear to me that the entire question of local government would be discussed by the State Council. He had always made the point that those particular places along the railroad, at Antung and south of Chengteh would not be determined by political measures, but by the Government just taking over. He was very specific regarding Kiangsu. That seemed to be the great problem with him. Therefore, the plain implication to me is that he meant all local governments.

General Chou: Do you mean that Kiangsu as well as all the other local governments will be settled by the State Council?

General Marshall: That was my impression—certainly Kiangsu.

I have here a memorandum for General Chou stating that a C–54 will be ready to leave at 8 o’clock Friday morning to take 25 passengers to Yenan. It should arrive between 11:30 and 12. It will immediately return. This memorandum describes the plane and its markings and requests assurance that it will not be fired upon.

General Chou: Thank you for the provision of a plane.

Did Dr. Stuart speak to you about the Yellow River business?

General Marshall: Yes. I sent word to Mr. Robertson this morning on that.

General Chou: Did you suggest a special team?

General Marshall: I sent a message saying they should send two teams. I did not say where to send them from. I read this morning General Hsu’s memorandum to you suggesting that a special technical team be sent to work all along the river to reassure you about control of the flood. I added that to the message, so that Mr. Robertson would have everything. I thought it best not to propose any particular team, but to let Executive Headquarters determine what was the best way to make teams available. I was told that the river had not reached a very high flood stage; that it was well below the dangerous stage.

General Chou: Mr. Todd⁵⁴ is still awaiting in Shanghai for a reply as to where the teams will be sent out. At that time he will go to Peiping to contact them. Also I will have other matters to take up with Mr. Todd. I hope that as soon as you receive a report from Peiping you will immediately inform Mr. Todd about the arrangements.

General Marshall: As I have indicated already in this memorandum of mine of yesterday to you, I listed some “impressions”. I would ask you to be very careful in regard to that, at least at the present time, from the viewpoint of public statements. I am giving you an impression I got and if that becomes immediately a subject of violent press controversy, I think it will hinder and not help obtaining what you actually want. At the same time, I recognize that later on, the Communists may feel compelled to take the issue to the public, but in view of my frankness in giving my personal impressions to you, I would get out of this nothing but embarrassment in what I am trying to do if it immediately becomes a subject of press controversy. I am referring particularly to what I spoke of as “impressions” I had gotten and I am referring particularly to the immediate future—the next few days. I recall the discussions you and I have had regarding your comments on Government statements and I merely say to you that I get exactly the same reaction when I meet the Generalissimo—he speaks about the Communist statements or propaganda. All that, of course, only makes the other side more stubborn and the only ones that profit are the newspapers.

Meeting adjourned.

54. Oliver J. Todd, American engineer and UNRRA adviser to the Yellow River Commission.