811.3393/11–546
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson)
The item on the United Nations Assembly agenda calling for report and discussion of troops stationed abroad76 brings up for careful consideration and review the question of our Marines in north China.
We will be able to report with clarity and force on why the Marines [Page 880] have been in north China and what they have been doing. At the request of the Chinese Government they have assisted in the repatriation of 350,000 Japanese from that area, and they have assisted in keeping communications open, thereby making possible the shipment of coal from north China to Shanghai, where it is vitally needed by industry. But Japanese repatriation from north China was completed during the summer, and more recently the Marines withdrew from the rail lines and are now concentrated in urban centers in north China (Peiping, Tientsin, Tangku, and Chinwangtao). It is understood that the Marines now perform some ancillary functions in connection with the Executive Headquarters in Peiping.
From the foregoing it seems clear that it will be difficult for our representative at the Assembly to make any convincing statement as to why the Marines continue to be stationed in north China. In this connection I was somewhat perturbed to note in a recent draft telegram77 to our representative on the Assembly78 a phrase stating that the Marines were in north China to assist in the evacuation of Japanese. At my suggestion the phrase was deleted. The fact that they are there at the request of the Chinese Government might still be used but this does not furnish an answer to the question, why? As a matter of fact, it raises the presumption that they are in north China solely for the purpose of supporting the National Government.
In connection with the discussions in the Assembly it is well to recall the Moscow agreement of December last year in regard to China.79 That agreement contains the following paragraph:
“Mr. Byrnes pointed out that American forces were in North China at the request of the Chinese Government, and referred also to the primary responsibility of the United States in the implementation of the terms of surrender with respect to the disarming and deportation of Japanese troops. He stated that American forces would be withdrawn just as soon as this responsibility was discharged or the Chinese Government was in a position to discharge the responsibility without the assistance of American forces.”
This paragraph is taken from a statement signed by Mr. Bevin80 and Mr. Molotov as well as Mr. Byrnes. There can be little doubt that the Russians at the Assembly will endeavor to make capital of this statement.
There has been an increasing volume of press comment from China (right, left and center) adversely critical of our retention of the [Page 881] Marines. There has also been an increasing tendency in this country to question the presence of the Marines there.
The problem of answering letters addressed to the State Department asking why the Marines are there is growing more difficult, and is reaching the point where it occasions embarrassment. Illustrative of this is your recent reply to Senator Brewster.81 We have many similar letters which are handled on the Office and Division level.
It is my understanding that there remain in north China something over 20,000 Marines. In addition to the places I have named above there is a small outfit at Tsingtao.
The last time we received any indication from General Marshall with regard to his attitude toward the Marines was last July.82 At that time he indicated that he thought the Marines should be withdrawn as soon as it was feasible to do so but did not think that an immediate withdrawal should be undertaken.
The question naturally arises as to what would be the effect on the political-military situation in north China if the Marines were withdrawn. In the past fears have been expressed, with reason, that the Chinese Communists might benefit from such withdrawal; and even that the Russians might in some way take advantage of withdrawal. Except in so far as the Communists may be in a position to interrupt communications (which they are doing right now with the Marines in north China), it appears that the recent military successes of the National Government troops have placed them in a position to maintain their control over the area. In addition to Kalgan, they have taken strategic points in Jehol Province and are rapidly consolidating their position in southern Manchuria. Therefore, it is not believed that the position of National Government forces would be jeopardized by withdrawal of the Marines.
I suggest that you discuss this matter with the Secretaries of War and Navy tomorrow and endeavor to obtain their agreement to the dispatch of a telegram to General Marshall83 asking him whether he does not think it would be feasible now to fix a date for the withdrawal of the Marines from north China. (The small detachment at Tsingtao might be excluded from consideration now if the Navy feels strongly that it is advisable to do so.) The actual date of withdrawal would not be important provided it was within the reasonably near future.
[Page 882]If agreement could be reached on a date of withdrawal, our representative at the Assembly could, after making a clear and forceful statement as to why our Marines have been in north China, state that, having completed their mission, they are to be withdrawn as of (blank date). Such a statement could end all argument on this account and I believe the psychological effect would be very good.
Pertinent to this whole question is the fact that the National Assembly is scheduled to meet in Nanking on November 12 to approve the Constitution and discuss other political matters such as changes in the Government. It is not yet known whether the Chinese Communists and the democratic parties will participate in the Assembly. If they do one may assume that General Marshall’s efforts have, at least for the time being, been successful. If they do not, and Chiang proceeds with the convening of the National Assembly, one may assume a “parting of the ways” (also for the time being because we cannot expect anything to be final or sharply drawn in this situation) in so far as negotiations between the Government and the dissident elements are concerned.84 In either contingency, the temporary success or the temporary failure of General Marshall’s mission, it would seem advisable seriously to consider withdrawal of the Marines.
- For report on General Assembly discussion of the question of the presence of armed forces of Members of the United Nations on nonenemy territories, see United Nations, Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly, Verbatim Record, 23 October–16 December, 1946, pp. 895, 1068, 1071, and 1316.↩
- Not found in Department files.↩
- For a statement made October 30 before the General Assembly by the Senior Representative of the U. S. delegation regarding the presence of United States forces in nonenemy territories, see Department of State Bulletin, November 24, 1946, p. 935.↩
- December 27, 1945, Department of State Bulletin, December 30, 1945, pp. 1027, 1030; see also Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vii, pp. 829 ff.↩
- Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Letter of November 2, not printed.↩
- Telegram No. 250920Z, July 25, by Admiral Cooke to Admiral Towers, also sent to the War Department for information, stated: “In personal conference Nanking yesterday General Marshall stated he desired to proceed now with reduction marines at Tsingtao so that forces remaining there will be one reinforced battalion of 4th Marines Reinf 12th Service Battalion, VMR 153 and the MAB Detachment.” For minutes of conversation of July 24, see p. 869.↩
- Telegram No. 84987, November 7, not printed.↩
- See ante, pp. 473 ff.↩