893.00/12–2146
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 9, 1947.]
Sir: I have the honor to report the reply which General Marshall had asked for from Yenan (see my despatch no. 305 dated December 2, 1946) and the consultations which have resulted from it.
On December 5 the following message was delivered to General Marshall:
[Here follows text quoted in memorandum of December 4 from Mr. Tung Pi-wu to General Marshall, printed on page 590.]
He and I agreed that this seemed in effect to indicate the desire of the Communist Party to terminate American mediation and indeed any further attempts to obtain a negotiated peace. For they must be well aware that these two conditions could not possibly be accepted by the National Government. It is worth noting also that they differ in part from the three published earlier by the Communist Party and confirmed by Mr. Tung Pi-wu as reported in despatch no. 305. The new stipulation demanding a return to the military dispositions as of January 13 would never be consented to by the Government and would in any case involve much wrangling and lengthy periods for the actual transfers of troops, transportation facilities being as disrupted as they now are in this country.
General Marshall then asked for my opinion and I advocated for consideration an American policy which might be summarized as follows:
- 1.
- The reorganization of the Government armed forces under General Marshall’s direction so as to reduce their numbers as rapidly as might be safely done while improving the quality through training and equipment. This would be on the condition that there would be no aggressive action against the Communist Party, but only defensive measures and the maintenance of local peace and order. Of course it would be extremely difficult to distinguish between attacking Communists and suppressing bandits or engaging in self-defense, but it was not impossible and would be immensely worthwhile. If the Communist Party really sought protection they could not have any surer guarantee of this than to have General Marshall in control of the National troops. As to whether they would continue their destructive sabotage and guerilla warfare or be contented with freedom from interference in their local administration—which seems to be what they really care for most—only time would tell. Conditions would probably vary with time and place. I thought, however, that such a procedure might do more to bring about their cooperation with the Government than anything else.
- 2.
- Insistence on drastic reforms in civil administration, especially in its local aspects. This was the only way to win ultimately over Communism. [Page 652] On our part it might involve advisers in budgetary, taxation and other fiscal matters, with a large measure of authority. It would call for tact, persistence and concrete information. But I felt by no means unhopeful both as to such assistance being welcomed, and as to the potentialities of genuine and lasting improvement. As in the military aspect of the task it would be a very great positive assistance to China and should make for stability in this part of the world.
- 3.
- The unceasing encouragement to the Communist Party to reconsider their present intransigent attitude. The door should be left widely and unmistakably open to them.
On December 7 Dr. T. V. Soong called to discuss the Yenan reply. Later that morning Mr. Wang Ping-nan came for the same purpose. I told him that we could only regard this as tantamount to breaking off negotiations. He admitted the difficulty but insisted that the Communist Party did really desire a peaceful settlement and with American mediation. I urged that in this case the best course would seem to be for both sides to agree to resume the conferences without imposing any conditions.
The next appointment was with President Chiang who also wished to know our reaction to the Yenan message. After discussing this, he spoke frankly of his conviction that the Communist Party issue must somehow be settled within the coming year because of the danger of Russian activity in Eastern Asia once she became less preoccupied with her western border problems. He felt that he had this responsibility not only to his own people but to the cause of world peace as well. He was convinced that the military strength of the Communist Party could be shattered in from six to ten months, and added that if he did not have good reason for this opinion he would wrong his people by recklessly adding to their hardships. He looked upon any further attempt to settle the Communist problem as hopeless, although he stood by his promise to keep the way open and to use all means to this end. He eagerly desired American assistance and believed that the larger issues at stake amply justified this, but that if this could not be obtained he regarded it as his duty to go ahead unaided. He asked me to request General Marshall to continue on as his personal adviser. I pointed out the impossibility of this and of any American help in the event of civil war. This left President Chiang in an unhappy quandary.
I have seen President Chiang several times subsequently and he has been having quite a struggle within himself and with his reactionary associates as to whether to employ armed force in an all-out determination to crush the military strength of the Communists or to follow our advice to limit his troops to self-defense and the maintenance of local order while putting all his efforts on constructive reforms and economic recovery.
Respectfully yours,