Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, The Far East: China, Volume X

Marshall Mission Files, Lot 54–D270

Notes on Meeting Between General Marshall and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Nanking, December 1, 1946, 4–7 p.m.⁸⁵

Nanking, December 1, 1946, 7 p.m.

The Generalissimo opened the meeting by asking me what was to be done in the present situation; the Communists not having replied to my question as to whether or not I continued to be acceptable to them in the role of mediator and also considering their refusal to participate in the National Assembly or in further negotiations.

I outlined at length the various developments which had led to the present situation emphasizing the fact, in my opinion, that the complete distrust of the Government in the good intentions of the Communists of last Spring had now been replaced by an overwhelming distrust on the part of the Communists of the good intent of any proposal of the Government towards a pacific settlement of differences. I commented on the fact that in the recent negotiations Dr. Stuart and I had found the Communists impossible to convince of the good intent of the Government or even our own integrity of action. However, I emphasized the fact as I saw it that even the most tolerant approaches of the Government, notably that of the Generalissimo of October 16th, were neutralized by military action—in the last case it being the attack on Antung and Chefoo at the same time as the announcement of the Generalissimo’s eight points. I stated that at the present time the only hope I could see to secure the cooperation of the Communists in the establishment of a democratic form of government would flow from the adoption in this Assembly of a constitution which was in accordance with the agreements of the PCC and this would be followed by establishment of the State Council with the seats accorded the Communists and the Democratic League and a bona fide reorganization of the Executive Yuan. I said that from a cursory examination of the constitution proposed to the National Assembly which had been made available only late the previous evening, it appeared that the document was in reasonable accord with the PCC. If that were adopted without some amending sentence which vitiated protections that all liberals were insisting upon and if definite steps were taken to put it into effect and the other steps referred to were taken, then I thought the Communists would be in a weak position if the Government sent a representative to Yenan inviting them to join in the procedure. I added that, of course, it would be necessary that the military operations cease except those of a defensive nature which must be for a bona fide purpose of defense and not by way of retaliation. I stated that Dr. Stuart had suggested the advisability of the Generalissimo, at such a moment, making a public statement, but on my part I thought it would be better if an approach to the Communists were done privately so that the usual arguments of unilateral action and propagandizing the world could not be made.

I then made detailed references to the precarious economic situation, the size of the military budget (about 90%), the fact that a virtual vacuum is being created in the assets of the Government to the support of the extensive military efforts at the present time and at the same time I was being pressed more frequently to favorably recommend to the U. S. Government various loans. I gave my estimate of what would happen if there was a financial collapse—that the Kuomintang Party would be imperiled and that a fertile field would be created for the spread of Communism. I also elaborated on the fact, as I see it, that the military commanders are wholly unaccustomed to any consideration of financial restrictions. The National economy is not a factor with them as it is almost conclusively with American Army officers, as was my preoccupation for years. I expressed the thought that the Communists were aware of this approaching crisis and that it entered into their calculations in the formulation of their plans. Directly opposed to this was the view on the part of leaders in the Government that the issue could be settled by military force with which I not only disagreed as a military measure, but felt that before sufficient time would elapse to prove the case there would be a complete economic collapse. I cited the example of the inability of the Government to keep the railroad opened between Chinwangtao and Tientsin since the withdrawal of Marines and the fact that I found that the sections of Hopei province which had presumably been occupied by the Government were still dotted throughout with Communist headquarters.

I summed up the situation with the comment that the Communists were too large a military and too large a civil force to be ignored; that even if one disregarded the brutality of the inevitable procedure they could not be eliminated. Therefore, it was imperative that the efforts to bring them into the Government should continue and the greatest care should be taken to avoid having military action disrupt the procedure of negotiations.

The Generalissimo replied in a statement of more than an hour. He expressed again his firm conviction that the Communists never intended to cooperate with the Government; that they were acting under Soviet influence; that their purpose was to disrupt the Government and to influence its foreign policy.

He referred briefly to the economic situation stating that while the situation was serious in the cities, it was a fact that the economy of China was largely based on the agrarian population and he felt that there was not the danger for about two years of a collapse that I had indicated. He described his past experience with the Communists and then entered into a detailed discussion of the military factors.

The Generalissimo stated that he felt that it was necessary to destroy the Communist military forces. If that were done there would not be great difficulty in handling the Communist question. He estimated that some eight to ten months would be required for this purpose. He referred in detail to the changed situation which had followed from his early contests with the Communists now that roads were available through the country to permit freedom of military movement. He was confident that the Communist forces could be exterminated in 8 to 10 months.

The Generalissimo then turned to Manchuria. He stated that the most valuable part of Manchuria to China was that south of Changchun and that he felt able to maintain the National Government in that region. He would refrain from an advance on Harbin largely because he felt that so long as he did not take that action the Russians on their part would take no action inimical to the Central Government of China. He discussed at length the Russian reactions and stated that it had been his experience, and it was his belief, that whenever the Central Government of China showed its strength the Russians acquiesced to peaceful arrangements. He cited the Russian reactions following the capture of Antung. He felt that so long as the National Government of China showed a strong hand the Russians would at this time cooperate with the Central Government in negotiations and arrangements. He expressed belief that the Russian intention was to avoid complications in the Far East so long as they were heavily involved in Germany.

The Generalissimo then referred to his age of 60 and that he no longer had the activity and energy he once possessed and he must soon terminate his role as leader, but that he felt that it was his duty to the Chinese people not to surrender this control until he had positively settled the Communist question.

The Generalissimo then expressed the opinion that I should consider that my mission was not exclusively confined to bringing the Central Government and the Communist Party together, that now that the Communists had displayed an unwillingness to cooperate, my role should be to facilitate the development of stability in the present Government of China and in the Far East. He felt that the U. S. should redefine its policy towards China in the light of the present situation, meaning evidently, in effect, that it should no longer be considered practical to consider the Communists as a working part of the Government.

The Generalissimo closed by asserting that he would do everything he could to bring the Communists into the Government by peaceful negotiations. That he would consider the suggestions that I had made and Dr. Stuart had made to this end.

Replying to his implication regarding American policy and the Communist Party, I briefly restated my view that you could not ignore this large group and the Government was not capable of destroying it, in my opinion, before the country would be faced with a complete economic collapse.

I did not discuss what to me was of vital concern and that was the collapse of the Kuomintang Party and the growing disapproval of the people in the character of government or misgovernment the party was giving the country.

85. Madame Chiang Kai-shek, as interpreter, and Ambassador Stuart were present. In telegram No. 1827, December 2, General Marshall reported the substance of his notes to President Truman and the Acting Secretary of State for their information.