Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and General Chou En-lai at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, August 23, 1946, 11:20 a.m.
| Also present: | Colonel Caughey |
| Captain Soong | |
| Mister Chang |
General Chou: I had many talks with Doctor Stuart these last two days so did not make an appointment with you, but on hearing last night that you were leaving for Kuling I came to see you.
General Marshall: Dr. Stuart has given me a very brief outline of his talk with you. I saw him yesterday afternoon. During one talk the day before yesterday you were waiting at the Embassy. Dr. Stuart saw me again yesterday evening and told me again what had happened and it was his desire that I go to Kuling right away. So I arranged to leave at 2 o’clock this afternoon. My purpose in going is to secure the Generalissimo’s immediate agreement to designate one [Page 73] or two or more individuals to meet with whomever you propose, under the temporary chairmanship of Dr. Stuart, to discuss the organization of the State Council.
General Chou: With regard to this question, I have talked with Dr. Stuart twice and it seems that we have the same opinion; that certain points should be clarified. It seems further that the Government has not yet reached a unanimous opinion with regard to these points.
In the case of Doctor Soong, though he expressed a desire to have a direct discussion with me, in his conference with me he said that, in the first place, he could not represent the Government. Secondly, he merely wanted to have a friendly chat without bringing forward any fixed idea or proposal. I conveyed to him my own opinion and also mentioned the meeting of Doctor Stuart’s small group with regard to the organization of the State Council. He made no reply and it seems that he is uninformed on the whole matter. With regard to the overall question, he did not express his opinion. At the same time, General Yu Ta Wei in his talk with Doctor Stuart failed to state explicitly the Government’s stand with regard to the small group, nor did he state whether the Government had definitely dropped the five points demand or not. It seems that the attitude of the Government is still uncertain.
General Marshall: First, as regards Dr. Soong, I am more or less responsible for his seeing you. Dr. Soong has not been intimately concerned in the various discussions we have had in the past six months. It was not until the Generalissimo communicated through Dr. Soong with me when the Generalissimo was in Mukden that Dr. Soong was ever brought into the negotiations at all. Since then it has only been from time to time that he entered the discussions. But, as he is the head of the Executive Yuan and is deeply concerned in everything that pertains to the economic situation in China (which, of course, relates to local affairs), I thought it was highly desirable that he should have some immediate personal contact with you. I hoped that you two might come to a better understanding of each other’s view of the situation, principally economic. Dr. Soong had in mind a formal meeting with you, with me present. But I thought it was possibly best to have an informal discussion with you first. That, I think, is the condition under which Dr. Soong requested the interview with you. He left for Shanghai this morning sick with a high fever.
In Shanghai he is to meet the Assistant Secretary of War,91 a representative of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and Mr. McCabe,92 [Page 74] who are trying to settle the surplus property question.93 Incidentally, the War and Navy representatives came out here because a settlement up to this time has been impossible. Part of the confusion has resulted from War and Navy Departments demands on their property with the result that some of it is being shipped back to the United States. Munitions are not included in surplus property disposals to China; only machinery, motor cars, rations, medical supplies, etc. This is why Dr. Soong left for Shanghai today. Mr. McCabe and his delegation came here to see Dr. Soong yesterday but could not arrange a meeting because of your meeting with him. This discussion, together with his fever, may delay him still further in meeting with you and myself.
I might add for your casual information that the great difficulty about surplus property has been that an accurate inventory of the immense masses of materiel has been almost impossible due to the rapid demobilization of our troops and the evacuation of the various islands where this property has accumulated. Further, the War Department and the Navy Department have been drawing on it and shipping it back to the United States, UNRRA had a purchase right, and the Philippines had a purchase right. It has been a very complicated problem to decide just exactly what there was for the Chinese Government to purchase. That is what Mr. McCabe’s delegation is endeavoring to settle. And, as I said before, they brought a Navy and Army representative so as to avoid Mr. McCabe reaching a settlement out here and then having the War and Navy Departments disrupt it back in Washington.
