Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume X

893.24/2–1846

The Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

Washington, February 18, 1946.

Dear Mr. Secretary: This letter provides the information which the President, by letter of 19 January,⁹ directed that the Secretary of War should furnish the State Department.

The total dollar value of lend lease aid to the Chinese National Government, which has already been extended since V–J Day, and which it is proposed should additionally be furnished before 31 October 1946 by the U. S. Army, is estimated to be $839,950,223. Of this, over one-half is for transfers made during the first two months after V–J Day. Of the estimated total, the Chinese have promised, or will promise under present prescribed procedures, cash reimbursement estimated at $130,023,539 upon presentation of a bill for maintenance items transferred after V–J Day; of this, it is estimated that $66,658,917 is for ammunition. Further, China Theater estimates that $5,500,000 of the total represents transfers physically made before 2 September 1945 but which paper shows as being transferred during November and December 1945.

This can be broken down to periods as indicated below:

V–J Day (2 Sept 45) to 2 March 46	$689,520,854
3 March 46 to 30 June 46	123,687,742
1 July 46 to 31 Oct 46	26,741,627

The chart at Annex “A” shows a breakdown of these figures by period, as between supplies and services, and as applied to the various programs of lend lease aid.

Information regarding the Chinese Army Program (39 Division Program) is attached at Annex “B”, and information regarding the training of Chinese in the U. S. and the Chinese Air Force Program is attached at Annex “C”.

Commanding General, China Theater presently plans to complete movement of seven Chinese armies to Manchuria by 1 September 1946, and to complete the disarmament and repatriation of 2,061,528 Japs (disarmed troops and civilians) from China (including Formosa and North French Indo-China but excluding Manchuria) by midyear 1946. He hopes to complete the disarmament and repatriation of 1,603,000 Japs (disarmed troops and civilians) from Manchuria by October 1946.

General Wedemeyer will not move additional Chinese troops to North China without specific instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, he has been directed to prepare plans for the reoccupation of North China by Chinese troops if this should be necessary and the figures shown against this program in Annex “A” for the periods 3 March to 30 June and 1 July to 31 October are estimated on the possibility that this operation will prove necessary. In such a case, the occupying troops will be diverted from Manchurian occupation missions, and no additional transportational expenses are expected; it would involve, however, the provision of additional supplies for the troops presently occupying North China, who are not now receiving logistical support.

In order to continue assistance to the Chinese and to meet Presidential commitments, transfers must be made after 30 June 1946 under the following programs:

a. Logistical assistance to the Chinese occupying Manchuria and possibly North China.

b. Training of Chinese in the United States.

c. Completion of the 39 Division Program and the Chinese Air Force Program, in accordance with terms to be arranged.

If it is the desire of the State Department to continue assistance to the Chinese subsequent to 30 June 1946, the expiration date of the Lend Lease Act, some sort of agreement must be made with the Chinese Government.

As regards the data set forth above and in the attached Annexes, you should realize that most of it has been prepared from estimates based on plans not yet firm. There will be changes as plans are revised, and as other developments permit closer estimates. You will be furnished these from time to time as they become available.

Sincerely yours,

Robert P. Patterson

[Enclosure 1]

Annex A

[Lend-Lease Aid to China]

1. The estimated figures shown on the attached chart were based on the following assumptions:

a. That initial issue and maintenance supplies already issued, and due in on requisitions from IBT,¹⁰ AFWesPac¹¹ and the United States, will support Chinese Armies in Manchuria through 30 June 1946 and that after 1 July 1946 minimum logistical support will be maintained until 31 October 1946.

b. That the movement of Chinese Armies to Manchuria will be completed about 1 September 1946.

c. That the entire cost of operations of liberty ships, under control of ComGenChina¹² and employed in the movement and support of Chinese Armies in Manchuria, will be borne by the Chinese Government, and that any fixed charges or rental fees and depreciation of ships will be a matter of future settlement between United States and Chinese Governments.

d. That all POL¹³ on Lend-Lease will terminate on 1 March 1946, at which time commercial concerns will take over such supply and distribution in China.

No charges have been included for the use of shipping under SCAJap¹⁴ which is being used in the repatriation of Japanese; but charges are included for Marine and Navy supplies and services, including those for Chinese troop movements and the disarmament and repatriation of Japanese since V–J Day.

