893.00/3–1346
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Vincent ) to the Secretary of State
Subject: War Department telegram 25154.94
The attached telegram from General Wedemeyer discusses the problem of deactivating the China Theater by May 1. The General refers to certain “residual responsibilities” which will exist after May 1 and suggests that they be discharged (1) by a “China Station Command” working under the direction of the U. S. Military Advisory Group; (2) by Executive Headquarters at Peiping (established by General Marshall to handle Chinese truce and Army reorganization problem); (3) by General MacArthur’s Headquarters at Tokyo; or (4) by the command of the 7th (U. S.) Fleet. We have a decided preference for either method (2) or (4), or a combination thereof. It is believed impracticable for General MacArthur to take over any operational duties in connection with the China Theater. With regard [Page 855] to the Advisory Group taking over operational duties, we have in the past expressed our disagreement with such an idea on the grounds that it is highly advisable that the Advisory Group not take upon itself operational duties even of a limited character. The character of these “residual responsibilities” (assistance in repatriating the Japanese, logistical support of Chinese troops, graves registration program, aerial mapping program in China, and disposition of surplus property) seem to indicate clearly that they could be discharged readily by General Marshall’s Executive Headquarters and the 7th Fleet. The proposition of leaving behind a Shanghai Port Command staffed by the U. S. Army after deactivation is likely to lead to misunderstanding as to our intentions in deactivating.
With regard to the Marines, Admiral Cooke seems to think it practicable to have all or most of them out of China by May 1, leaving behind a small group of service troops to assist General Marshall’s Executive Headquarters in Peiping.
It is understood that Admiral Cooke is opposed to the use of the Navy contingent of the Military Advisory Group for operational duties. It is also understood that he does not agree with General Wedemeyer’s idea that the Military Advisory Group be made responsible to the J. C. S. here. We also have our doubts as to the advisability of J. C. S. assuming direction of the Advisory Group in as much as the J. C. S. is primarily an operational organization and we do not, as I have stated above, wish to have the Advisory Group have any connection with operations.
You may wish to discuss this matter with General Marshall.