Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume X

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs ( Vincent ) to the Secretary of State

[ Washington ,] January 24, 1947.

1. The establishment of the Executive Headquarters at Peiping was provided for in the truce agreement¹³ reached between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party as a tripartite agency for implementing that agreement, and this agency was subsequently entrusted with the carrying out of other agreements reached between the two Chinese factions. It is, therefore, indelibly associated with those agreements. In the light of the foregoing, it is now believed advisable to withdraw the United States Branch of the Executive Headquarters for reasons as follows:

(a) The recall of General Marshall and the end, at least for the time being, of the American mediation effort virtually ends the present usefulness of this agency. Its United States Branch has been under strong attack from the Chinese Communist Party for many months, and the Headquarters has necessarily become inseparably identified with the truce agreement of January 1946, which is now completely discarded, as well as with other agreements more or less abandoned.

(b) Neither of the two Chinese Branches of the Executive Headquarters gives any indication of seeking to utilize this agency for the purpose of bringing peace to China, but neither side apparently wishes to take the responsibility for abolishing this agency.

(c) The Executive Headquarters has for some time virtually ceased to function. Its field teams—the vital elements—have either been withdrawn from the field or, where teams are still in the field, there are no National Government representatives on teams in Communist areas or Communist representatives on teams in National Government territory.

(d) There seem to be no prospects for an early resumption of peace negotiations between the National Government and the Communist Party—the last attempt being the Government’s offer to send a special delegation to Yenan, which failed because of “misguided” Government publicity and excessive Communist demands (i. e., a return to the positions held on January 13, 1946, and the dissolution of the National Assembly).

(e) Retention of Executive Headquarters in anticipation of a resumption of negotiations would require the continued maintenance for an indefinite period of a presently ineffective organ and of United States Marine units necessary for the security and logistical support of the United States Branch and would raise the question of the possibility of the Headquarters’ ever being an effective instrument in view of its lowered prestige in the eyes of many Chinese resulting from its previous ineffectiveness and Communist Party propaganda attacks thereon.

(f) The withdrawal of the United States Branch of the Executive Headquarters on an orderly schedule would permit the evacuation of those United States Marine units now engaged in providing security and logistical support to the United States Branch of the Headquarters, thus removing an object of propaganda attack from Chinese Communist and other Chinese sources. The withdrawal of these Marine units, following the evacuation of the United States Branch, would be so timed as to prevent creating the impression that the Marines were being withdrawn as a result of propaganda attacks.

2. If the continued existence of the Executive Headquarters were based on the assumption that the presence of American forces in China was necessary for purposes of over-all strategy to assure a “foothold” on the Asiatic continent, this would constitute subterfuge on the part of the United States, since the original purpose of this agency was clearly defined as the implementation of the truce agreement. Therefore, the continued maintenance of forces in China through the existence of the Executive Headquarters might carry with it a definite liability from the standpoint of our moral position in that country without any accompanying compensating advantages of vital importance. The advantages of a so-called military “foothold” would be outweighed by the factors arguing against the continued maintenance of American forces under this guise.

3. An outline plan prepared by the concerned United States Army authorities in China for the withdrawal of the United States Branch of the Executive Headquarters envisages the completion of the inactivation and evacuation procedures for the United States Branch of the Headquarters during a period of 120 days:

(a) During the first 30 days, inactivation of the United States Branch of the Executive Headquarters at Peiping and of the Advance Section at Changchun and the return of the field teams and their related supplies would take place, all personnel to revert to the Peiping Headquarters Group for redeployment or for reassignment. Arrangements would be made for disposition of supplies and Communist Party personnel would be returned to Communist areas.

(b) During the second 30 days, disposal of Air Force personnel and final liquidation of property at the airfield at Peiping would be carried out by the Air Division of the Army Advisory Group, which would be given operational control of the U. S. 332nd Troop Carrier Squadron now serving as a part of the Executive Headquarters.

(c) During the final period of 60 days, a residual detachment of approximately 50 men, attached to and receiving administrative and logistical support from the Army Advisory Group, would complete the liquidation of the Peiping establishment.

4. The agreement signed by the National Government and Chinese Communist representatives on January 10, 1946, provided that Executive Headquarters should remain in existence and operation until this agreement should be rescinded by the President of the National Government or the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party after due notification to the other. When the decision is made for the withdrawal of the United States Branch, notification of intention to take such action should be communicated by our Ambassador at Nanking¹⁴ to the Generalissimo and through the Communist delegation at Nanking to Chairman Mao Tze-tung. At the same time they should also be informed that United States facilities will be provided for the return of Communist personnel to Communist areas and a deadline should be established for such movements.

Final action in this matter should await the early submission by the United States Army authorities in China of a detailed plan, which will be based upon the above-described outline plan.

J[ohn] C[arter] V[incent]

13. January 10, 1946, vol. ix, p. 125.
14. Dr. J. Leighton Stuart.