2. China Theater records for the period 2 September to 31 October 1946 [1945] do not indicate the specific purpose for which items were transferred to the Chinese, and the figure for this period is therefore carried under the heading “Miscellaneous”. These records are now being recomputed in the War Department and a more accurate figure will be forwarded to you when it is available.

3. For your information, a flat charge of $2,000 per ton is made for transportation services intra China, and $1,500 per ton was charged for transportation over the hump. This is reflected in the “Service Charges” in the chart to this Annex.

4. The Chinese Training Program in the U. S. under Lend-Lease aid is limited to the training of Chinese Air Cadets. Estimated completion date of the last class, if present training schedules and shipping rates are maintained, is about 1 January 1948.

[Subenclosure]

Lend Lease Aid to China

		2 Sep–2 Mar 46		3 Mar–30 Jun 46	1 Jul–31 Oct 46	Total
		2 Sep–31 Oct	1 Nov–2 Mar
Movement & Logistical Support of Chinese Armies in Manchuria	Services	433,880,999.94	12,083,782.00	4,578,513.00	1,263,730.00	17,926,025.00
	Supplies		67,472,274.00	67,900,469.00	13,068,420.00	148,441,163.00
	Sub Total		79,556,056.00	72,478,982.00	14,332,150.00	166,367,188.00
Assistance to Chinese possibly Required North China	Services		None	None	None	None
	Supplies		581,546.00	3,865,300.00	4,831,600.00	9,278,446.00
	Sub Total		581,546.00	3,865,300.00	4,831,600.00	9,278,446.00
Disarmament & Repatriation or Japanese	Services		3,729,204.00	93,646.00	2,550.00	3,825,400.00
	Supplies		None	None	None
	Sub Total		3,729,204.00	93,646.00	2,550.00	3,825,400.00
Miscellaneous: Transfers in IBT; Transfer of Aircraft			157,058,902.00	44,257,838.00	None	635,197,739.94
Training of Chinese in U.S.		14,714,147.00		2,991,976.00	7,575,327.00 (To estimated completion date 1 Jan 1948)	25,281,450.00
Total		689,520,854.94		123,687,742.00	26,741,627.00	839,950,223.94

[Enclosure 2]

Annex B

Chinese Army Program (CAP)

1. By 2 September 1945, the 39 Division Program (CAP) was about 43% complete by tonnage in hands of troops, while a much larger percentage was already in stock piles in India–Burma Theater and China Theater. On and after that date, the transfer of supplies to the Chinese under Lend-Lease became permissible only as the Commanding General, China Theater decided that the supplies were required by the Chinese in their mission of reoccupying the liberated areas of China, but with the end of the war the changed tactical situation made possible a much more rapid distribution of the supplies which were required.

2. In order to provide necessary equipment for the Chinese armies which were moved to North China and Manchuria after V–J Day, General Wedemeyer utilized the CAP stockpiles available to the theater, on the basis that all the CAP equipment remaining in India–Burma and China Theaters was required by the Chinese in the reoccupation mission.

3. At the present time, the Chinese Army Program is not a fixed program, but is being used by General Wedemeyer as a guide for issue.

4. It was originally estimated that the cost to implement the 39 Division Program would be about $90,000,000, which included delivery of the supplies to India. At the present time, the total cost to complete the 39 Division Program would be $6,605,513. This is broken down by services in the chart below, which shows the actual status of completion with respect to the dollar value of the Chinese Army Program; the chart does not mean that 39 Divisions are completely equipped in some services, but that this comparative percentage has been transferred to Chinese troops.

	Percentage of Completion by Tonnage	Dollar Value to Complete
Medical	112	None
Ordnance	160	None
Quartermaster	40	3,957,144
Signal	142	0
CWS	64	2,102,210
Engineer	61	546,159

5. Commanding General, China Theater has been directed to record, for credit against any Chinese Army Program which may be approved in the future, the supplies now being transferred to the Chinese Armies for the mission of reoccupying the liberated areas of China. In this connection, it is pointed out that much of the supplies and equipment, which have already been transferred to the Chinese are being dissipated or expended in present operations.

[Enclosure 3]

Annex C

Military Training of Chinese in the U. S.

