Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume X

740.00119 Pacific War/6–2746

Memorandum by the State Department Member of the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee (Hilldring) to the Secretary of State

SWN–4471

Washington, 27 June 1946.

By informal action on 25 June 1946 the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 258/5 as amended by SWNCC 258/6 and SWNCC 258/7.

A copy of the revised approved paper is forwarded herewith. It is requested that the Department of State transmit the draft note in Appendix “C”²⁵ of the revised approved paper to the Chinese Government.

For the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee:

J. H. Hilldring

[Annex]

Repatriation of Civilian Japanese From China

Report by the State–War–Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

[SWNCC 258/5]

the problem

1. To determine United States policy concerning the repatriation of civilian Japanese from China (including Manchuria and Formosa).

facts bearing on the problem

2. See Appendix “A”.

discussion

3. See Appendix “B”.

conclusions

4. It is concluded that:

a. The United States favors the repatriation of all Japanese from China and is prepared to continue to assist the Chinese Government in attaining this end.

b. It is recognized that there may be compelling reasons for the temporary retention by the Chinese Government of a limited number of certain categories of Japanese civilians in China. The United States Government, however, should:

(1) urge upon the Chinese Government the desirability of repatriating at once Japanese civilians now resident in China except those temporarily indispensable to China’s recovery.

(2) also urge the Chinese Government to adopt a policy of permitting only those Japanese to remain whose presence is required on grounds of professional or technical abilities and who, at the same time, are able to demonstrate by their past records that they do not represent any threat to the peace and security of China and are not likely to serve as an entering wedge for the resurgence of Japanese influence on the Continent.

c. As a general policy, the repatriation of Japanese military personnel should have priority over that of civilians.

d. Current directives to United States military commanders in the field and agreements between United States and Chinese military commanders adequately describe the methods by which the United States is to assist the Chinese Government in repatriating Japanese civilians from China to Japan.

recommendations

5. It is recommended that:

a. Upon approval by SWNCC, this paper be transmitted to the JCS^25a for information and guidance and to the State, War, and Navy Departments and the United States member of the Far Eastern Commission for information; and

b. When this paper has been transmitted to the JCS for information and guidance, the Department of State be requested to transmit the enclosed draft note (Appendix “C”) to the Chinese Government.²⁶

Appendix “A”

facts bearing on the problem

1. In a statement of United States policy toward China, the President on 15 December 1945 announced:²⁷

“It is the firm belief of this Government that a strong, united and democratic China is of the utmost importance for the success of the United Nations Organization and for world peace.…

“In continuation of the constant and close collaboration with the National Government of the Republic of China in the prosecution of this war, in consonance with the Potsdam Declaration, and to remove possibility of Japanese influence remaining in China, the United States has assumed a definite obligation in the disarmament and evacuation of the Japanese troops.… The United States recognizes and will continue to recognize the National Government of China and cooperate with it in international affairs and specifically in eliminating Japanese influence from China.… The maintenance of peace in the Pacific may be jeopardized, if not frustrated, unless Japanese influence in China is wholly removed and unless China takes her place as a unified, democratic, and peaceful nation. This is the purpose of the maintenance for the time being of United States military and naval forces in China.”

2. Replacement of Japanese Engineers, Technicians, and Supervisors in China, Formosa, and Manchuria

At the end of hostilities approximately 168,000 Japanese occupied key positions as engineers, technicians, supervisors, and foremen in the industry and agriculture of China, Formosa, and Manchuria. The duties of these men varied widely, but all are believed to possess at least two years of specialized training. The time and manner of their replacement by Chinese is therefore a matter of considerable importance.

a. China Proper

Of the 168,000 key Japanese, 48,000 were employed in China Proper. The distribution of these workers by industry for all of China is not available. Table I below presents the situation in North China. In the remainder of China, relatively more of the highly trained Japanese were probably in light industry and shipping and fewer in railroads, heavy chemicals, and mining.

Table I: Highly Trained Japanese Personnel—North China 1945

Industry	Number of Workers
Railroads and Harbors	22,700
Shipping	83
Aviation	289
Communications	1,317
Heavy Chemicals	1,730
Light Industries	744
Electricity, Gas, and Water	2,033
Civil Engineering and Architecture	1,398
Agriculture (including animal husbandry, etc.)	626
Mining	758
Others	186
Total	31,864

The problem faced by the Chinese authorities in replacing the many highly trained Japanese formerly employed in China Proper is much smaller than might be expected. With minor exceptions in the fields of iron, light metals, and chemicals, the Japanese constructed no new industry in China Proper during their occupation. Skilled Chinese personnel should accordingly be available for partially manning most of the plants taken over from the Japanese. In many cases this personnel should be sufficient for the limited level of operations possible under current transport and material shortages. In other cases, deficits of highly trained workers can be met by upgrading men from jobs requiring somewhat less skill. With the exception of the textile industry, Chinese should be able to fill all but a few essential positions after a short period of transition.

b. Formosa

The replacement problem in Formosa is much more difficult. The industry and agriculture of that island was to a large extent developed under Japanese supervision. Formosan Chinese were never permitted to acquire the higher administrative and technical skills. The estimated 23,000 Japanese engineers, technicians, supervisors, and foremen employed in the Formosan economy are believed to constitute the bulk of the workers in those categories on the island. Japanese are known to have enjoyed an almost complete monopoly of the higher administrative positions.