Now, as to your other comment regarding the Government position in relation to the proposal Dr. Stuart made, in which I joined, of the creation of this small group to endeavor to reach an understanding which would permit the immediate organization of the State Council. This is our proposal which was made without regard to the military situation, in the effort to get something done immediately which might make other settlements easier of adjustment. In one sense it has no relation to the 5 military conditions the Generalissimo presented through Dr. Stuart to General Chou. In another sense, in the opinion of Dr. Stuart and myself, it presents a probability of a peaceful adjustment. What we are trying to do is get started with the State Council in the hope that as soon as agreement has been reached by the small group we can then find a quick basis for settling the military stalemate. The issue is to break this tragic stalemate and further development of a civil war. Therefore Dr. Stuart and I have turned [Page 75] to the proposition of a State Council. I will do all I can to find some basis for a settlement regarding the fighting, but my expectation is that an agreement on the question of the State Council would be the strongest influence I could find towards promoting a quick settlement of hostilities. Therefore, my hope is that we can get started with this small group and find an acceptable basis of settlement just as quickly as possible and with as few conditional arrangements as possible. Conditional arrangements in the past have been the cause of most of our grief.
General Chou: In my meeting with Dr. Soong, he mentioned that he had a meeting with General Marshall before the meeting with me. He said that he is not likely to hold regular meetings with me since he is too busy and he can only arrange informal meetings from time to time. He did not mention having a formal meeting with you present. Since he is expected to be back about Sunday, he can meet me next week with regard to the organization of the State Council.
It seems a very simple question to me because all the main problems have been settled in the provisions of the PCC with the exception of two points which are: First, the distribution of the Council seats among the parties; secondly, the reorganized government should proceed on the basis of an agreed party platform. That is the peaceful reconstruction problem. It can be said with certainty that the reorganized government would have no objection to committing itself to the joint platform. In case some changes are to be made with regard to its provisions, then a two-thirds majority will be required to make any alterations.
That implies that there should be a one-third veto power on such matters as alteration of that platform. No agreement has been reached on the specific terms governing alteration. One of the Government representatives suggested that a minimum vote for veto need not be fixed but simply arrange that in case the Communist Party would not agree to any alteration, then the transaction will not be passed, or else the Communist Party may withdraw. The Government would not raise that question again so I never feel sure whether the Government is still considering such a proposition or not. If this matter is left unsettled, it will be more difficult to reach a decision. But if there is good intention to settle the matter, it can be gone over in a day’s time.
It is also my idea that an agreement on the government reorganization would help a great deal towards the cessation of hostilities. On the other hand, cessation of hostilities itself is also a necessary factor for the successful reorganization of the Government considering that it cannot be expected that while the Communist Representatives are [Page 76] sitting in the Government, the civil war should be expected to go on.
In answer to the date factor, I perfectly agree with Dr. Stuart that it should be arranged as quickly as possible because the longer it is drawn out, the more general the fighting will become. I learned, reliably, that large scale fighting will take place in the next two to three weeks, as I mentioned in today’s memorandum to you.94 If we should in the meantime reach some basis of arrangements for the reorganization of the Government, then at least the fighting will not assume such large proportions. If the negotiations prove to be a procrastination, then the fighting will be further enlarged.
Of course, I never thought that the Government could fulfill their military plan for defeat of the Communists within two or three weeks, just as the plan to occupy the whole North Kiangsu has failed. At any rate the situation will become very serious and it would be extremely difficult for me to explain to our people that there is still hope in the negotiations. Since June, the Government has consistently been adopting delaying tactics. They brought forward one demand after another which were not acceptable to us. On our part, for the last four months, we did not raise any claim at all. It is my sincere hope that you and Dr. Stuart’s efforts will meet with success. Otherwise it would be impossible for me to explain that the Government is not using delaying tactics and is not planning for country wide civil war.
By the way, I wish to make a point on the contemplated gas warfare. I have learned that the Government has already sent up gas warfare equipment from Nanking to Hsuchow. Should it be conducted in that region, it will become a very serious problem. Even the Fascist countries refrained from employing such means in the last war. It would be a serious crime if the Government would use it for Civil War purposes. I can give you my full assurance that the Communists have no such equipment and would not use such equipment. It is almost the same thing as our having no airplanes, while the Government has made over 300 raids against Communist areas despite our protests. Such a move would only increase the resentment. I hope that when in Kuling, you will take this matter up with the Generalissimo. If Communist soldiers suffer from gas casualties, it can immediately be shown to the correspondents and will be known throughout the world. Of course, it might be difficult to identify tear gas effects and to my knowledge the major part of the gas warfare equipment is of the tear gas type. But if other gases are used, the damage will be still higher. General Chen Cheng95 is making [Page 77] plans for its use on all fronts and is now flying to Peiping to make preparations for the operations.
General Marshall: I would like to say that I am in full agreement with you that the prolongation of the fighting will increase the bitterness to a point very difficult ever to compromise and also will develop a situation which will be entirely beyond control.
