Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume X

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270: Telegram

Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer ⁹⁵ to the Chief of Staff ( Eisenhower )

Shanghai , 21 January 1946.

20766. Reurad 92047.⁹⁶

1. Secretary of State stress[ed] the “Advisory” functions of the proposed Military Advisory Group. The initial conception of this group⁹⁷ was presented by the Generalissimo⁹⁸ and his Minister of War.⁹⁹ The Generalissimo desired an extensive degree of American supervision in the training of his military forces. China being a large country and the projected Army large and scattered a correspondingly large American personnel would be necessary. We cannot provide sufficient personnel for close supervision in the lower echelons, but the Generalissimo does desire and expects this form of assistance in his projected service schools, including air, ground and naval as well as in the general and special staff groups of the Ministry of War and in the Supreme Headquarters.

2. The Generalissimo for some inexplainable reason does not like the connotation of military mission and therefore requested that the group be termed the Military Advisory Group. It was not his intention, however, to limit the functions of the group to advisory functions on the highest military staff level. The American personnel would not participate in any manner in Chinese military operations. The supervision of training mentioned above would be accomplished by combined U. S. and Chinese inspection teams with checking on the actual work of ground units and by small liaison groups working with Chinese Air Force units.

3. I am in agreement that the Army Advisory Group proposed last fall by the Generalissimo through me as his Chief of Staff, is too large. Obviously, however, the more American personnel we employ in actual supervisory capacities the more effective the work will be. It may be a year or much longer before approximately 3,800 Americans as set up in JCS 1330/10¹ could be accommodated and appropriately employed. I now propose that a nucleus of the Army Advisory Group would be established immediately under presidential war powers. This would total approximately 300 or 400 officers and men initially. This procedure would permit us to maintain continuity of American assistance that has proven so invaluable in creating a dependable military force of Alpha divisions and small air units. We should not delay such participation any longer for both the British and Russians are bidding strongly for Chinese approval of similar advisory groups.

4. We have developed an excellent cooperative spirit in assisting the Chinese the past several months. The Generalissimo has stated categorically to me that he intends to accept U. S. military doctrine, organization and equipment exclusively. I, therefore, strongly recommend that an able officer be designated now to head up the group and be required to report here within the next few weeks. I would give him every assistance in setting up his headquarters, in establishing his group functions and in making appropriate dispositions of personnel and equipment to insure the continuity of American influence, prestige and effort above indicated.

5. It is my opinion that the initial authorization for the Army Advisory Group should total approximately 750 officers and enlisted men. They should be Regular Army personnel specially selected and particularly adept in staff organization and procedures and in the junior ranks with fine training capabilities. A proposed organization based on the strength of 750 will be dispatched to the War Department shortly.² If approval of this organization were received from the President and State Department, I believe that there should be a qualifying statement in the paper presented to the effect that subsequent recommendations for an increased strength may be submitted by the War Department in that it is not possible to determine at this time how the situation here may develop and to what degree we might wish to render military assistance to China.

6. With respect to the specific immunities, privileges and concessions for American personnel in the Military Advisory Group: In the first place the Generalissimo and his Minister of War in their initial plan submitted to me proposed in a large measure that such privileges be accorded American personnel. They did this all [on] their own initiative. Under the circumstances I do not feel, therefore, that these privileges are excessive or would be unacceptable to the Chinese Government. There are these further factors to be considered:

a. “Complete exemption from any form of import duty or taxation on goods to be used or consumed by the personnel of the group.” Comment: It is believed that such exemption should be included, insofar as it affects imports from the U. S., its territories and possessions. This exemption should cover personal and household needs of group personnel and their legal dependents. There should also be an exemption from income taxes and property taxes levied by the Chinese authorities. In other words, all that is asked is that the Advisory Group should be considered on a quasi-diplomatic status as is, we believe, the commonly accepted practice with military missions in other foreign countries. General Marshall thinks it important to make this particular point of view clear to Mister Byrnes.

b. “Exemption from Chinese jurisdiction for all group personnel, civilian as well as military.” Comment: In a country as unstable and politically corrupt as China, military and U. S. civilian members of the proposed military group, their families and dependents, should receive complete immunity from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of Chinese courts. U. S. military jurisdiction should maintain for legal and disciplinary matters. While the objections to such an arrangement are recognized, it is the most satisfactory arrangement for handling this mission problem and U. S. citizens who are asked to represent their government here should be entitled to this protection. If, however, this concession demands too much “face” of Chinese sovereignty the following is considered the minimum acceptable:

(1) All military personnel on duty with the mission and their families and household dependents and all U. S. civilians employed by the mission (the latter belonging in the category included under Article of War 2) should be exempted from Chinese criminal jurisdiction, except as to those cases where we request the Chinese authorities to accept a jurisdiction.

(2) Civilians, Americans or otherwise, not included in 4a [6a] above, such as servants, should not receive the exemption noted therein.