Formosans were used by the Japanese in the lesser supervisory jobs and in technical work requiring only one or two years specialized training. Some of the skilled Formosans may be able to take on greater responsibilities as the Japanese are repatriated. Also, bomb damage to sugar refineries, light metal plants, and fertilizer plants, postpones the necessity of filling a number of key positions formerly held by Japanese. The Formosan economy would nevertheless be severely crippled for some years if all or most of the highly trained Japanese in industry and agriculture were repatriated now. For this reason, an agreement has been reached between the Governor of Formosa and the Chinese Government to permit the temporary retention in Formosa of 5600 Japanese civilian technicians and about 22,400 of their dependents.

c. Manchuria

The situation in Manchuria appears to lie somewhat between that in China Proper and that in Formosa. As in Formosa, the Japanese in Manchuria held the majority of the top technical and administrative jobs. A greater degree of participation was, however, permitted the Manchurian Chinese than was allowed native workers in Formosa. It is assumed that this may have reflected the ostensibly autonomous status of Manchukuo, and in part the fact that much industry existed in the area before 1931. Some Chinese may therefore already possess the training needed in positions previously occupied by Japanese. A much larger number should be able to act as replacements by being upgraded from their present jobs.

Approximately 97,000 highly trained Japanese were employed in Manchurian industry and agriculture. The number of these key workers that must be replaced by Chinese cannot be estimated on the basis of present knowledge. Extensive stripping of plants, prolonged civil war, or both, could convert an apparent skilled labor deficit into a real surplus. Additional sources of uncertainty are the questionable economic basis for much of Manchurian heavy industry and the as yet unannounced Chinese governmental policy toward continued operation of such industry. The most reasonable guess is that not all the 97,000 key Japanese need be replaced by Chinese, but that the number of trained Chinese available will still be considerably less than the number required to man operable facilities.

3. The Repatriation Plan for the China Theatre, dated 6 February 1946, was agreed to by SCAP, CinCPac,^27a ComGenChina, the Chinese National Military Council and Supreme Hq. Chinese Army. Among the policies and points agreed upon were the following:

“I. Mission:

“The Joint Chiefs of Staff have directed the Commanding General, U. S. Forces, China Theater to render advice to the Chinese National Government in repatriation of Japanese military and civilian personnel from China proper, Manchuria, Formosa, Hainan Island, and French Indo-China, north of the 16° North Latitude.

“II. Responsibilities

“1. The Chinese National Government is responsible for the repatriation of all Japanese, civilian and military with the specific responsibility of disarming and delivery of all repatriates to port areas and processing preliminary to the water lift. Further, they are responsible to insure sufficient backlog of processed repatriates at each repatriation port to prevent delay in sailing of vessels.

“a. Processing and movement of Japanese to ports of embarkation is the direct responsibility of Supreme Headquarters, Chinese Army.

“2. The China Theater is responsible for maintaining liaison between the Supreme Headquarters, Chinese Army, the Chinese National Government, and 7th Fleet, SCAP and SCAJap.²⁸

“3. The 7th Fleet is responsible for water lift involving U. S. Navy vessels.

“4. SCAJap is responsible for water lift by Japanese manned vessels.

“III. Operations

“1. China Theater will establish the order of priority for repatriation from the various repatriation ports in China and will allocate shipping from sources available to the China Theater.²⁹

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“3. Processing and Movement of Japanese to Ports of Embarkation:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“g. Rations for Sea Movement:

• “(1) U. S. Navy Vessels: A sufficient number of rations for length of the voyage plus one day’s emergency rations will be placed on board each ship by the Chinese Repatriation Control Agency at the port of embarkation. The rations placed on board to consist of one day’s ration pre-cooked rice, the balance of rations to consist of dry (uncooked) rice. Ship commanders will make cooking facilities available.
• “(2) SCAJap Vessels will be manned and operated by Japanese personnel and will carry sufficient rations, food and other stores necessary for the care and feeding of the returning repatriates.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“4. Movement of Japanese Between China and Japan:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

• “b. First priority will be granted to the movement of Japanese military and Naval personnel and second priority to the movement of Japanese civilians. Exceptions may be made when deemed necessary. Japanese will be disarmed prior to repatriation. As far as practicable, Japanese Military personnel and civilians will be segregated.
• “c. Beginning approximately 1 February, LSTs and Liberties manned by Japanese crews and operated under SCAJap will be made available for repatriation from ports in China. Approximately 85 Jap-manned LSTs and 100 Liberties will be repatriation service, by end of March 1946. 30% of all captured Jap shipping in repatriation service will be assigned to China Theater repatriation.