I would like you to have the following in mind in connection with my efforts at the present time. There has always been a wealth of accusations on both sides regarding the wrongdoings and evil purpose of the other side but I have never experienced such a complete contrast in views of the situation as at the present time. The Government states its belief that the Communists are provoking the fighting and are using negotiations merely for delaying purposes to their military advantage; and you give me exactly the same statement of the case with the conditions all reversed. I have my own views on this which vary in different localities and vary as to certain periods, but invariably I am confronted with the repetition of each side of the claims of the other and I have to make the best of that confusion. My purpose, and that of Dr. Stuart, is to bring the fighting to an end. I have tried every method I could find and now have turned to the State Council. Up to the present time I had to confine my efforts to matters pertaining to military affairs. As General Chou knows, the Government, or rather the Generalissimo insisted upon certain conditions of a military nature, before he would consider the political aspects, including the issue of local governments in Kiangsu and certain other stipulated areas. Now I think I have prevailed upon him to agree to this meeting in an effort to initiate a State Council, and that is my purpose in going to Kuling today. I am equally anxious, with you, to have it done quickly so that once the agreement has been made and once the candidates have been nominated, we may be able to reach an agreement for the termination of the fighting. I agree with you that it is not conceivable that actual political discussions of a newly created State Council could proceed while fighting was still going on. My hope is that if we can find an agreement and can have the individuals nominated, then we can turn next to the settlement of the fighting. Certainly that is my objective and I will do my best to that end. This matter that you have brought to my attention in your memorandum today, I will refer to the Generalissimo.
General Chou: I merely wish to say the following with regard to the military situation. Of course sometimes the initiative has gone into the hands of one side and sometimes the other. Sometimes when the Government made attacks, then the Communists dealt a counterblow. [Page 78] Therefore, sometimes the military situation goes to the one side and sometimes to the other. I admit there is such a situation, but on two points there is a great difference between the attitude of the Government and ours.
The first is that, since April this year throughout, we can reach the conclusion that the Government has occupied many more places in Manchuria and China Proper than the Communist Army. Since January 13 the Government has occupied 59 cities and since June 7 over 20 cities. These are still in their possession. In addition they occupied over 3,000 townlets, towns and villages, while the places occupied by the Communists in the counterattacks are very much less than that. We have always held to the idea that the status of January 13 should be renewed in China Proper and the status of June 7 should be renewed in Manchuria, and that both sides carry out this restoration of positions. This is our attitude, while the Government merely asks for evacuation of Communist troops from the places taken after those dates. This is the great difference in the attitude of the two parties.
The second, and much more important, is that we have been advocating all the time for an unconditional truce, and without any condition of the military advantages at that particular time. The Government’s attitude is different. They attach conditional terms to the truce and they also choose to make suggestions whenever the situation was adverse to them. As you know, the terms put up by the Government are becoming more and more numerous from time to time. As to the time factor—previously they said they would enter into a truce as soon as Changchun was occupied by them. Later on they preferred to wait until the time is more advantageous to them. After these advantages occurred to them the truce would be turned into an armistice. I hope that you will have a fair view on this question, because this will be recorded in history. We have been advocating all the time for truce and we are willing to enter into it at any time, though there are many matters that have to be settled in connection with the truce. These matters can be arranged after the truce is declared. There is only one attitude thus far presented by the Government. That is, the longer the war lasts, the more places the Communists will lose. If that is their contention, it means they are determined to carry on with the war to the end. However I feel sure they would fail in pursuing that course.
The recent measures taken by the Communist Party as broadcast by Yenan and Kalgan are only aimed to put up a total resistance. This differs from the normal patient actions in this respect. The resistance will be conducted in all the places where there are Communist troops, instead of taking an entirely passive attitude. Also, [Page 79] the civilian population will be mobilized. It is of a defensive nature and there is no intention of striking out from the Communist areas or aim to overthrow the National Government. However should the fighting be continued indefinitely then the situation may undergo some change. By that time we may feel forced to wage a nation-wide war. Should that happen, that would be very bad.
As I told you at the last meeting the Kuomintang is contemplating calling the National Assembly without Communist participation. Should they do that, we will feel forced to call the Delegation Conference of the liberated areas. This is not our intention but we may be forced into it.
General Marshall: I have to make my arrangement to leave for Kuling. I am very glad to hear what you had to say. I will mention this subject (indicating General Chou’s memo regarding gas warfare) to the Generalissimo. I will also see if I can get the Government to go ahead with Dr. Stuart’s small group for the initiation of the State Council.
Meeting was adjourned.