Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Tu Ta-wei at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, August 30, 1946, 10:45 a.m.

Also present: Lt. Col. Hutchin

General Yu Ta Wei: I would like for you to tell me generally what resulted from your meeting last night with General Chou En-lai in order that I can pass this information on to the Generalissimo.

General Marshall: I can tell the Generalissimo directly what transpired last evening as I plan to go to Kuling this afternoon. However, for your information General Chou appears to be greatly disturbed over the situation. He was not particularly hopeful as to what might result from the establishment of Doctor Stuart’s small group. He was inclined to feel that the procedure Doctor Stuart and I have proposed—State Council discussion—would constitute merely a prolongation of the war, and would, in effect, mislead the people of China into a too optimistic point of view. However, he did agree to go ahead with it.

Doctor Stuart had commented to General Chou about the Generalissimo’s statement to me that there was no necessity for issuing a cease fire order as they already had that from the 10th January agreement, and in fact, all that was necessary was for the Communists to stop fighting. General Chou had given considerable thought to that point of view and referred to it in his discussions of last night. I took particular pains to tell him that the Generalissimo had not revised his previous stand on the five points. I did not explain to General Chou the Generalissimo’s apparent confusion over the terms of the statement of 10 January.

General Chou agreed to go ahead with the business of Doctor Stuart’s small group. Even though he thought it would prove to be misleading. I felt that there would still be the hope for a more definite basis for the termination of hostilities. I will explain all that to the Generalissimo tonight.

You might say that Doctor Stuart will proceed toward the solution of only the one basic step in the hope that it would serve to clarify the atmosphere. I continued to emphasize, to put clearly into General Chou’s mind, that this was something we (General Marshall and Doctor Stuart) were hoping to accomplish and that we felt there was [Page 109] nothing else we could do right now. At least the course of action we proposed would serve to extend hope toward reaching a solution.

One of the main troubles is that the Communists are more or less the victims of their own propaganda which is evidenced by the great importance they attach to the alleged assistance being given to the Kuomintang by the United States. They have played this theme song to a “fare thee well” as though every effort of the Kuomintang is now, and will continue to be, dependent upon the immediate support they are receiving from the United States.

General Yu Ta Wei: In this connection I would like to show you a message I have just received concerning orders we placed for some one hundred thirty million dollars worth of ammunition needed, and which we had hoped to buy from the United States. This message indicates that the requisitions were approved all the way up, but in the last analysis the State Department disapproved granting the necessary export license. The reason stated for this disapproval of an export license was that the ammunition was intended for a representative National Army under a coalition Government.23 This is the first really major evidence of restricting United States aid to China and it will naturally put our Government in a very difficult position.

General Marshall: I am much interested in seeing this message, although I had nothing to do with it. I anticipated, and so told you, that it was just a matter of time before such a step would be taken. I have been in a position right along to stop this, and to stop that, but I have refrained from doing so in an effort to do everything possible to reach a solution for the peace of China. This transaction about the ammunition exports has apparently been handled in Washington without any reference to me. I am glad that it was for it confirms exactly what I have been telling you and the Generalissimo for some time.

From this point on, the conversation was held off the record.

  1. See letter of August 23 to the Chairman of the Chinese Supply Commission, p. 757.