“Note: The Chinese National Government will report all shipping recovered from the Japanese to SCAP through headquarters, China Theater. This shipping will be placed at the disposal of SCAP for use in repatriation.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“VI. U. S. Army Repatriation Teams will be placed at each port of embarkation in China, Formosa, French Indo-China and Manchuria except those maintained by the Marines in North China, for liaison with the local Chinese Repatriation organizations and coordination of shipping 7th Fleet and SCAJap.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“Annex ‘D’”

“Supply Procedures in Repatriation”

“The following procedures will apply concerning repatriation supply matters:

• “1. The Japanese Government is responsible in general for furnishing supplies for vessels engaged in repatriation to or from Japan.
• “2. SCAP will insure that the necessary supplies for SCAJap ships are furnished by the Japanese. Vessels will be provisioned in Japan with the necessary blankets, food, and medical supplies in so far as practicable. During periods of cold weather in Japan, the Japanese will place aboard vessels departing from Japan sufficient warm clothing for repatriates to be returned to Japan from warm climates.”

4. No repatriation of Japanese civilians has been reported from Manchuria, which leaves an estimated 1,000,000 in that area. On 3 May 1946 China Theatre Headquarters reported that repatriation from Formosa was considered completed, with 32,079 civilians remaining on the island. On the same date South China was reported cleared, with no civilians remaining. A total of 68,926 Japanese civilians remained in Central and North China on 3 May. A total of 710,221 Japanese civilians had been repatriated by that date from all the above areas, plus northern Indochina.

Appendix “B”

discussion

1. The President in his statement regarding United States policy toward China of 16 December 1945 made clear that an important corollary of the basic United States policy of helping the growth of “a strong, united, and democratic China” is the elimination of Japanese influence from China. Although the President indicated that this was to be done primarily by the evacuation of Japanese troops from China, it is obvious that the elimination of Japanese influence from China also calls for the repatriation of those Japanese civilians whose presence in China would permit continued Japanese influence or would threaten the peace and security of China and thus prove to be a threat to United States security and detrimental to U. S. interests.

2. It must be recognized that many, if not most, Japanese civilians, if permitted to remain in China, would secretly strive for the resurgence of Japanese power and influence on the continent. The danger is particularly grave in view of the dominant position the Japanese have held in the political and economic life of Formosa, Manchuria, and many parts of North China. The easiest way to eliminate the danger would, of course, be to repatriate all Japanese from China. From this point of view, it is to the interests of the United States to have all civilian Japanese repatriated from China.

3. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that Chinese authorities in several areas have expressed a need for the continued services of certain Japanese technicians. These Chinese authorities believe that because of the professional and technical skills these Japanese possess and because of the inadequate numbers of trained Chinese able to take their places, the immediate and complete expulsion of all these Japanese technicians would prove to be injurious to the economic life and general well-being of certain important areas in China. This argument would be invalidated if the United States or other Allied powers were to supply China with sufficient number of technicians at comparable salary rates, but this seems impracticable. It is possible that the Soviet Union for political reasons might be willing to do so or that large numbers of unemployed German technicians might be willing to work in China at the salary scale of the Japanese technicians, but these alternatives would raise new problems fully as grave as those resulting from the presence of Japanese technicians in China.

4. The course of wisdom would seem to be a rational compromise between these two conflicting points of view. The elimination of Japanese influence in China would necessitate a drastic reduction of the numbers of Japanese in China and the expulsion of all individuals who might prove to be a threat to peace and security but would not necessarily call for the repatriation of all Japanese. It appears that the great majority of Japanese in China desire to be repatriated, and these should all certainly be sent home. It is reported that even in Formosa, where the Japanese have been longest and are best entrenched, about 60 percent desired immediate repatriation. Of the remainder, which for China as a whole is probably far less than 40%, only those should be permitted to remain whose presence is required on grounds of professional and technical abilities and who, at the same time, have been able to demonstrate on the basis of their past records that they do not represent any threat to peace and security in the Far East, and are not likely to serve as an entering wedge for the resurgence of Japanese power and influence on the continent. A rigid application of these two tests would leave in China a group of Japanese which would be relatively small in numbers and little likely to be a threat to Chinese peace and security and yet which would be able to make a maximum contribution to the economic life and general well-being of China.

5. The United States is following a policy of repatriating from the United States to Japan only those Japanese who desire repatriation or are believed to be disloyal to the United States and a threat to its peace and security. The United States, furthermore, recognizes that the question of the repatriation of civilian Japanese by other Allied powers is in each case a domestic problem to be decided by the individual nation concerned. Under these circumstances, it would not be proper for the United States to insist upon the repatriation from China to Japan of all or even certain categories of Japanese civilians resident in China. The most that the United States can do is to urge the Chinese Government to adopt the course of action outlined above and to continue to assist the Chinese Government in carrying out the repatriation program it decides upon.

25. Draft note not printed; for text, see telegram No. 397, July 2, 6 p.m., to the Embassy in China, p. 905.
26. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
26. See telegram No. 397, July 2, 6 p.m., to the Embassy in China, p. 905.
27. For complete text of statement, see Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 607.
28. Commander in Chief, Pacific.
28. Shipping Control Administrator, Japan.
29. Omissions indicated in the original.