Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270
Minutes of Meeting Between General Marshall and Dr. Stuart at No. 5 Ning Hai Road, Nanking, December 5, 1946, 10 a.m.
| Also present: | Colonel Underwood |
General Marshall showed Dr. Stuart a copy of the letter just received from General Chou En Lai96 (See Encl 1). General Marshall asked for Dr. Stuart’s reaction to the letter. Dr. Stuart said it was unrealistic and that the National Government could not possibly consider the proposals set forth therein. He stated that the letter did not answer General Marshall’s specific request for CCP acceptance or rejection of American mediation. He said that the letter indicated to him that the Communist Party apparently did not want further negotiation.
General Marshall asked what course of action should be followed as a result of General Chou’s letter. Dr. Stuart recommended supporting the National Government subject to the following three conditions: a) Cessation of hostilities; b) Reformation of the Kuomintang; c) Reorganization of the government with the door left open for Communist participation.
General Marshall doubted that hostilities could be stopped unilaterally since the Government always claims to be fighting in self-defense. Dr. Stuart characterized army reorganization as the heart of the problem and predicted that under General Marshall’s guidance demobilization of Government forces would be possible even in the face of an active Communist army. He stated that in his opinion a smaller, well-trained mobile army should meet Government requirements as well as the present large, scattered, poorly organized army. General Marshall referred to the immense Government task of guarding long, vital lines of communication. He stated that this task alone required a large army and he was convinced that he could not achieve any demobilization of Government forces as long as an active, hostile Communist [Page 592] force was in the field and as long as the Generalissimo was bent on destruction of the Communist Party. He referred to the Generalissimo’s recent prediction that the Communist Party could be wiped out in from eight to ten months. In summary, General Marshall stated that the final disposition of the Communist army must be determined before any appreciable demobilization of Government forces can be accomplished.
General Marshall asked for Dr. Stuart’s opinion of the reason for the present Communist stalling tactics. Dr. Stuart felt that the Communists were shooting for total removal of U. S. assistance to the National Government. He felt that the Communists were gambling for high stakes; namely the removal of U. S. aid, followed by Communist success, partly through military effort, chiefly through political effort. He felt that if the Communists saw that the U. S. assistance was not, in fact, going to be removed, the Communists would change their tactics. At any rate, he did not think that Communist tactics would become aggressive in the near future. General Marshall then recounted his many efforts to break the power of the reactionaries in the National Government. He stated that this was the big issue and that the Communist Party had been playing directly into the hands of the reactionaries. Dr. Stuart agreed that the Generalissimo must break once and for all with the reactionaries and he, himself, felt that this was a definite possibility. General Marshall doubted this possibility, particularly since the Generalissimo is convinced that a policy of force is the only practicable solution as he completely distrusts the Communists and their purposes in getting into the government. He stated that whenever the Generalissimo makes a concession, he does so against his own better judgment and that in moments of crisis he is influenced by his reactionary associates.
General Marshall then referred to a conversation which took place at the Russian Embassy the preceding night following a dinner at which he and Mrs. Marshall were the only guests. He stated that the Russian Ambassador asked many searching questions, all bearing on General Marshall’s estimate of the situation in China. General Marshall decided to speak frankly in the hope that his words might be repeated beneficially to the Communist delegation. He emphasized the overwhelming Communist suspicion of himself, Dr. Stuart and the National Government; and he showed how this suspicion had defeated American mediation efforts and had played directly into the hands of the reactionary elements of the Kuomintang. He also described his action in recommending to the President his recall when he had failed to halt the advance on Kalgan. He said that the Russian Ambassador was evidently surprised by his frankness and particularly by his comments on the relationship between the Communist [Page 593] suspicion and refusal to negotiate and the purposes of the Kuomintang reactionaries. In parting, General Marshall told the Russian Ambassador that he had given the Ambassador his frank confidence, but that the reverse was not the case. He said the truth of the matter was that he was going down the middle of the road and did not care who knew it. General Marshall commented that he might have made a mistake in speaking so frankly to the Russian Ambassador, but that he regarded it as a risk worth taking. Dr. Stuart considered General Marshall’s tactics correct and considered that the Russian Ambassador would probably advise the Communist delegation accordingly.
General Marshall referred again to General Chou’s letter. Dr. Stuart reviewed his original analysis and added that the letter was tantamount to Communist acceptance of the Generalissimo’s challenge to settle the issue by force. Dr. Stuart suggested that the Generalissimo be told outright that if he persisted in settling the issue by force, United States assistance would be totally withdrawn. Conversely, if he reformed the Kuomintang and broadened the Government on a democratic basis, he could expect continued American aid in military and economic matters. He mentioned, however, that U. S. supervision would be necessary to insure the carrying out of political reforms.
General Marshall remarked that the Generalissimo had already been told emphatically that the U. S. would not back a campaign of force in any way. He asked what new Presidential policy should be announced in the event the Generalissimo follows the reformed course. Dr. Stuart indicated that we should continue essentially the existing policy for the sake of the nation as a whole, hoping that with a new democratic constitution and a reformed and reorganized government, the government of China would become truly more representative of the Chinese people. The policy should underscore the hope that the Communist Party would join in the government for the good of the common people of China. Economic support should consist of technical advisors and such physical assistance as appeared justified at the various stages in the broadening and the reformation of the government. The economic phase of the policy should be restrained but at the same time should hold out hope for China. With regard to military problems, the U. S. should stand pat on original reorganization plans, emphasizing the understanding that retained forces would not be used for civil war. He added that, although visionary, it was essential that the Chinese Army develop through American training and associations a new consciousness of responsibility to protect the people rather than to plunder them. The Army must realize that patriotism consists of protecting the people from within [Page 594] as well as from foreign foes. General Marshall asked what the Communist Party reaction to such policy would be. Dr. Stuart said the Communists would be surprised and somewhat dismayed; specifically they would see in the policy what they fear most, the strengthening of the political appeal of the National Government.
General Marshall stated that the Communist Party was now practically beyond our reach and had in a sense refused American mediation. Under those conditions he wondered what the Soviet reaction would be to the new policy suggested by Dr. Stuart. Dr. Stuart felt that there would be no Russian interference for several years but that the degree of Russian interference would depend largely upon the character of our statements to the Communist Party leaders.
General Marshall referred to the practical and political difficulties of getting American Government and public acceptance and understanding of a new policy. Dr. Stuart agreed that the new policy would produce many troublesome reactions and that we would have to ride them out, emphasizing that the Communist Party was being given an opportunity either to come into a democratic government or to demonstrate their lack of desire to cooperate. He stated that we would be strengthening a democratic form of government as against a Communist form of government, that we would be exchanging one party tutelage for American tutelage, that any other course would amount to abandoning China. He reiterated his conviction that the Generalissimo could be won away from the reactionaries and held away from them.
General Marshall stated that no new American policy could be recommended until we know the answers to certain questions such as 1) the Communist attitude regarding him personally, 2) the type of constitution adopted by the National Assembly, 3) the method of implementing that constitution, 4) reorganization of the State Council and the Executive Yuan, 5) extent to which or manner in which the door was being left open for future Communist participation.
- Supra. ↩