1. The training of Chinese in the U. S. was initiated as part of the program of assistance to China to modernize the Chinese Army, thereby making it more effective in the war against Japan. Initially the training in the U. S. was limited to individual technical training; the bulk of training being in Air Force specialties (pilots, technicians), crew training and training in lesser specialties was conducted by U. S. Forces in China and India. All cost incident to this training was charged under the provisions of Lend-Lease Act. All requests for training in the U. S. of Chinese were screened against operational requirements by the U. S. Theater Commander, and based upon his recommendations these programs were considered by the War Department. Under this program a Chinese Air Force of approximately 7½ groups was brought into being.

2. In January 1945 a survey of the training being conducted for the Chinese in China and India and the capability for conducting such training in the U. S. resulted in the transfer of training for Chinese Air Force from the theaters to the U. S. This change was based upon the more efficient training facilities that existed in the U. S. making undesirable the duplication of training installations in the theaters. After the termination of training in the theaters the objective for the revised schedule of Chinese training in the U. S. was the modernization and maintenance of the 7½ group program which had been partially implemented by that time. All Chinese requests were screened against this basic 7½ group program.

3. As of V–J Day there were approximately 2300 Chinese in various stages of training in the U. S. and approximately 1280 students in China who had been selected and earmarked to receive training in the U. S. At the cessation of hostilities the War Department put into effect an interim policy of the J. C. S. on U. S. training programs for Foreign Nationals. This policy provided that the training of nationals in the U. S. for war against Japan be discontinued as soon as practicable after the defeat of Japan. Those trainees undergoing training or having embarked for the U. S. were to be permitted to complete their training if the nation concerned so desired. In no case however were additional trainees to be shipped to the U. S. The effect of this policy was to continue training of the Chinese in the U. S. but to cancel any further shipment of students against previously approved schedules.

4. As result of the Presidential policy of 5 September on Lend-Lease, the Chinese were notified that training in the U. S. under Lend-Lease would cease on 30 November 1945 and subsequent to that date it would be on a cash reimbursable basis. This date for termination under Lend-Lease was selected after a review of the status of students in training, and after consideration of the time lapse for returning these students to China.

5. On 14 November the Generalissimo,¹⁵ in a communication to the President,¹⁶ pointed out that no facilities existed in China for training Chinese Air Force personnel. Chinese schools for this purpose were planned to commence 1 May 1946 but output from these schools would not begin until 1 May 1947. The termination of training in the U. S. before 1 May ’47 would seriously affect the Chinese Air Force; therefore, it was urgently requested, until postwar arrangements and methods of settlement between China and the U. S. are made, that the completion of training program in the U. S. and the required transportation be authorized. The Generalissimo stated that the Chinese Government would expect to bear the expense of this program under arrangements to be concluded. The President’s reply to this message (State Department Cable 1873, 19 November 1945)¹⁷ informed the Generalissimo that inquiry of his Chiefs of Staff revealed that arrangements have already been made to conduct the training of the Chinese Air Force personnel substantially as outlined in the Generalissimo’s message. This reply by the President was interpreted by the War Department to be a directive to continue Chinese Air Force Training Program in the U. S. and China Theater was so notified.

6. Under the above approval for continuation of Chinese Air Force training in the U. S., students presently in training are being continued to completion and first increment of approximately 300 students has departed from China; further shipments of students from China are scheduled to be made at two month intervals in increments approximating 300 each, until the last of the 1280 students to complete the program has been shipped.

7. With respect to equipment for the CAF, the Joint Chiefs of Staff has but recently approved an eight and one-third group CAF Program; this program envisages eight and one-third tactical groups with the necessary service, depot and other supporting units. At this time it is not possible to indicate the cost to the U. S. Government to provide the equipment for such a program; but when inventories of equipment now in the hands of the Chinese in China can be made, based on this new program, the cost of completion can be computed.

9. Supra.
10. India–Burma Theater.
11. Army Forces, Western Pacific.
12. Commanding General, U. S. Forces, China Theater.
13. Petroleum supplies.
14. Shipping Control Authority, Japan.
15. President Chiang Kai-shek.
16. See telegram No. 1973, November 14, 1945, 8 a.m., from the Chargé in China, Foreign Relations, 1945, vol. vii, p. 629.
17. Ibid., p. 638.