Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume X

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Memorandum by Brigadier General Thomas S. Timberman ¹⁰ to Colonel J. Hart Caughey, at Nanking

Pelping, 10 December 1946.

1. The increasing inactivity of Executive Headquarters in the last two months has created many practical problems in Executive Headquarters, particularly in the United States Branch. Efforts of the United States Branch to solve these problems have aimed to maintain Executive Headquarters as an active agency in order to preserve a working organization to implement whatever agreements might be reached by the Committee of Three.

2. However, in addition to the above considerations which have guided the day to day operations of Executive Headquarters staff, it has been necessary from the practical view point of the Director of Operations to attempt an evaluation of some of the broader aspects. It has been deemed essential to develop an estimate of the situation, even on the basis of a limited outlook, in order to be prepared, mentally at least, for any major eventuality. The dangers of this approach have been thoroughly appreciated and exploratory thoughts set out herein are those of myself and my personal staff alone.

3. The attitude of both major Chinese factions has a direct bearing on the long range problem. However, the intentions of the Communist Party appear to be the controlling element at the moment. An accurate assessment of their intentions and objectives is difficult because of their wide spread use of propaganda, which can be and has been turned on or off and reoriented almost at will without full regard for the truth. Nevertheless, press and observer reports and statements and attitudes of principal C. P. negotiators, have fallen into a general pattern which, in my opinion, supports the following hypothesis:

a. The objective of the CCP is complete domination of China, substituting CCP one party rule for that of present Kuomintang.

b. At the moment the CCP is hedging its position against all out N. G. punitive measures and at the same time realigning its own strategy. At this point the CCP high command believes that it must retain its military force, place the CCP in position to secure maximum Soviet support and still maintain the means for a political penetration of the Chinese Government. In this interim period they are uncertain whether continued long term participation in peace negotiations will best serve their ends so they are prepared to jump either way.

c. The physical isolation of the Shensi stronghold from other CCP areas in China, and from physical contact with the Soviets, dictates against its retention as the CCP capital. As a cover for their objective the CCP are believed to have publicized an impending N. G. attack on Yenan which may be based on more or less sound intelligence. Whether such attack develops or not the stage has been set for a shift of the CCP center of gravity to the North East.

d. Northern Manchuria offers the advantages of physical proximity to the Soviets and the location of considerable numbers of CCP troops. Contacts with many of the CCP areas of North China will be but little more difficult from Manchuria than from Shensi. The advantages of a shift of their center of influence to Manchuria are greater than the advantages accruing to the CCP by remaining in their present location.

e. Meanwhile CCP military forces in all areas which they now hold in China proper can continue to harass N. G. areas and lines of communications.

f. At the same time CP political forces in China proper will attempt to increase their influence with the people to the detriment of the Kuomintang by propaganda, by fomenting disorders in N. G. areas, and by instituting a modicum of local reform in immediate areas of CCP control.

g. Concurrently, efforts will be continued to gain a foothold in the Chinese Government. Initially this may be by continued token negotiation on the part of a few front men ostensibly controlled from Yenan Headquarters (or other center in the Shensi area) which will be retained as a facade.

h. If CCP interim efforts in China proper prove successful or if the Kuomintang Government begins to crumble from its own corruption, the avenue will be open for increased CP emphasis on China proper.

i. If, however, the Kuomintang extends its power through a throttle hold on the country’s economy and by virtue of increased foreign support (material and/or moral), or even by the outside chance of self imposed reform, the CCP will have prepared their own sphere of influence in Northern Manchuria in which to maintain themselves for the long haul.

j. The CCP undoubtedly realize the benefits that have accrued to them as a result of U. S. participation in negotiations over the past year despite CCP propaganda to the contrary. The CCP will continue to take every advantage of U. S. assistance.

4. The part which the U. S. Branch of Executive Headquarters should continue to play in this picture, of course, will be dictated by over-all U. S. policy in which it is believed the actions and recommendations of General Marshall will play a large part. It has been anticipated that he may ask for a recommendation from the U. S. Branch staff of Executive Headquarters as to the role that that organization should continue to play in the future. To reach such a recommendation it has been necessary to attempt an evaluation of factors beyond the immediate scope of Executive Headquarters in an effort to determine with what conditions we may be faced. In this process there have emerged three general alternatives open to the U. S. in China:

a. Continue our mediation efforts to bring peace to China through tripartite negotiation on present basis.

b. Throw full support to the present government.

c. Withdraw all support and mediation assistance from China and resume assistance in Chinese affairs only on a completely new and realistic basis.

5. The optimum solution is not found in any one of these courses specifically, but rather in a combination of the three, along the following lines:

As the first step both Chinese factions should be given an opportunity to resume sincere negotiation. Failing their acceptance of this opportunity, announcement should be made of immediate withdrawal of U. S. assistance. Only in this way is there believed to be an outside chance of inducing the CCP to resume negotiation in a sincere spirit. If neither Chinese side agrees to reopen negotiations the U. S. must, of course, withdraw and can do so in the knowledge that internal conditions in China will be no worse in that event than they would be if present ineffective negotiations are continued. If both Chinese sides accept the ultimatum, proof of their sincerity must be given promptly and unequivocally by their agreement to abide by conditions dictated by the U. S. Any subsequent show of insincerity by either side would be the signal for prompt U. S. withdrawal.

In the unlikely case that the CCP should accept the U. S. ultimatum and the N. G. reject it, it seems likely that sufficient pressure could be put on the N. G. to secure their acceptance also. If not, however, the U. S. should withdraw. In the more probable case that only the N. G. accepts the U. S. ultimatum, a counter offer by the U. S. to the Chinese N. G. might be in order setting forth the strict conditions under which U. S. aid would be furnished to China. Rejection of this counter offer should be followed promptly by an immediate U. S. withdrawal.

In the event that withdrawal becomes the only alternative, removal of every form of U. S. assistance to China must be made abruptly so that the impact will be felt. Without a sharp impact it is unlikely that the expression of desire for resumption of U. S. assistance will be sufficient to effect it on a realistic and therefore workable basis.

6. Based on uncertain indications of the generally unreliable press it is believed that initial steps along the above lines already have been taken and that the major uncertainties at the present time involve timing rather than the direction of subsequent moves.

7. Assuming that the above estimate of the situation is substantially correct, and based on a limited appreciation of the major factors involved, it is recommended that General Marshall’s withdrawal from mediation should be announced as a final act possibly from Washington. Moreover, termination of U. S. participation in Executive Headquarters should be announced concurrently or in close sequence in order to preclude unfavorable press speculation and the appearance that the U. S. Branch withdrew under pressure, rather than on the basis of a lack of desire for cooperation which has been demonstrated by the two Chinese factions. The physical withdrawal of U. S. personnel from China under these circumstances will, it is estimated, require up to 60 days. It is believed that personnel can be phased out in such a way during this period that if the Chinese Government extends an invitation for continued U. S. assistance in rehabilitating the country through inter-governmental cooperation rather than by internal mediation, a skeleton organization will be present to assist in performing this task.

T. S. Timberman

10. Director of Operations, Executive Headquarters at Peiping.