(3) Exemption from Chinese Civil Court jurisdiction should be granted only for acts or omissions in the course of official duties of group personnel. This personnel should include U. S. civilians of the category included in Article of War 2. It should be provided specifically that civil liability will not attach for acts or omissions, even if negligent, in the performance of Army Military Group duties, unless such acts or omissions are criminal in nature, in which latter event group personnel will become subject to civil, but not criminal, jurisdiction of the Chinese authorities.

c. “China will refrain from supporting armed forces (Chinese) not sponsored by the U. S. when such support would interfere quantitatively or qualitatively with the effectiveness or efficiency of the V. S. sponsored units.” Comment: Concur that this proposal suggests too broad a concession. Suggestion that this para be reworded to stipulate that U. S. advice, assistance and support will be limited to U. S. approved units. This condition will strengthen the recommendation of the Advisory Group designed to prevent the Chinese from dissipating their meager resources among excessive units.

d. “China may purchase military equipment from another power only after consultation with the Advisory Group.” Comment: Do not concur that this restriction is an excessive concession. It is considered reasonable and essential that Advisory Group be consulted as to the advisability of Chinese purchases of foreign military equipment to prevent the Chinese from receiving obsolete, unnecessary and odd-sized equipment, difficult to maintain, supply and replace.

e. “Certain preferential treatment for American commercial organizations in China.” Comment: While it may not appear on the surface ethical procedure to require certain concessions from the Chinese Government in return for assistance that the U. S. may give, I feel that we must definitely operate a quid pro quo basis. It is my conviction that we are entirely too generous and unrealistic in rendering assistance to other governments. The Chinese Government knows and expects us to have certain objectives in the Far East, political, military and economic. We are only deceiving ourselves if we approach the problem of continued assistance to China without protecting those American interests. One very cogent example that I have personally examined and know to be true. The American businessman is severely handicapped in this area by the lack of governmental action with reference to trade treaties with China. While we are vacillating, the British and Soviet Governments are supporting their business organizations in this area in consonance with their plans to assume dominant roles. The United States has advanced huge loans to China and has made sacrifices in treasure and lives during the course of the war to assist the Chinese. I have talked to many Chinese officials and businessmen and they want American capital here. They express strongly and quite frankly their desire to facilitate American business as opposed to British, French, Dutch and Soviet interests. I do not construe therefore agreements with China favoring Americans as preferential treatment. It is merely implementation of international quid pro quo. In talking to the President last October, I obtained the definite impression that he visualized a quid pro quo approach to international problems.

7. I am not completely in accord with the Secretary of State’s statement that the size and function of the Military Advisory Group could be construed as a projection of the U. S. military power on to the Asiatic Continent. Even if so construed, I do not feel that our country would be criticized in the premises. The Generalissimo has informed me most confidentially that both Soviet Russia and Great Britain have offered completely gratis the military assistance visualized in the American Army Advisory Group. The relationship between China and the U. S. the past several years as compared to the relationships with the other countries mentioned have caused the Generalissimo to favor complete cooperation with the U. S. Obviously there are political and economic reasons as well as military, for his strong inclination toward America.

8. General Marshall’s³ comments: The foregoing message has been read and discussed with Wedemeyer. I agree in principle with the Secretary of State’s views, with which Wedemeyer is also in accord, namely, that the Military Advisory Group should be materially reduced in strength. With regard to immunities, privileges and concessions, these were in part proposed, I am informed by Wedemeyer, by the Generalissimo and his Minister of War in their initial approach on the subject of the Army Advisory Group. Most of these immunities are those accorded as a matter of course to diplomatic personnel and this mission would be a very definite diplomatic implication or stamp on the part of the United States Government. The appointment of an officer to take charge of the Army Advisory Group is urgently necessary. I have come to the conclusion that Wedemeyer should not be burdened with this duty and, also, that for the present he should continue as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo. As the United States Forces, China Theater complete their task as assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, they can gradually be evacuated, [and] concurrently the Army Advisory Group will perform its functions as it gradually builds up to authorized strength.

9. Additional comments by Wedemeyer: During Secretary of War’s⁴ visit in this theater he expressed general concurrence with the ideas embodied in this message. He requested that this matter be brought to his attention when he returned to Washington for he feels urgently that concrete steps should be initiated to finalize the Army Military Advisory Group.

95. Commanding General, U. S. Forces in the China Theater and Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander of the China Theater (Chiang Kai-shek).
96. Telegram of January 8, not printed; it transmitted memorandum of January 5, supra.
97. See telegram No. 1505 of September 2, 1945, from the Ambassador in China (Hurley), Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vii, p. 546.
98. President Chiang Kai-shek.
99. General Chen Cheng.
1. Report of October 22, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vii, p. 590.
2. Telegram No. 22580, February 8, not printed.
3. General of the Army George C. Marshall, Special Representative of President Truman in China.
4. Robert P. Patterson.